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Abstract 
This dissertation examines how early-to-mid twentieth century American poetry is 
preoccupied with objects that unsettle the divide between nature and culture. Given the 
entanglement of these two domains, I argue that American modernism is “dirty.” This 
designation leads me to sketch what I call “dirty modernism” – a sort of symptom of 
America’s obsession with cleanliness at the time – which includes the registers of waste, 
energy, animality, raciality, and sensuality. Reading these registers, I turn to what I call 
“ecological objects,” or representations of how nature and culture come together, which 
includes trash, natural resources, inanimals, and tools. Undergirding my study is the 
notion of dirt. Dirt is potential junk, but something of value. It is this tension that I use as 
a heuristic for reading how American modernist poetry brings aesthetics and environment 
together. Drawn to things, American poetry is a receptacle for a wide range of nonhuman, 
inanimate objects, and modernist poetics has an ambivalent obsession with the 
persistence of this inanimacy. Through an ecocritical mode of analysis, one that 
understands that nature is not just green, I introduce dirty modernism with the Baroness 
Elsa von Freytag-Loringhoven. In chapter 1, I turn to William Carlos Williams’ 
relationship with waste and explore what it means to be a literary dumpster diver, or 
someone who analyzes debris with specific attention to trash-like forms. In chapter 2, I 
explore the energy humanities and show how natural resources inform Gertrude Stein’s 
poetry. In chapter 3, I theorize what I call the “inanimal,” which registers the tension 
between life and death through an exploration of animal objecthood in a wide range of 
modernist poetry. In chapter 4, I read the work of Claude McKay, Sterling A. Brown, and 
Jean Toomer to investigate a crisis around the interchange of African American workers 
and their labour and tools. Here, I explain how a sticky form of relationality informs an 
ecopoetics that provocatively brings together human, object, and environment in a 
racialized, American context. To conclude, I return to the Baroness and offer some final 
thoughts, which are followed by a coda on dirty modernism’s plastic futures. 	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Introduction: Dirty Modernism 
 
 
She wore trash. Adorned with tomato cans, celluloid rings, teaspoon earrings, 
American stamps, and a taillight, the German-born Baroness Elsa von Freytag-
Loringhoven walked the streets of New York during the early twentieth century 
(Gammel, Baroness Elsa 3). The Baroness is remembered as William Carlos Williams’ 
notorious lover, who attacked him on more than one occasion, but is otherwise forgotten.1 
Compared to Williams, she is at the margins of modernism.2 I start with this figure, 
however, because the Baroness’ turn to trash as adornment lays bare the gritty strain of 
modernism, one that understands how “the world is largely messy” (Law 3). In my thesis, 
I uncover the significance of this gritty strain through an exploration of what I call “dirty 
modernism,” which intervenes in the current scholarship around the intersection of 
American literature, modernist studies, and ecocriticism. For a nation obsessed with 
cleanliness,3 its artworks are surprisingly scuzzy.  
Dirty modernism demarcates the different ways in which early-to-mid twentieth 
century American poetry is drawn to and informed by the uncharacteristic, often nasty 
side of nature. As Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer put it, “[n]ature is so much 
filth” (253). With reactions ranging from admiration to abhorrence, modernist writers are 
preoccupied with the ostensibly unnatural object world.4 Although I employ an 
ecocritical approach to understanding this preoccupation, I do so by acknowledging that 
nature is not just green. Caught up in the romantic, pastoral, and georgic, a green 
understanding of nature – “the favored color of ecocriticism” (Cohen xx) – over-invests 
in sustainability. Typically, ecocriticism results in an environmentally oriented analysis 
of literature and culture that focuses on how nature is represented in a text and how 
humanity exists within an imagined natural world (xx).5 As a result, green readings 
reproduce “a split between nature and culture” despite “constitutive and intractable 
hybridities” (xx).6 To avoid reproducing this split, one also evident in the scholarship on 
modernism,7 I shift the very “nature” of the debate by being dirty, by not drawing any 
clean-cut lines between nature and not-nature. What I am calling dirty modernism 
unsettles such divides and, importantly, engages and depicts the entangled matter in the 
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mess that is modernity. Dirty modernism is, I argue, especially concerned with what I call 
“ecological objects,”8 or representations of things that straddle the supposed line between 
nature and culture,9 which, for this study, involves trash, fuel, inanimals, and tools. Well 
below the sizable “hyperobject,”10 and more specific than the capacious “quasi-object,”11 
an ecological object is a topos with traces of tension and dirty forms of nature and culture 
encoded or built into an entity existing within relation. An ecological object can be 
nonhuman, inanimate, agential, inactive, useful, useless, or any combination of these 
traits, while also being directly or indirectly in dialogue with an outside.12 Through the 
representation of ecological objects, then, a handful of writers show how nature is dirty. 
Specifically, the poetry of dirty modernism demonstrates an understanding of how 
“ecology for its part gets attached to everything” (Latour, Politics of Nature 21).   
Ranging from matter to morality, dirty modernism is “dirty” in all senses of the 
word. I focus on dirty modernism’s registers of waste, energy, animality, raciality, and, 
occasionally, sensuality. Whether erotic, earthly, or otherwise, dirty modernism is 
grounded in forms of tension because, as Mary Douglas puts it, “dirt is essentially 
disorder” (2). “Dirt offends against order” (2), she writes, and so, too, does dirty 
modernism. It registers an entanglement of entities that are precariously a part of, yet 
apart from, their relations,13 which not only reveals a sense of tension, but also shows 
how categorization is not as easy as it seems in modernism and modernity. That “there is 
no such thing as dirt” (xvii) complicates things, too, because that which is “dirty” is 
founded on a strained relation with its surrounds: “no single item is dirty apart from a 
particular system of classification in which it does not fit” (xvii). Here, dirt is just as 
much about form as it is about content. Take, for instance, Louis Zukofsky’s “To my 
wash-stand.” With its sanitary subject matter, Zukofsky’s poem comes off clean, but 
overflows with filthy forms. With its phallic “base” and “shaft” and yonic oval bowl, the 
poem’s libidinal energy comes from and to a head and spills out on the page: “a flow 
which / if I have called a song / is a song / entirely in my head” (52). The poem also 
makes a mess when the anaphoric apostrophe “To my wash-stand” is washed out and 
disappears after the fourth stanza. “To my wash-stand” is tangled, too, as it does not 
know right from left. With the words “right” and “left,” Zukofsky employs a “chiasmic 
structure” in the fifth stanza that produces a “totalizing admixture” (Jennison 183). 
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Similarly, the typography reveals the tension of a dirty, messy form. After marking up 
Zukofsky’s “To my wash-stand,” its knotted nature appears:  
To my wash-stand 
in which I wash 
 my left hand 
and my right hand  
…………………………… 
  To my wash-stand 
whose square is marble 
  and inscribes two        
smaller ovals to left and right for soap 
    
  Comes a song of  
water from the right faucet and the left 
  my left and my 
right hand mixing hot and cold [.] (52) 
With a prime meridian demarcating the poem’s left and right hemispheres, “To 
my wash-stand” ends up exhibiting a tension around the different orderings of the words 
“left” and “right.” When they first appear, for instance, “left” is on the right side, and 
“right” is on the left side. As the poem’s messy nature continues, as the dirt of “left” and 
“right” swirl around the sink and make their way down the drain, we are witness to one of 
many forms of dirty modernism. Zukofsky’s seemingly hygienic basin also recalls dirty 
modernism’s “sexy dirt on a pedestal” (Bochner 204) – Marcel Duchamp’s Fountain14 – 
which is, really, the perfect example of that which is dirty, as it is both lewd and “matter 
out of place” (Douglas 50).  
Although Douglas argues that there is no such thing as dirt, it still exists. We all 
know what dirt is when we see it. It turns out that the very concept of dirt is an unclean, 
messy one. Dirt is everything, yet nothing: what is dirty entirely depends on what is or is 
not around. This paradoxical tension points to how and what dirt is according to its 
context, which makes it an inherently ecological form, one that recognizes an entity in 
relation to its surrounds. Primarily reading things as things, as ecological objects, then, I 
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explore American modernism’s “vast, sprawling mesh of interconnection without a 
definite center or edge,” which exhibits a “radical intimacy,” a “coexistence with other 
beings, sentient and otherwise” (Morton, The Ecological Thought 8). Here, my project on 
dirty modernism discloses the “otherwise” with its ecological objects.  
Dirty modernism’s ecological objects are not exclusively American. But the 
objecthood of American natures is not unfounded. In 1925, constructivist Boris Arvatov 
noted that, “‘americanism’ includes both a positive side—‘Thing-ness’—and a negative 
one—alienation from nature” (127).15 Formed by a relation of separation, one of tension, 
American thingness is more natural than we would have expected. Perhaps 
unintentionally, then, Arvatov’s conceptualization of Americanism discloses a built-in 
tension between nature and culture, an entanglement of ecological objects. What I am 
calling an ecological object is also more pronounced in American culture because of its 
political landscape, which facilitates a “democracy extended to things” (Latour, We Have 
Never Been Modern 12). A testament to this is how Whitman – a poet of lists of things 
whose long shadow extends into the modernist period – uses “America and democracy as 
convertible terms” (The Portable Walt Whitman 396).16 Like Whitman,17 American 
culture, especially modernism, exhibits a “democracy extended to things,” which means 
that, “all things equally exist, yet they do not exist equally” (Bogost 11).18 While this is an 
ontological rather than a political argument,19 America brings these two areas together. 
The republic of America is tied to the “res” in “res publica,” which means “thing.”20 As 
Martin Heidegger explains, “[r]es publica means, not the state, but that which, known to 
everyone, concerns everybody and is therefore deliberated in public” (172), and, 
importantly, “[t]hat which concerns man is what is real in res” (173). Modifying the 
notion of democracy,21 I turn to what is “real in res” in America and explore a political 
ecology of messy things22 that emerges in and is registered by American modernist 
poetry, for “poetry is made of things” (Bruns, The Material of Poetry 79).  
In this regard, I engage the new materialisms23 to explore how they affect and 
compel an expanded way of reading modernism that considers more that just the 
human.24 This involves, for instance, contemplating “a vitality intrinsic to materiality as 
such” (Bennett, Vibrant Matter xiii). Here, the “point is not that we should think objects 
rather than humans,” but instead understand how “there is only one type of being: 
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objects” (Bryant, The Democracy of Objects 20). “As a consequence,” writes Levi R. 
Bryant, “humans are not excluded, but are rather objects among the various types of 
objects that exist or populate the world, each with their own specific powers and 
capacities” (20). In part, then, dirty modernism names an unacknowledged ecology of 
common and crass, animate and inanimate, organic and inorganic entangled things in 
American poetry. How these things are represented reflects the blurred and fraught 
relationship between the seemingly separate domains of nature and culture, a tension that 
is manifest in dirty modernism’s different registers. Digging up the dirt on modernism, I 
show how it is always already sullied and complicated by everyday things.  
To start, the Baroness helps us get our hands dirty by offering an illustration of 
the stakes of this approach to modernism. From 29 June 1910 to 18 April 1923, the 
Baroness spent most of her time living in New York, where she made her mark as the 
“first American dada” (Gammel, Baroness Elsa xvii, xix; Heap qtd. in Gammel, Body 
Sweats 331). Often living in squalor, her work was borne out of waste.25 In his 
misogynistic account of an encounter with the Baroness,26 Williams describes her place 
on Fourteenth Street close to the Hudson River where she lived for several years at “the 
most unspeakably filthy tenement in the city” (Gammel, BE 231; Contact 11). 
“Romantically, mystically dirty, of grimy walls, dark, gaslit halls and narrow stairs,” 
writes Williams, “it smelt of black waterclosets, one to a floor, with low gasflame always 
burning and torn newspapers trodden in the wet. Waves of stench thickened on each 
landing as one moved up” (11). Williams could not stomach it because he did not have 
the guts: “you lack entrails,” writes the Baroness to him in an undated letter, “you have 
all your life been disemboweled” (“Letter to William Carlos Williams” n.p.). Dwelling in 
debris, in modernism’s melting pot tenement living, the Baroness lived in a room full of 
ironware, tires, gilded vegetables, hungry dogs, celluloid paintings, and ash cans (Biddle 
in Gammel and Wrighton 796). Truly a scavenger of “Earthrubbish” (Body Sweats 127), 
to borrow from one of her poems, the Baroness made a remarkable mess in modernism 
with her grimy collages, assemblages, poetry, criticism, and performances.  
Take, for instance, the Baroness’ Dadaist “Performance Poem 2.” I turn to it to 
foreground the messy intersection of modernity, ecology, and dirtiness in dirty 
modernism. Here, the Baroness’ penchant for “a provocative but purposeful scatology 
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[…] radically challenges the purified rationalism of modernism” (Gammel and Wrighton 
803). “Performance Poem 2” reads:   
Merdelamerdelamerdelamerdelamerdelamer… 
de l’a     A     merique! (Body Sweats 89) 
With the poem’s pun on “merde,” “mer,” and “Amerique,”27 its use of epizeuxis, or the 
emphatic repetition of a word or phrase, and its excision of space between letters, we read 
of the close crashing waves of excrement inundating America. The Baroness’ poem 
presents a nation subsumed by a sea of shit. As she put it, “[b]eauty is ever dead in 
America” (291). Given its title, “Performance Poem 2” gestures to how this flood of filth 
took another form, too. 
“Performance Poem 2” is a fragment of Elsa, Baroness von Freytag-Loringhoven, 
Shaving Her Pubic Hair (1921), a film collaboration between the Baroness, Man Ray, 
and Marcel Duchamp (Gammel, Baroness Elsa xix). Although the film was ruined,28 an 
artifact of it remains. Included in a letter from Man Ray to Tristan Tzara postmarked 8 
June 1921, there is an image of the Baroness, who is naked (290). With her head shaved, 
pubes exposed, right arm up and bent behind her head, left arm akimbo, and legs forming 
the letter “A,” the image of the Baroness is a provocative piece of sexual iconography 
(290).29 Above, to the right, and to the left of the image is the following, respectively: 
“MERDELAMERDELAMERDELAMERDELAMERDELAMER,” “de l’a,” and 
“merique” (290). We can read “de l’a” and “merique” as “de l’Amerique,” but the 
separation of the two by the image also suggests that the Baroness’ legs articulate the “A” 
in “Amerique” and “Art,” too, because the Baroness’ “exuberantly bared body 
represented Dada’s provocation against puritanical America” (Reiss in Gammel, Body 
Sweats 350; Gammel, Body Sweats 350). Perhaps the “A” is for how America is “Anal” 
as well.  
Writing about the Baroness, Irene Gammel and John Wrighton unpack a “theory 
of Dada ecopoetics” (798), which gestures to dirty modernism. For them, “the Baroness’s 
poetry reinvigorates the integration of nature and art in her radical proclamations of the 
body as site and source of artistic production, informed by, responding to, and 
incorporating the congestion of filth, noise, detritus, and refuse that corresponded to 
modern urban life and its emergent technologies in the first decades of the twentieth 
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century” (798). As they note, Dada ecopoetics explores a number of themes, which 
include: the breakdown of the boundary between nature and city; the reclamation of 
rubbish through trash aesthetics; a multisensorial, immersive perspective resulting in a 
link between perceiver and perceived; an antipastoral aesthetic; and an extreme ecopoetic 
liminality, or threshold crossing (798). Gammel and Wrighton show that through 
“dismantling boundaries of the urban and rural, the animate and inanimate, the organic 
and technological, the Baroness projects a new kind of ‘nature’ into the city space” (798). 
Importantly, it is this “new kind of ‘nature’” that dirty modernism reveals. “Opening a 
new field at the intersection of poetry, ecology, and Dada” (798), Gammel and Wrighton 
investigate “a poetics of porous boundaries within a progressive and transgressive 
aesthetic” (799), which contributes to “reconfiguring modernism’s avant-garde and its 
relationship to the environment” (799). Dirty modernism is found in this “new field,” too, 
but it includes a broader literary history, one left unexplored until now. With an acute 
attention to dirty modernism’s ecological objects, then, I take seriously “the making in 
language of a place that is not exclusively ‘nature’ but which recognizes that everything 
including art, urban life, and modern technology, is part of the environment” (811). 
“Ecology permeates all forms” (The Ecological Thought 11), writes Timothy Morton, 
which are often quite dirty.  
Before we can “suck at the tit of Mother Dirt” (288), to borrow from Carl 
Sandburg, however, it is necessary to turn to the dimensions of dirt and dirtiness. My new 
“nature” is full of dirty ecological objects and their forms. Dirt is “matter out of place,” 
that is, it is that which leaks out, that which cannot be contained. Covering the earth, dirt 
sullies the world and registers a grittiness that, while often hidden, is, at the same time, 
everywhere. A permanent stain, dirt irks as the residuum. Dirt drives this dissonant 
remainder into both stuff and style to reveal that there is something rather than nothing. 
An activity, a force, dirt is always un-cleaning the world over. “Dirt,” however, “is also 
organic and fertile” (Kaprow 18), it does not just make a mess, but also affects what 
belongs to whom.30 Dirt is all around, even underground near things, like Anne Sexton’s 
“Earthworm,” where a “Slim inquirer” finds “a grocery store there down under the earth” 
that is “well stocked with broken wine bottles, / old cigars, old door knobs and earth” 
(505).  
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From sensual to sticky, then, dirt takes many forms. In addition to being matter 
out of place, dirt as energy is lively, empowering, and disruptive. Dirt also marks the 
tension around the thresholds and slippages between human, animal, and object, which 
often disclose problematic forms of objectification.31 With these associations in mind, I 
explore the degrees of dirtiness throughout dirty modernism’s different registers of waste, 
energy, animality, raciality, and sensuality. In one of his poems, Hart Crane writes, 
“preferring laxatives to wine / all America is saying / ‘how are my bowels today?’” (103). 
The American body politic is intoxicated with cleanliness, but if it is full of shit that gets 
flushed out, then where does it all go? We know that “the janitor’s poems / Of every day” 
make their way to the dump, which is “full / Of images” (201), to borrow from Wallace 
Stevens’ “The Man on the Dump,” but dirt does not stay hidden. Even if “One rejects / 
The trash” (202), forms of excrement appear and pile up. For instance, Stevens’ repeated 
use of the word “dew” and its variations (“dewed” and “dewiest”) mirror the 
accumulation of waste. Indeed, “dew, dew” (202) sounds a lot like “doo-doo.” In the vein 
of a new type of American studies,32 Dirty Modernism analyzes the nature of these messy 
moments. 
 Overall, Dirty Modernism aims to give a poetic, ecocritical edge33 to current 
conversations in material culture like thing theory, vital materialism, speculative realism, 
and object-oriented ontology.34 Responding to the so-called “object turn” with feminist 
theory,35 Sara Ahmed thinks of “subjects and objects as parts of worlds in which we are 
entangled; these ‘tangles’ make worlds too messy to start with things assumed as apart 
from other things” (Willful Subjects 211n4). With Ahmed in mind, I explore the 
ecological nature of “tangles” in modernist American poetry, tangles that exhibit 
emergent things tied to their environs to varying degrees. Indeed, poetry proves to be the 
place of matter out of place.  
 There is a long history of poetry and materiality, one that dates back to Aristotle36 
and, of course, includes the well-known poem by John Keats, “Ode on a Grecian Urn.” 
Modernist poetry foregrounds materiality, too—take, for instance, the title of Stevens’ 
poem, “Not Ideas About the Thing but the Thing Itself.”37 As Gerald L. Bruns notes, 
“modernist […] poetry comes down on the side of things” (“Obscurity” 175). Even now, 
poetry is rendered thingly as an object of allure,38 a causal, nonhuman agent,39 or a text-
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body.40 Despite this long history, literary critic Bill Brown chooses to write a “prehistory 
of the modernist fascination with things” (A Sense of Things 14) 41 with infrequent 
references to poetry.42 It is time to look at modernist poetry proper, especially from an 
ecocritical angle rather than an anthropocentric one.43 Even Douglas Mao’s landmark 
Solid Objects (1998) needs an upgrade. Mao argues that modernism’s objects are in a 
state of crisis, but focuses only on the side of production. Here, wasted things are passed 
over.44 More broadly, then, modernist studies have been itching for something dirtier and 
more ecologically aware.45 With the proliferation of new materials today affecting 
ecological crises, we need this analysis as much as modernist studies does. My project 
offers thought and perhaps action to a wasted world, one that does not need to clean up 
dirt per se, but understand the very dirtiness of entities and existence. Dirty Modernism, 
then, is divided into four chapters. The first one is on waste, and it requires some detailed 
explanation.  
 “When you think about where your waste goes,” writes Morton, “your world 
starts to shrink” (Ecology without Nature 1). Morton refers to the infrastructure of waste 
disposal to evoke our nearness to excrement. While pushed to the periphery, the truth of 
trash is that it does not just disappear.46 The repressed returns in a process that I call 
“litterality,” or the intersection of real, mimetic, and formal forms of waste. Litterality 
initiates a mode of analysis that takes seriously literalism when it comes to trash. But 
litterality also accounts for the ways in which forms of waste enter cultural production to 
varying degrees.47 Trash is flexible, liminal, and vague.48 The indeterminacy of garbage 
helps us to conceptualize trash as a threshold, one where aesthetic, environmental, 
ethical, social, political, and other domains intersect. Fast or slow, trash is always already 
transforming; thinking it as a threshold opens it up to both the actual and the virtual.49 
While some are hesitant to reconfigure waste,50 there is no reason why we should not 
experiment with refuse because, as Barry Allen notes, “[t]rash is generated where 
knowledge ends” (204). Instead of an anthropocentric reading of trash,51 then, we could 
follow Williams’ alternative way of thinking about it: “That which should be / rare, is 
trash; because it contains nothing of you” (Paterson 123).  
Chapter 1 turns to the work of William Carlos Williams to explore what it means 
to be a literary dumpster diver, or someone who analyzes debris with specific attention to 
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trash-like forms. Dumpster diving is the fulcrum for what I call the “waste commons.” 
The waste commons signals the way in which waste belongs to no one and everyone.52 
Trash ties us together because we all waste.53 Waste is not only in the commons, but it 
also creates them, if not another form of them. If garbage is liminal, a threshold – both 
inside and outside a system of value and exchange – then it marks a node in a dispersed 
material network. Something is operative within capitalism that is not capitalistic. 
Dumpster diving is a phenomenon that works against, but cannot exist without 
capitalism.54 This reciprocal relationship appeals to sustaining the status quo. But it does 
not preclude the possibility of change – change that is perhaps already underway through 
waste – given the power of the scavenger to affect the system. In fact, turning to trash is a 
form of critique, one that opens up the social sphere.55 As I see it, literary dumpster 
divers implicitly, if not explicitly, critique the hegemonic political economy.  
To be clear, capitalism produces an antithetical world. Here, scavengers, dumpster 
divers, and trash are in between, a part of, yet apart from capitalism. Scavenging as such 
is polyvalent, it does different things simultaneously, like “removing, processing, and 
reintroducing materials back into the system” (Rufus and Lawson 91) while also 
generating newfangled ways of knowing and living based on use and misuse. Within 
rather than without, here rather than beyond, the waste commons names an alternative 
political economy at work. Indeed, waste commons – a public material network – is 
always already coexisting in the social and constituted by litterality, or the actual trash 
that manifests itself in and through multiple forms and mediums given the liminal nature 
of waste. To engage the waste commons, the literary critic needs to be a dumpster diver, 
and America is the perfect place to dig, especially at the turn of the century, which is a 
period when the fundamental shift to “the empire of the ephemeral” was underway 
(Strasser 199).56  
 If “[e]conomic growth during the twentieth century has been fueled by waste” (15), 
then what else is a byproduct of “waste energy” (Williams, Imaginations 175)? For me, 
“waste energy” contributes toward the cultural production of poetry. Christopher Nealon 
argues that “the workings of capitalism are a central subject matter of twentieth-century 
American poetry in English” (1) where “matter” means “less a metaphysically substantial 
‘content’ lodged in the abstraction of ‘form’ than a question returned to through different 
	  	  
11 
topoi, in different forms, and different genres” (1). Accordingly, capitalism’s excrement – 
the remains of consumption – is the stuff of modernist poetry. If, as Williams writes, it 
“behooves a poet […] to pay close attention to what poetry there is in the world and of 
what it is made” (Embodiment of Knowledge 39), then it follows that the waste around 
Williams is the poetry with which he works.  
 Expanding on Williams’ “waste energy,” chapter 2 turns to the energy humanities 
in order to explore how resources inform Gertrude Stein’s poetry. With Whitman’s 
materiality in mind, I consider Stein’s energy consciousness and her petropoetics, or the 
relationship between art and oil. In this regard, I foreground how energy fuels Stein’s 
work and world. Reading Stein’s latent, yet manifest energetic materiality enables me to 
interpret her aesthetics as material relations that disclose the entanglement between 
nature and culture. Considering the energetic materiality of poetic expression, then, I 
explore representations of wood, coal, and electricity in Stein’s writing, which leads me 
to uncover the transformative, powerful, and sensual or erotic nature of energy. 
Following this, I discuss Stein’s petropoetics in a number of ways, which gesture to the 
importance of considering the embodiment and representations of energy around Stein’s 
car. 
 In chapter 3, I theorize what I call the “inanimal,” or inanimate animals, a necessary 
intervention into modernist animal studies that is preoccupied with the relationship 
between humans and animals. Instead, I argue that there is a specific kind of animality in 
modernism, one that involves the tension between life and death. It is this tension that I 
find and explore in the context of animal objecthood, or the interaction between animals 
and objects. For me, the inanimal is a representation and blurring of the point and time 
between life and death, which affects how the animal takes shape and form in modernist 
poetry. There are several different modes in modernism that evoke the inanimal. These 
include, among others, commodity and ethical rights, rendering, prolepsis, technical 
innovations, vitalism and violence, and animals and race. Turning to a wide range of 
poets that constitute modernism’s bestiary, I show how animals are objectified in 
modernism. There is, indeed, a material-semiotic relation in and around animals in 
modernist poetry that has been left unexplored, one that captures how an animal is object-
like, an object is animal-like, or an animal or object is transitioning from one to the other. 
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These tensions register the entanglement between nature and culture found in dirty 
modernism’s ecological objects. The push and pull between vitality and inanimacy leads 
me to my last chapter on the relationship between humans and objects situated in labour-
oriented environs, which reveals a racial register of dirty modernism.  
Turning to poets like Claude McKay, Sterling A. Brown, and Jean Toomer, 
chapter 4 investigates a crisis: the extent to which the interchange of African American 
workers with their tools troubles the reverence of labour. Here I argue that the notion of 
race as a problem in the twentieth century, following W.E.B. DuBois’ account of the 
colour line, is, in part, linked to the tense relationship between the representation of 
African American workers and their tools. We are aware of how the representation of a 
racialized labourer can be and often is objectified, but the concept of stickiness helps 
unpack the ecological dimensions of this process. Writing about stickiness, Ahmed offers 
a different way of thinking about it. Her form of stickiness foregrounds the relationality 
and history of contact between surfaces and signs, humans or otherwise. Drawing on 
Ahmed’s form of stickiness, this chapter explains how a sticky form of relationality 
informs ecopoetics, which provocatively brings together human, object, and environment 
in a racialized, American context. Looking at scenes of labour through what Bryant calls 
“black ecology,” I focus on a racial tension around degraded workers using tools who are, 
in turn, tools. The embodiment and racialization of tools foregrounds both the power and 
precarity of an objectified black body and its parts. This registers an uncanny form of 
alienation where the worker is not just a human or a tool, but both simultaneously. There 
is, I argue, a messy ecology of sticky black tools in modernism, one that discloses a 
rhetorical register of racialization involving objects. I follow my last chapter with a 
handful of closing remarks and a coda on dirty modernism’s plastics.  
 Having opened with the Baroness, we can start to see just how dirty things can be, 
and just how much there is to be done to think through modernism’s relationship to the 
environment. To borrow from the Baroness again, there is so much “Earthrubbish” to be 
sifted through. Indeed, the Baroness herself could not even dispose of waste. In her 
provocative, smart, and scathing review of Williams’ Kora in Hell (1920), the Baroness 
referred to the “Education of W.C. trash” (Body Sweats 310), where “W.C.” stood for 
“water closet” (1), an early type of toilet. The Baroness’ pet name for Williams is not just 
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a joke. While Williams the doctor is quite clean, Williams the poet ends up being rather 
dirty, trashy even.  
*** 
As a child, I was drawn to household wastebaskets. For whatever reason, I was 
especially interested in collecting toilet paper rolls. I recall making telescopes out of 
them. To this day, I am an avid thrift shopper and occasional dumpster diver. It makes 
sense to me that I would write a dissertation on dirty things. Frank O’Hara taught me how 
we are “all jumbled / together like life in a Jumble Shop,” one full of things that we can 
and should take seriously. It is never too late to look through a telescope made out of 
trash to see not only the world, but also the universe of things.  
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1 See Williams’ The Autobiography of William Carlos Williams (1951) (164-166; 168-
169).  
2 One of the earliest publications on the Baroness is Robert Reiss’ “‘My Baroness’: Elsa 
von Freytag-Loringhoven” from 1985. Since then, only about a dozen or so critics have 
written about the Baroness, and Irene Gammel has authored a majority of the 
publications. As early as 1993, Gammel has been steadily working away on the Baroness 
to great success. From a monograph to an archive to several articles, Gammel has made 
some groundbreaking inroads on the Baroness’s life and work by touching upon topics of 
intimacy, female sexual confession, sexuality, bodily performance, biography and life 
writing, New York Dada, (eco)poetics, and sound poetry (see Gammel 1993, 1995, 1999, 
2000, 2002, 2003, 2011, 2013). Other writers on the Baroness include Richard Cavell, 
Tanya Clement, Kerry Driscoll, Paul Hjartarson, Amelia Jones, Rudolf E. Kenzli, Linda 
Lappin, Klaus Martens, Adam McKible, John Writghton, Eliza Jane Reilly, Robert Reiss, 
and Suzanne Zelazo (see Bibliography). 
3 In Chasing Dirt (1995), Suellen Hoy traces a history of America’s pursuit of cleanliness 
starting in the early nineteenth century through to the 1950s (xiv).	  
4 As Bill Brown notes, modernism “has increasingly been recognized as an inquiry into 
the fate of the object world, an account of how objects produce subjects, and an effort to 
encounter or effect a kind of thingness” (“Materialities of Modernism” 282).  
5 In his introduction to Prismatic Ecology: Ecotheory Beyond Green (2013), editor 
Jeffery Jerome Cohen cites The Green Studies Reader (2000) for an overview of how 
green as such figures into ecocriticism (xxxi n8).  
6 Cohen gestures towards Bruno Latour’s “Great Bifurcation” (xx) and intimates that his 
work influences Prismatic Ecology (xxxi-xxxii n9).  
7 While Bill Brown acknowledges how modernism attempts to blur nature and culture, 
subjects and objects, people and things, he ultimately casts doubt on this endeavour by 
suggesting that we cannot “accept such knowledge as a fait accompli” (“Thing Theory” 
12).  
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8 In terms of nomenclature, there is much to be said when it comes to “objects” versus 
“things” (Bill Brown’s “Thing Theory” offers an excellent overview). Someone like 
Graham Harman notes how “Heidegger’s own distinction between ‘objects’ and ‘things’ 
is irrelevant” and thus “we can use the single term ‘object,’ simply because that was the 
term used by phenomenology when it first revived the philosophical theme of individual 
things” (“The Well-Wrought Broken Hammer” 187). Conversely, Jane Bennett prefers 
“‘thing’ or ‘body’ better as a marker for individuation, better highlighting the way certain 
edges within an assemblage tend to stand out to certain classes of bodies” (“Systems and 
Things” 231). Indeed, for Bennett, “the frame of subjects and objects is unfriendly to the 
intensified ecological awareness that we need if we are to respond intelligently to signs of 
the breakdown of the earth’s carrying capacity for human life” (231). This conversation 
between Harman and Bennett is but a sample of the debate. For me, “ecological objects” 
brings together the best of both worlds by specifying the nature of my interest with the 
adjective “ecological” while also alluding to the history of phenomenology with 
“objects.” Moreover, I want to hold onto “objects” because, as I note later, I agree with 
Levi R. Bryant’s notion of onticology in Democracy of Objects (2011) where all entities 
are objects (20); such a formulation greatly expands the parameters of critical thinking 
within the environmental humanities.  
9 My thinking about the relationship between nature and culture here is indebted to two 
thinkers, among others, namely, Donna J. Haraway and her idea of “natureculture” and 
Bruno Latour and his discussion of “nature-culture” (see Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: 
The Reinvention of Nature [1991], The Companion Species Manifesto: Dogs, People, and 
Significant Otherness [2003], and When Species Meet [2008]; and see We Have Never 
Been Modern [1993]). 
10 In Hyperobjects (2013), Timothy Morton’s writes about “things that are massively 
distributed in time and space relative to humans” (1). These hyperobjects are “‘hyper’ in 
relation to some other entity, whether they are directly manufactured by humans or not”; 
take, for instance, things like black holes, biospheres, the Solar System, nuclear materials 
on Earth, or even Styrofoam and plastic (1). 
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11 In The Parasite (2007), Michel Serres explains how a “quasi-object is not an object, 
but it is one nevertheless, since it is not a subject, since it is in the world; is it also a 
quasi-subject, since it marks or designates a subject who, without it, would not be a 
subject” (225). Elucidating Serres, Bruno Latour writes that, “[q]uasi-objects are much 
more social, much more fabricated, much more collective than the ‘hard’ parts of nature, 
but they are in no way the arbitrary receptacles of a full-fledged society. On the other 
hand they are much more real, nonhuman and objective than those shapeless screens on 
which society – for unknown reasons – needed to be ‘projected’” (We Have Never Been 
Modern 55). Smartly critiquing this, Ronald E. Day writes the following: “the ‘quasi-
object’ in its constituted/constituting duality is nothing other than that which is defined 
within a set of institutions and signs to play a central role in establishing such-and-such 
institutions and signs a domain over materials. […] The quasi-object is a semiotic marker 
crossing liberally heterogeneous institutions and ontological types that are conjoined and 
held in place by their sharing of a code or a series of codes for locating and defining an 
object and its functions” (82). 
12 In this regard, we could think of how “[a] poem is […] a nonhuman agent” (Morton, 
“An Object-Oriented Defense of Poetry” 215; see notes 33, 39). 
13 Or, to borrow from Levi R. Bryant, “one object is simultaneously a part of another 
object and an independent object in its own right” (The Democracy of Objects 214).	  
14 On April 9, 1917, the Society of Independent Artists met at Grand Central Palace in 
New York for a private viewing of the “Big Show.” Of the 2,500 works presented by 
1,200 artists, one piece stood out: a urinal signed “R. Mutt 1917.” Its title simply read 
Fountain. After much debate, the Independent’s committee rejected Fountain despite 
having claimed that the Big Show would be devoted to artistic openness. At the time, no 
one on the committee knew that one of its members, Marcel Duchamp, was the artist 
behind Fountain, which he had submitted under the pseudonym Richard Mutt. In 
response to the anti-democratic sentiment of the committee, Duchamp resigned his post 
on April 10—without, however, disclosing his intimate connection to the piece in 
question. Following this, Fountain found its way to Alfred Stieglitz’s Photo-Secession 
gallery at 291 Fifth Avenue. Having only been on display for a brief time at 291, 
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Duchamp’s readymade mysteriously disappeared. Regardless of its short stay on the art 
scene, Fountain exposed a new American materialism at work. For a full account of this, 
see Jay Bochner’s American Lens (2005). 
15 I am indebted to Bill Brown’s “Materialities of Modernism” for this quotation; 
however, it is worth noting that Brown does not quote Arvatov’s “negative” side of 
Americanism—namely, the “alienation from nature.” Bringing this notion into the fold 
helps us to think through the ways in which what I am calling dirty modernism 
circumscribes and includes ecological objects, too. 
16 Of course, for Whitman, democracy is not just political. “Did you, too, O friend, 
suppose democracy was only for elections, for politics, and for a party name?” (The 
Portable Walt Whitman 423), he asks. “I say democracy is only of use there that it may 
pass on and come to its flower and fruits in manners, in the highest forms of interaction 
between men, and their beliefs—in religion, literature, colleges, and schools—democracy 
in all public and private life” (423). Here, democracy has to enter into and encompass 
everything in order to be more than just a “cavil,” or petty objection (398). In this regard, 
Whitman puts stock in the poet as a voice of democracy. “Of all nations the United States 
with veins full of poetical stuff most need poets and will doubtless have the greatest and 
use them the greatest. Their Presidents shall not be their common referee so much as their 
poets shall. Of all mankind the great poet is the equable man” (Leaves of Grass 8). It is 
Whitman’s “American bard” (15) and the “poets of the kosmos” (18) that explore the 
inclusive nature of democracy. 
17 It is odd to extend democracy to include what Whitman himself calls, at one point, 
“dumb real objects” (Leaves of Grass 10). Elsewhere, however, Whitman does advocate 
deriving “inspiration in real objects” (25); in a version of “A Song for Occupations,” 
moreover, he writes about how “Your person and every particle that relates to your 
person” includes “Everyday objects” like “the housechairs, the carpet, the bed and the 
counterpane of the bed” (94-96).	  
18 Although back-to-back, Bogost does not fully follow Latour’s work (see Bogost’s 
Alien Phenomenology 6-7, 19). In fact, object-oriented ontology is at odds with actor-
network theory (see Graham Harman’s Prince of Networks: Bruno Latour and 
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Metaphysics [2009]). And so I juxtapose the two for the express purpose of gesturing 
towards and illustrating an alternative way of thinking at work here. 
19 Referencing Bogost, Levi R. Bryant explains his phrase “democracy of objects”: “The 
democracy of objects is not a political thesis to the effect that all objects ought to be 
treated equally or that all objects ought to participate in human affairs. The democracy of 
objects is the ontological thesis that all objects […] equally exist while they do not exist 
equally. The claim that all objects equally exist is the claim that no object can be treated 
as constructed by another object. The claim that objects do not exist equally is the claim 
that objects contribute to collectives or assemblages to a greater and lesser degree. In 
short, no object such as the subject or culture is the ground of all others” (19). 
20 For a thorough discussion and deployment of “res publica,” please see Bruno Latour 
and Peter Weibel’s Making Things Public: Atmospheres of Democracy (2005), where 
they note at one point that, “the prestigious phrase Res publica includes the word res, 
thing, and the pragmatic tradition has centered around pragmata, that is, things once 
again. Whether in Latin or in Greek, the same questions is raised: What would politics 
look like if it became a politics of things?” (249).  
21 Here, my thinking is in sync with Jane Bennett’s suggestion that “the scope of 
democratization can be broadened to acknowledge more nonhumans in more ways, in 
something like the ways in which we have come to hear the political voices of other 
humans formerly on the outs” (Vibrant Matter 109). Here, she explains how it is that the 
more and less than human matter in this context: “Theories of democracy that assume a 
world of active subjects and passive objects begin to appear as thin descriptions at a time 
when the interactions between human, viral, animal, and technological bodies are 
becoming more and more intense. If human culture is inextricably enmeshed with 
vibrant, nonhuman agencies, and if human intentionality can be agentic only if 
accompanied by a vast entourage of nonhumans, then it seems that the appropriate unit of 
analysis for democratic theory is neither the individual human nor an exclusively human 
collective but the (ontologically heterogeneous) ‘public’ coalescing around a problem” 
(108). 
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22 Here, I am alluding to Bennett’s subtitle to her book, Vibrant Matter (2010), that is, “a 
political ecology of things.” With special attention to materiality, then, Bennett defines 
“politics as a political ecology and a notion of publics as human-nonhuman collectives” 
(xix). For a detailed discussion of this, see Bennett’s chapter “Political Ecologies” in 
Vibrant Matter. 
23 I use this term loosely to gesture towards a surge of movements and modes of thinking 
over the past couple of decades, like actor-network theory, speculative realism, and 
object-oriented ontology. Also, the term “new materialism” has a specific history: “‘New 
materialism’ as a term was coined by Manuel DeLanda and Rosi Braidotti in the second 
half of the 1990’s. New materialism shows how the mind is always already material (the 
mind is an idea of the body), how matter is necessarily something of the mind (the mind 
has the body as its object), and how nature and culture are always already 
‘naturecultures’ (Donna Haraway’s term). New materialism opposes the transcendental 
and humanist (dualist) traditions that are haunting cultural theory, standing on the brink 
of both the modern and the post-postmodern era. The transcendental and humanist 
traditions, which are manifold yet consistently predicated on dualist structures, continue 
to stir debates that are being opened up by new materialists […]. What can be labeled 
‘new materialism’ shifts these dualist structures by allowing for the conceptualization of 
the travelling of the fluxes of nature and culture, matter and mind, and opening up active 
theory formation” (Dolphijn and van der Tuin 48). 
24 Here, I am, in part, indebted to Peter Sloterdijk’s “‘dirty’ materialism,” which is an 
answer to how an “exaggerated idealism of power […] undervalues the rights of the 
concrete” (105). However, I want to expand the scope of how dirty materialism’s “core is 
existentialism” (105) to include nonhumans and inanimate objects.   
25 Indeed, the Baroness used everyday refuse to make sculptures; take, for instance, the 
following description of one of her artworks: “‘under a glass bell, a piece of sculpture 
that appeared to be chicken guts imitated in wax’” (Williams qtd. in Gammel, Baroness 
Elsa 264). 
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26 For a discussion of Williams’ sexism and misogyny in the New York Dada avant-
garde, see Amelia Jones’ Irrational Modernism: A Neurasthenic History of New York 
Dada (2004) (10 ff.). 
27 “As for the merdelamerde pun on America,” writes Gammel, “the Baroness had a 
preoccupation both with merde and America. And while Man Ray would have known the 
meaning of mer and merde, the grammatically complex use of possessive article (de la 
and de l’) and the elegant French play would also suggest Duchamp’s possible hand in 
the pun” (Gammel, Baroness Elsa 463n7). 
28 Gammel explains this by quoting Calvin Tomkins’s Duchamp: A Biography (1996): 
“‘[W]hen they tried to develop the film themselves in the dark, winding it around 
radiating circles of nails that Duchamp had patiently hammered into a plywood disc, then 
immersing the disc in a garbage can lid filled with developer, the film stuck together and 
was ruined’” (Baroness Elsa 290). 
29 Gammel offers an excellent reading of the Baroness’ pose (Baroness Elsa 290, 292-
293). 
30 See, for instance, Serres’ Malfeasance (2011), where he argues that “appropriation 
takes places through dirt” (3).	  
31 For extended discussions of dirt, cleanliness, and hygiene more broadly, see 
publications like Katherine Ashenburg’s The Dirt on Clean (2007), Ben Campkin and 
Rosie Cox’s edited Dirt: New Geographies on Cleanliness and Contamination (2007), 
Rose Cox and company’s Dirt: the Filthy Reality of Everyday Life (2011), Victoria 
Kelley’s Soap and Water: Cleanliness, Dirt and the Working Classes in Victorian and 
Edwardian Britain (2010), and Michal Thompson’s Rubbish Theory (1979). 	  
32 In American Body | Politic (2010), Bernd Herzogenrath offers “another revision of 
American studies” (18), one that considers the “‘real,’ the ‘other’ of culture—materiality 
and the body, or what Deleuze and Guattari call the rhizomatic and ‘immediate 
connection with an outside’” (19). Herzogenrath’s focus is “in between culture and 
nature, representation and production, physical body and body politic” (19) in America. 
This frame is similar to what I am doing with dirty modernism's ecological objects, albeit 
less anthropocentrically, in that I am focusing on the aestheticization of inanimate objects 
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in American modernist poetry and, in turn, gesturing to the way in which the material 
“outside” often affects representation in an ecological fashion.  
33 Morton’s does something similar in “An Object-Oriented Defense of Poetry.” He 
notes, for instance, how “anthropomorphism is not as big a deal as some ecological 
criticism thinks” and, in turn, notes that “everything is itselfpomorphizing” where “all 
entities whatsoever constantly translate other objects into their own terms” (207). One 
implication of Morton’s point is that there is so much more to bring into the fold when it 
comes to ecocriticism, and it is with this in mind that I investigate dirty modernism’s 
ecological objects.  
34 For a discussion of thing theory, see Brown’s “Thing Theory” and A Sense of Things 
(2003). On vital materialism, consult Bennett’s Vibrant Matter (2010), which highlights 
“the material agency or effectivity of nonhuman or not-quite-human things” (ix). 
Bennett’s project advocates a vital materialism because, as she sees it, the “figure of an 
intrinsically inanimate matter may be one of the impediments to the emergence of more 
ecological and more materially sustainable modes of production and consumption” (ix). 
Thus, Bennett wants to “promote greener forms of human culture and more attentive 
encounters between people-materialities and thing-materialities” (x). For a discussion of 
speculative realism and object-oriented ontology (OOO), see, for instance, Graham 
Harman’s Tool-Being (2002) and The Quadruple Object (2011), Quentin Meillassoux’s 
After Finitude (2008), Levi R. Bryant, Nick Srnicek, and Graham Harman’s edited 
collection The Speculative Turn (2011), Bryant’s The Democracy of Objects (2011), 
Bogost’s Alien Phenomenology (2012), and Morton’s Realist Magic (2013). Much of the 
conversation and debate here revolves around and develops from the notion of what 
Meillassoux calls “correlationism,” which entails “the idea according to which we only 
ever have access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term 
considered apart from the other” (5).  
35 In response to Harman’s critique of genealogy in The Speculative Turn (2011), one that 
suggests that genealogy reduces an object to its history, Ahmed argues that the object 
turn and object-oriented ontology is guilty of an “object fetishism” that separates an 
object from its history (Willful Subjects 211n4). For her, this is an iteration of how the 
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“feminist critique of the subject is a critique of the concept of autonomy: of how the male 
subject is separated from the world (including the mother’s body) in order to represent 
itself as giving birth to itself” (211n4). 	  
36 If, as Aristotle writes, “art […] completes what nature cannot bring to finish” (Physics 
199a9-199a19), and if “a thing is more properly said to be what it is when it exists in 
actuality than when it exists potentially” (193b7-193b12), then aesthetics are intimately 
tied to and share a reality with materiality. Indeed, one feature of Aristotle’s notion of 
form registers materiality: he notes how “from art proceed the things of which the form is 
in the soul” and, subsequently, qualifies “form” by explaining that it means “the essence 
of each thing and its primary substance” (Metaphysics 1032a27-1032b21). See also 
Gerald L. Bruns’ chapter “Poetic Materialism: the Poet’s Redemption of Everyday 
Things” in his The Material of Poetry (2005).  
37 Cristina Giorcelli’s edited collection, The Idea and The Thing in Modernist American 
Poetry (2001) offers a comprehensive overview of the subject matter with special 
attention to the Objectivists. 	  
38 For Harman, allure is “the key phenomenon of all the arts, literature included” and it 
“alludes to entities as they are, quite apart from any relations with or effects upon other 
entities in the world” (“The Well-Wrought Broken Hammer” 187). In making these 
remarks, Harman works towards distinguishing what would be an object-oriented 
criticism from New Criticism, New Historicism, and deconstruction. In turn, he offers a 
“countermethod” that moves away from “dissolving a text upward into its readings or 
downward into its cultural elements” and towards the idea that “we should focus 
specifically on how it resists such dissolution” (200). Calling for “‘the death of the 
culture,’” Harman suggests that rather than “emphasize the social conditions that gave 
rise to any given work, we ought to do the contrary, and look at how works reverse or 
shape what might have been expected in their time and place, or at how some withstand 
the earthquakes of the centuries much better than others” (201). For him, then, “[w]e 
must be fully aware of nonconnections in any consideration of cultural influence on 
literature” (201). 
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39 In “An Object-Oriented Defense of Poetry,” Morton explains how “causality is 
aesthetic” (205) and, in turn, notes the following: “To study a poem […] is to see how 
causality itself operates. A poem directly intervenes in reality in a causal way” (206). 
Following this, moreover, Morton points out that a “poem is not simply a representation, 
but rather a nonhuman agent”(215), which leads him to suggest that, “poetry simply is 
causality” (216). 
40 In response to Harman and Morton, Bennett writes about systems and things and, in 
closing, turns to poetry, where she considers “a text as a material body” (232). For her, a 
text-body not only gestures toward “a something more than itself,” but also functions as a 
“distributive network of bodies” that includes “words on the page, words in the reader’s 
imagination, sounds of words, sounds and smells in the reading, etc.” (232). Explaining a 
text-body, Bennett writes: “Texts are bodies that can light up, by rendering human 
perception more acute, those bodies whose favored vehicle of affectivity is less wordy: 
plants, animals, blades of grass, household objects, trace” (232). 
41 In A Sense of Things (2003), Brown continues his exploration of how material culture 
affects the literary imagination, or how the “sensuous encounter with the physical world” 
yields “textual residues” (16-17). In this regard, he specifically turns to investigating “the 
imaginative technologies for lifting and redeeming” (17) what he calls “the material 
unconscious,” or “literature’s repository of disparate and fragmentary, unevenly 
developed, even contradictory images of the material everyday,” which illuminates the 
“shards of the past” and, in turn, reassembles them into a “recognizable form” (The 
Material Unconscious 4, 18). In A Sense of Things, then, a key question for Brown is, 
“[w]hat are the rhetorical strategies by which fiction works to convince us not just of the 
visual and tactile physicality of the world it depicts but also of that world’s significance?” 
(17). 
42 Granted, Brown discusses William Carlos Williams on several occasions in A Sense of 
Things (2003), but his conceptualization of the modernist poet is problematic. Brown’s 
modernist poet is a savior: “the modernist poet, whether addressing natural or 
technological objects, feels the need to rescue them – to extract them in their real 
nakedness […] – not from consumer culture so much as from rationalism, symbolism, 
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and language itself” (“Materialities of Modernism” 289). This overly redemptive frame 
of modernist poetics keeps things too clean; indeed, it does not consider how forms of 
filth and filthy forms affect poetic production, too. 
43 One example of Brown’s anthropocentrism can be found in the following quotation:  
“What first reads like the effort to accept things in their physical quiddity becomes the 
effort to penetrate them, to see through them, and to find…within an object…the subject” 
(A Sense of Things 12). Writing on thing theory, moreover, Harman notes how it is 
anthropocentric, or how it “shows symptoms of a correlationism in which the human-
world duet is always central” (“The Well-Wrought Broken Hammer” 193).  
44 Aaron Jaffe’s forthcoming The Way Things Go: an Essay on the Matter of Second 
Modernism (2014), however, offers a reading of the fate of modernist objects with an eye 
to how novelty becomes waste. 
45 There are, however, a number of publications that gesture towards these issues. Take, 
for instance, Colleen Lamos’ Deviant Modernism (1998), Lawrence Buell’s Writing for 
an Endangered World (2001), Jed Rasula’s This Compost (2002), Angus Fletcher’s A 
New Theory for American Poetry (2004), William A. Cohen and Ryan Johnson’s Filth 
(2004), Douglas Mao and Rebecca L. Walkowitz’s Bad Modernisms (2006), Mark 
Goble’s Beautiful Circuits (2010), Abbie Garrington’s Haptic Modernism (2013), 
Catherine Laure Frost’s The Problem with Pleasure (2013), and Joshua Schuster’s 
forthcoming The Ecology of Modernism (2015).  
46 Consider, for instance, the Great Pacific Garbage Patch: “that location in the Pacific 
Ocean where currents bring all the plastic, non-biodegradable flotsam of our global 
consumer society, where it bunches and groups together and is now said to cover an area 
the size of the United States itself” (Canavan, Klarr, and Vu 23). 
47 Elsewhere, I call this phenomenon “scrap poetics.” See Michael Sloane’s “Poetry, 
Garbage, Gift: Scrap Poetics in Contemporary North American Poetry.” In Literature, 
Rhetoric and Values: Selected Proceedings of a Conference held at the University of 
Waterloo, 3-5 June 2011. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2011. 
Print. 
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48 “Garbage is liminal,” writes Christopher Todd Anderson, it is “an evocative substance, 
both patently material and psychologically resonant” (36). Indeed, “[g]arbage is the 
formlessness from which form takes flight,” writes John Scanlan, “the ghost that haunts 
presence” (14). For Scanlan, garbage is inherently vague; he suggests that there cannot be 
a definitive notion of garbage as such (14). On this, he writes: “If this outline of ‘garbage’ 
makes one thing clear it is that there is no determinate and singularly applicable concept 
of ‘garbage’. Indeed, there is no ‘social theory’ or concept of garbage at all; nor is there a 
readily accessible literature that lays bare the intellectual parameters for a discussion of, 
or investigation into, the possibility that such a concept might eventually be elaborated” 
(14). 
49 Here I am thinking of Gilles Deleuze, who might offer a provocative way to read waste 
given the relationship between the actual and the virtual; as he puts it, “[p]urely actual 
objects do not exist. Every actual surrounds itself with a cloud of virtual images” (148). 
What this might mean for waste is worth exploring. Unpacking the relationship between 
the actual and the virtual, Constantin V. Boundas writes, “the virtual and the actual are 
two mutually exclusive, yet jointly sufficient, characterisations of the real. The actual/real 
are states of affairs, bodies, bodily mixtures and individuals. The virtual/real are 
incorporeal events and singularities on a plane of consistency, belonging to the pure past 
– the past that can never be fully present. Without being or resembling the actual, the 
virtual nonetheless has the capacity to bring about actualisation and yet the virtual never 
coincides or can be identified with its actualisation” (300). Although I will not get into 
this idea here, I think that reading waste through Deleuze’s conceptualization of the 
actual and the virtual would be productive because it would emphasize the way in which 
different states of trash or decomposition are actualizing waste matter; indeed, along the 
“plane of consistency,” we might even locate the existence and operation of what I am 
calling litterality, or scrap poetics. 
50 Scanlan is hesitant to rethink rubbish: “the act of conceptualizing garbage actually 
transforms it into something else” (14-15). “To repeat,” he writes, “garbage is neither one 
thing nor another, but instead is the remainder of such neatness, and this is one reason 
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why it could be a dubious exercise to reconfigure it, to bring it back into our thinking – to 
make it something to us” (16). 
51 Take, for instance, someone like Greg Kennedy who suggests that an “ontology of 
trash is ultimately self-exploration” (x). 
52 Part of my thought process here resides in the fact that it is not illegal in America for 
anyone to take trash from the curb; citing the case California v. Greenwood (1988), 
Strasser notes how “the Supreme Court declared that the borders of the household do not 
encompass the contents of trash cans, in a case that involved evidence found in a drug 
dealer’s rubbish. The Court maintained that citizens may not reasonably expect their trash 
to be private and that law enforcement officers looking for evidence do not need a 
warrant to search the trash” (7). Of course, 1988 is not a watershed year by any means, 
because the act of scavenging trash dates back to time immemorial. That being said, the 
codification of this phenomenon helps us to think through how there is, in fact, a sort of 
waste commons always already in existence. 
53 “It might be strange to call it culture, but a great and subversive work of art, an 
immensely complex collage, is made and remade every day on the street and everyone 
participates in its fabrication. Trash […] is something which people make collectively, 
and not quite inadvertently” (Stallabrass 407). 
54 “Scavengers needs capitalism, and capitalism needs scavengers” (91), write Anneli 
Rufus and Kristan Lawson. “Without your castoffs and junk, “ they write, “we’d have 
nothing to scavenge. And without someone removing, processing, and reintroducing 
materials back into the system, the capitalist economy would eventually run out of raw 
materials” (91). This phenomenon is called “scavenomics,” which they explain in more 
detail in the following quotation: “If there is overproduction, and everybody buys too 
much stuff, then sooner or later some of that stuff will be discarded; and if enough gets 
discarded, then people will see that the products they used to pay for can now be acquired 
for free through scavenging; and once a sufficient number of people become scavengers, 
they stop buying new stuff, and production will thereby slow down to sustainable levels. 
The opposite is also true: If everybody starts scavenging, then production will cease 
entirely because no one is buying; but if nothing is being produced, then the inventory of 
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scavengeable material will eventually disappear and there will once again be a demand 
for new stuff, and production will start up again. This process, in a nutshell, is how 
scavenomics works” (82). 
55 “To look to destruction for the positive, and for critique in garbage,” writes Stallabrass, 
“is one way of saying how bad things are” (417). Taking “rubbish as an allegory of 
contemporary capital,” Stallabrass suggests that trash “may be read as revelatory of the 
operation of capitalism” (417), because it exhibits the “symbolic pose of the commodity 
as a sham” (417)—that is, the commodity is “just stuff” (416). “When the commodity 
form is stripped away,” writes Stallabrass, “something may be revealed of the social 
relations which are immanent in the objects and which bind people and their fates” (419). 
John Roberts – one of Stallabrass’ detractors – notes that “[h]e replays […] one of the 
most routinised aspects of early modernism’s romantic-primitivism: the idea that the 
unformed, the grotesque, the anti-aesthetic can provide a utopian glimpse beyond the 
limits of capitalist order and linearity” (17). I do not disagree with this critique of 
Stallabrass’ utopic sentiment; however, I think that Roberts is overstating his case. It is 
unclear as to whether or not Stallabrass discusses trash to push beyond capitalism. On the 
one hand, he notes that “a certain liberation can be found in aspects of trash” (Stallabrass 
420); on the other hand, he ends with saying that “[a]ll this is not of course been to claim 
that there is some radical, popular power to littering” (423). 
56 Jeff Ferrell writes that, “America’s engorged [d]umpsters confirm what many already 
suspect: the culture and economy of consumption runs on waste” (28). Indeed, from the 
late nineteenth century to the early-to-mid twentieth century, attitudes towards, and 
practices of, waste and wasting changed (see Strasser 12-13, 15, 126, 199-200). “Toward 
the end of the nineteenth century,” writes Strasser, “disposal became separate from 
production, and Americans’ relationship to waste was fundamentally transformed. Trash 
and trashmaking became integral to the economy in a wholly new way: the growth of 
markets for new products came to depend in part on the continuous disposal of old 
things” (15). The rhetoric of the new consumer culture “transformed Americans’ 
relationship to waste and, in general, to the material world” (201). By 1929 it was clear 
that “the ideal of the durable and reusable was displaced by aspirations of leisure and 
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luxury, ease and cleanliness” (201), which, implicitly, required a higher degree of 
disposability. 
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Chapter 1: Dumpster Diving William Carlos Williams 
 
 
Williams is clean. He found the form of “old poetry” to be “inadequate” and 
“lousey with mediæval filth” (“Belly Music” 31). Williams dismisses old poetry as filthy, 
as what must be thrown away. For him, poetry is instead, “[c]lean, new! Clean as the 
tread of a locomotive wheel” (31). This fittingly reflects Williams’ healthcare 
profession’s demand for sterility.1 More broadly, Williams’ approach to aesthetics also 
parallels what Susan Strasser refers to as the “new ideals of cleanliness” (200) unfolding 
in the 1920s.2 Around this time, Williams is spick-and-span when it comes to content and 
form. In Sour Grapes (1921), “The Thinker” features the speaker’s wife’s pristine “pink 
slippers”: “My wife’s new pink slippers / have gay pompons. / There is not a spot or a 
stain / On their satin toes or their sides” (1: 167). In the same collection, we come across 
the succinct, sharp, and sterile “Lines”:  
Leaves are greygreen, 
the glass broken, bright green. (1: 159) 
Although far from fertile given the pallid “greygreen” leaves, this poem’s lively 
luminosity – the gist of its radiance – is refracted in the “bright green” broken glass, 
fragile fragments that form the very nature of a couple of “Lines.” For a poem that is as 
clean as can be, however, it is strange, if not jarring, that it contains waste. Although the 
poet declares, “I: clean / clean / clean” (1: 200), there is “a girder, still itself among the 
rubbish” (107), to borrow from Charles Reznikoff.  
This chapter suggests that while Williams’ poetry may be overtly concerned with 
cleanliness, a closer look reveals a fascination with waste.3 Williams writes, “I touch the 
words and they baffle me. I turn them over in my mind and look at them but they mean 
little that is clean. They are plastered with muck out of the cities” (Imaginations 175). 
This tension between clean and dirty in the creative process plays itself out as early as 
“Le Médecin Malgré Lui,” a poem published in 1918 in Poetry whose title alludes to “a 
Molière comedy based on a fable about a woodcutter who, to avoid a beating, pretends he 
is a doctor” (Litz and MacGowan qtd. in Williams 1: 490). It opens as follows:  
Oh I suppose I should  
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wash the walls of my office 
polish the rust from  
my instruments and keep them 
definitely in order 
build shelves in the laboratory 
empty out the old stains 
clean the bottles 
and refill them, buy 
another lens, put 
my journals on edge instead of 
letting them lie flat 
in heaps—[.] (1: 122) 
Williams is “spoofing the medical establishment” (Crawford 107), but this poem also 
aims to assuage anxiety about contamination while ultimately lingering in filth given the 
speaker’s deferred desire to clean (“Oh I suppose I should”). The hyperbolic ending 
evokes a blissfully pristine blank slate: “I might be / a credit to my Lady Happiness / and 
never think anything / but a white thought!” (Williams 1: 122). Left unresolved, this 
poem’s rusty, stained mise en scène gestures toward how waste informs Williams’ work. 
If there is any doubt, then one need only read “Construction,” published in Sparrow in 
1961, two years before Williams’ death, which finds the speaker arrested by a form of 
ejaculatory expenditure: 
on the sidewalk  
in front of the funeral  
home 
 
where the high 
school kids gather  
at night 
 
there was a used  
condom squashed  
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flat [.] (2: 376) 
Writing about a purged prophylactic, Williams includes waste in his work from 
beginning to end.  
Trash inspired Williams more than he would like to admit. As he put it in a letter 
published in 1946, “we live out of manure heaps” (“Letter to an Australian Editor” 12).4 
In 1916, thirty years earlier, Alfred Kreymborg’s Others published Williams’ 
“Epigramme” (1: 479), a poem that presents another “manure heap”:  
Hast ever seen man 
Dig gold in a manure heap?  
Then open two eyes 
For digging among these,  
Our fellow townsmen,  
I turn up this nugget. (1: 52) 
Williams’ poem raises a number of issues that are relevant to an analysis of waste matter 
as a trope that resonates throughout his poetry. 
What little has been said about “Epigramme” focuses on the question of what is 
valuable to whom through an antagonistic classism, evident in the alienated speaker’s 
condescension of his or her “fellow townsmen.”5 The supercilious speaker opens with an 
incredulous question: “Hast ever seen man / Dig gold in a manure heap?” Yet, the 
speaker is, in fact, “digging among” his or her “fellow townsmen,” too, which exhibits an 
engagement with and a concern for the commons. This seemingly strained social relation 
is stronger than it appears. The inclusive possessive “Our” in “Our fellow townsmen” 
brings together the blind and the seeing with what they share: waste. In “Epigramme,” 
waste recalibrates the social; it yields an unclean community and poetry, or “this nugget” 
of “gold.” Williams’ poem shows us how dirty he can be as his poetic coprophilia 
foregrounds a handful of filthy features: the shameful, yet aesthetically arousing 
phenomenon of sifting through feces; the identification with the hobo scouring scraps; the 
rejection of middle class decorum through a transgressed taboo; the desire to search for 
value in detritus; and the recognition of expired poetry that is no longer “good.” With 
regard to this last point, the poem’s retrieval of the archaic “[h]ast” – a scavenged scrap 
of the past – is a symbolic gesture. It indicates how Williams not only recognizes that 
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what is left behind or discarded still exists within a system of use and value, but also, 
paradoxically, acknowledges that trash is an aesthetic, aneconomic object.  
Named what it is, moreover, “Epigramme” is an epigram. Williams’ poem uses 
this genre’s form to foreground the permanence, yet ephemerality of waste. The word 
“epigram” means “inscription” (Mackail 1). Originally, inscriptions were in verse, and 
even with the popularization of prose over time, the metrical form remained because it 
was striking and indelible (1). Historically, inscriptions were engraved on monuments, 
and as inscriptions became epigrams – a short, concise poem with a pointed turn, 
witticism, or verbal fancy (4-5) – they retained part of their material history. A trace of 
what a monument is and means has impressed itself upon the genre: “the first part of such 
an epigram fulfils the monument’s function by elaborating a verbal symbol with its 
attendant mystery in such a way as to excite a curiosity to be satisfied in the last part of 
the epigram which explains that mystery” (Russell 283). In Williams’ poem, the mystery 
of a monument is transformed into a manure heap, which, surprisingly, reveals a nugget 
in the rough. While this pile of shit stands in for Rutherford, New Jersey, it is also a 
reference to the real monuments of trash in New Jersey’s Meadowlands, which are a part 
of Williams’ world. Here, we get a sense of the permanence of waste, yet, thanks to the 
ephemeral form of the epigram, trash is made out to be temporary, too. This tension 
marks Williams’ intimacy with waste, a relationship that I explore by dumpster diving his 
body of work. 
Williams digs into the matter of poetry and finds inspiration and aesthetic material 
among the very waste that he claims to reject. In this chapter, I employ the figure of 
dumpster diving6 as a hermeneutic for reading Williams’ writing. As a methodology, 
dumpster diving involves sifting through ostensibly useless traces of materiality in order 
to find an object of value, one that enhances an understanding of a text. Moreover, it 
considers how the act of creative imagination rehabilitates trash from its apparent 
worthlessness. For me, dumpster diving is a restricted form of close reading that focuses 
on marginal things that establish or reestablish a relationship with waste and wasting. It is 
also an approach that explores how a text engages with waste as a resource for creative 
production, which brings word and world, text and trash, together in provocative ways. 
Turning to thresholds, the critical practice of literary dumpster diving encourages the 
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process of confronting and examining levels of discomfort and disgust in response to 
trash, and, subsequently, considering how these affects influence textual analysis, let 
alone the work as a whole. And so dumpster diving helps to dirty rather than green the 
canon while suggesting that scholarship return to or uncover minor or unknown works 
and things. But dumpster diving is also about embracing contingency. You do not know 
what you will find. And if and when you find something, you do not know if it will work. 
Open to failure, the critic as dumpster diver explores the unproductivity of waste, too, 
and wonders what happens – if anything – when trash is just trash. In this manner, 
dumpster diving is an extension of ecocriticism. Exploring the gross rather than the 
green, dumpster diving analyzes representations of nonhuman, often inanimate, organic 
and inorganic things and how they function or malfunction in a larger system or network 
of material relations. Dumpster diving roots and rummages through dirty modernism, 
which reveals a grimy genealogy composed of gradations of fertility and sterility, vitality 
and inanimacy of unclean, base things in American poetry. 
For this reason, I turn to how trash is a material resource for modernist poetry, 
especially the ways in which the content and form of waste affects Williams’ writing. 
Dumpster diving him, I find and scrutinize forms of filth and filthy forms that are a part 
of an ecology of trash. In doing so, I argue that Williams’ writing exhibits a trash 
poetics.7 Williams’ trash poetics is not only influenced by the waste in his surroundings, 
but also involves an attention to how common and crass things are dirty in different ways, 
and how they appear in broken, fragmentary forms that produce messy lyrical collages or 
assemblages that often refuse the orderliness of rhyme. Indeed, Williams’ trash poetics 
are tied to a tension or ambivalence around waste. Reading Williams in this way, I take 
my cue not only from Walter Benjamin’s point about how “poets find the refuse of 
society on their street and derive their heroic subject from this very refuse” (Charles 
Baudelaire 79),8 but also from his friend, Theodor W. Adorno, who writes that “the 
poetic process declares itself to be a process of wastage” (261).9 Thus, I set out to situate 
Williams within the history of trash and the cultural artifacts that this history produces 
with the aim of exhibiting a facet of dirty modernism in the U.S., as revealed in his poetic 
practice. 
Drawing on the method of cultural materialism, this chapter begins with an 
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exploration of how waste makes its way into Williams’ life and work with a discussion of 
New Jersey’s polluted Passaic River and messy Meadowlands. It is necessary to 
investigate the material history of Williams’ local landscape and how he experienced 
these gritty geographies because his poetry is located within this important space.10 
Reading the intersection of Williams’ world and work, I delve into dirty modernism and 
discover how the poet reveals intimate engagements with and ambivalence about waste in 
selections from his oeuvre. The chapter concludes with my discussion of Williams’ 
connection with other writers and artists with regard to poetry, trash, and collage, which 
is followed by a reading that captures both Williams’ and dirty modernism’s trashy 
nature.  
In 1883, Williams was born in Rutherford, New Jersey, a borough in “The 
Garbage State,”11 which was “forever to be known as the open trash can at the foot of the 
great Big Apple” (D. Wheeler 57). In The Autobiography of William Carlos Williams 
(1951), the author reflects on the rural area where he grew up, a place with little to no 
sanitary infrastructure (279).12 Referring to his childhood home at 131 West Passaic 
Avenue, Williams notes how he had “cesspools in the backyard and outhouses as on any 
farm” (279; Neumann 98). Consciously or not, Williams’ exposure to filth at a young age 
stuck with him given the proliferation of trash in his writing. “Garbage. / Half the world 
ignored” (2: 86), writes Williams, but he could not ignore that half of the world given his 
surrounds. 
In November 1913, Williams and his wife Floss moved into 9 Ridge Road in 
Rutherford, which is a two-minute drive or a nine-minute walk from Williams’ childhood 
home and a three-minute drive or a nineteen-minute walk from what he called “the vilest 
swillhole in christendom, the Passaic River” (AG 195; Ahearn 20; “Rutherford, New 
Jersey”). During his life, Williams did not stray far from what he called a “stink hole” (6) 
in his short story, “Life Along the Passaic River” (1938). With waste nearby, Williams 
could not ignore it; his olfactory descriptions were not inaccurate. As a result of the 
population increase at the turn of the century, the Passaic Valley – from the Great Falls at 
Paterson to below Newark – yielded seventy million gallons of sewage discharge daily, 
which “constituted a public nuisance, a health menace, and a growing threat to property 
interests” (Benidickson 224). The area was known for its odors: carrying untreated 
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sewage, filth, and industrial waste, the Passaic River’s strong tidal flows led to stagnation 
(Revell 131). In “the warmer months of 1899, conditions reminiscent of London’s Great 
Stink compelled residents living up to half a mile from the Passaic shore to close their 
windows against the stench; homes closer to the river were virtually uninhabitable” 
(Benidickson 225).13 Williams could not avoid the stench from “[t]he Passaic, that filthy 
river” (1: 34), as he put it in his poem “The Wanderer: A Rococo Study.”  
In March 1914, Williams published “The Wanderer” in The Egoist, and a revised 
version of it appears in Al Que Quiere! (1917) (1: 477). Referred to as his “artistic 
coming-of-age,” “The Wanderer” consists of seven subtitled sections exhibiting aesthetic 
religiosity, pseudo-biblical rhetoric, his grandmother Emily Dickinson Wellcome as a 
muse, and a “laboratory of styles” ranging from “comic bombast” to “earnest prophecy” 
to “hortatory romantic sentiments” (Leibowitz 31-33). “The climax of this peculiar poem 
is the poet’s baptismal immersion in the filthy waters of the Passaic River” (33), notes 
Herbert Leibowitz. Here is the apex:  
Then the river began to enter my heart 
Eddying back cool and limpid 
Clear to the beginning of days!  
But with the rebound it leaped again forward— 
Muddy then black and shrunken 
Till I felt the utter depth of its filthiness,14 
The vile breadth of its degradation 
And sank down knowing this was me now. (Williams 1: 35) 
“How shall I be a mirror to this modernity?” (1: 28), asks the speaker at the outset of 
“The Wanderer.” Although not explicitly answered, we can take his or her dirty baptism 
– one Williams experienced, too, having plunged into the Passaic15 – as a commitment to 
contact with the world.16 Indeed, the environs have changed since Thomas Ward’s idyllic 
antebellum collection Passaic, a Group of Poems Touching that River (1842), which 
references the “clear streams” (22) of the river. After the Civil War, as Martin V. Melosi 
notes, the Passaic river became “a classic illustration of how factories defiled their 
environment” (Effluent America 27).17 The pervasive pollution of the Passaic at the turn 
of the century and beyond indicates how much the local waterway was littered with 
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industrial waste. With the messy Meadowlands nearby, too, domestic debris hit close to 
home for Williams, for at “one point very recently in its history the Meadowlands was the 
largest dump in the world” (Sullivan 16).  
The Meadowlands were infamous: for three hundred years – since European 
settlement18 – the Meadowlands were treated like trash, which is uncannily on par with 
how they were first and foremost nature’s junkyard.19 The Meadowlands were regarded 
as “‘wastelands’”: “[t]hey were viewed as unpleasant, unhealthy, unproductive places 
that ought to be ‘improved’ out of existence as rapidly as possible” (Marshall 6). In 1867, 
a journalist wrote that the Meadowlands were “blurs upon the fair face of [n]ature” and 
“worthless” (qtd. in Marshall 6).  Overlooking how the Meadowlands function as a 
“hydrological kidney” (Sullivan 16),20 this journalist saw nothing but an eyesore. Surely, 
this was Williams’ vast, grey desolate field (1: 150). Exacerbating this eyesore, the 
Meadowlands became an actual wasteland. In 1870, the Meadowlands’ unnatural nature 
was appropriated for what would be “‘a century of waste disposal’” (The Hackensack 
Meadowlands Comprehensive Land Use Plan qtd. in McGurty 34).21 
In 1907, a federal engineer who surveyed the Meadowlands declared that the 
“‘marsh in its present condition is not only worthless, but is a detriment to public health 
and a nuisance to the residents of the adjacent upland’” (Marshall 7). Land reclamation 
proposals treated the Meadowlands like a receptacle. Developers suggested technologies 
of dredging and filling in that would use fodder from rivers, bays, excavation and 
construction debris, and municipal trash (10). In the early 1900s, development actually 
began: companies started to transform land between the mouth of the Passaic and 
Hackensack Rivers using fill that included “garbage transported in barges from New 
York City” (11, 13).22 While the Newark Meadowlands were filled in between 1914 and 
1974, the Hackensack Meadowlands were left undeveloped for some time (11).23 But this 
did not mean that they were dump lands in waiting. “By the mid-20th century,” writes 
Stephen Marshall, “even garbage not being used for land-making projects was brought to 
the Meadowlands” (13). “It was simply deposited in open dumps, and later, in sanitary 
landfills” (13), he adds, which led to the mere “disposal of garbage in a manner that 
simply polluted” (13).24 It is important to explain the difference between an “open dump” 
and a “sanitary landfill” to understand how Williams came across waste. In an open 
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dump, municipal solid waste is deposited in or on a pre-existing excavation, a piece of 
unused land, or a hillside, and it neither separates waste from soil or rock strata nor 
covers the refuse to avoid or protect against odors, scavengers, or weather of all sorts 
(Blight 470). Conversely, a sanitary landfill is situated on a sealed base and, in turn, 
covered with a drainage system that collects seepage emanating from the waste (470). 
Early on, “sanitary landfills were layered: garbage was covered with ashes, street 
sweepings, rubbish, or dirt; then another layer of garbage; and so forth” (Melosi, The 
Sanitary City 162). In the history of sanitary landfills in America, there were attempts to 
implement them in the 1910s in Seattle, New Orleans, and Davenport, Iowa, but they 
were not really employed until after World War II; by the end of 1945, for instance, 
nearly one hundred cities in America had adopted the sanitary landfill (127, 162-163).25 
Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, then, from open dump to sanitary 
landfill, garbage was dumped in the Meadowlands, making messy monuments very 
visible.26 It makes sense why Eileen McGurty notes how it “had become impossible to 
think about the Jersey Meadowlands without thinking first and foremost about garbage” 
(31).27 Importantly, the Meadowlands were basically in Williams’ backyard.28 Given his 
fondness for walking,29 he encountered them. 
To get a sense of what Williams witnessed, we need to turn to one of his 
excursions. On 2 January 1921, for the first time, Williams encountered Kenneth Burke 
in what Matthew Josephson referred to as “the great swamp” (75; East xiii). Burke, 
Josephson, and Robert McAlmon spent “a Sunday with Williams in the New Jersey 
countryside” (Josephson 72); Josephson describes the surrounds from their “long walk” 
(73) in the following passage:  
We had grown weary of tramping for hours amid the dun winter scenery and 
pungent stench of the Great Swamp of New Jersey [… .] We had been walking 
through mean streets of the industrial suburbs, past dilapidated factories and 
warehouses, grimy railway yards, coal bunkers, and mountains of rubble and tin 
cans; in short, one of the ugliest and most blighted areas in all America […] we 
had all the panorama of American junk that is to be seen on the outskirts of all our 
great cities. (76-77)30 
New Jersey was a notorious dump with garbage gathering in the Meadowlands. For most 
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of his life, Williams eyed “the panorama of American junk.” Indeed, it was always there 
because it was not until the Hackensack Meadowlands Reclamation and Development 
Act of 1968 – five years after his death – when an actual effort was made to stop 
landfilling the surrounds (McGurty 32).31 In fact, up until the 1960s, “[m]ore than a tenth 
of the area was zoned as open dumps that accepted 35 percent of the state’s solid waste 
from 121 municipalities” (Salmore 348). Observing the open dumps, the “mountains of 
rubble and tin cans”, and “one of the ugliest and most blighted areas in all America,” 
Williams observed and walked through a wasteland.32 His sludgy surrounds seeped into 
what and how he wrote.  
 A year after moving into 9 Ridge Road, Williams published “Invitation” in The 
Egoist in 1914 (1: 478), the first poem not only to address his “townspeople,” but also to 
gesture to the filthy “ochred patches” and “meadow things” in the Meadowlands: 
We live in this flat blue basin,  
We and the meadow things, my townspeople,  
And there beyond where the snow lies  
In ochred patches float the smoke-grey towers. 
Has it never struck you as curious  
That we do not all leave this place?  
Surely we are blest 
With a noteworthy wisdom, my townspeople!  
Let us be conscious and talk of these things. (1: 40) 
There are a number of explicit references to wastelands and dumps in Williams,33 and so 
the “meadow things” in this poem can be many things ranging from wildlife to waste. 
The “meadow things” could be the “townspeople”, too, troglodytes living a rote life. Not 
unlike the ostensible condescension evident in “Epigramme,” the speaker in “Invitation” 
takes umbrage with “Rutherfordian torpor” (Ahearn 59) when he or she asks, “[h]as it 
never struck you as curious / that we do not all leave this place?”34 Williams’ “meadow 
things” mean “townspeople.” This reading is not necessarily incorrect, but, if we look 
closely at the poem, it becomes apparent that “meadow things” gestures to something 
else, too, because the townspeople are already accounted for in it. When the speaker 
directly addresses his or her audience – “my townspeople,” a punctuated apostrophe – it 
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is clear that they are included in the pronoun “we.” Moreover, the definite article in “the 
meadow things” separates them from speaker and townspeople.  
Surely, there is an abyss between human and waste, but, paradoxically, there is 
also a connection – a connection through separation – that appears when we turn to and 
away from trash. “For separation is a relation,” writes Gay Hawkins, “it is not the 
opposite of connection; to experience ourselves as separate from rubbish is still to be in a 
relation with it” (41). We are “enmeshed in rubbishy things whether we like it or not” 
(80).35 Detritus is discarded, but not entirely: there are varying degrees of attachment and 
detachment when it comes to debris. In Williams’ “Invitation,” the relation of “[w]e” to 
“meadow things” with the conjunction “and” signifies both connection and separation. 
Rather than a fantasy of cleanliness, then, there is an understanding of how humans in the 
environs share their space with waste. In “Invitation,” Williams does not record or 
describe what was just around the corner; rather, he opts for the vague phrase, “meadow 
things.” They are unlike the way in which “[o]ne by one objects are defined” (1: 183) in 
“Spring and All (By the road to the contagious hospital),” another poem that refers to 
“the / waste of broad, muddy fields / brown with dried weeds” (1: 183) in the 
Meadowlands. There are, to be sure, specific scraps in Williams: “a flash of juncos in the 
field of grey locust saplings with a white sun powdery upon them and a large rusty can 
wedged in the crotch of one of them, for the winter, human fruit, and on the polished 
straws of the dead grass a scroll of crimson paper—not yet rained on” (1: 299). Despite 
this specificity, Williams’ use of the ambiguous “meadow things” marks a familiarity, yet 
disgust with waste, an ambivalence toward rampant dumping given the norms at the time, 
and an overall tension tied to modernity’s transition between an ideology of reuse and 
one of disposability. Far from idyllic, romantic, or nostalgic, the “meadow things” of the 
Meadowlands marks Williams’ exhibition of and engagement with a sort of putrescent 
pastoral, a place and state of decay and debris where the dirty reality of modernity 
appears in the poem.36 
Williams’ scraps include a manure heap, broken glass, rusty instruments, a 
squashed condom, the filthy Passaic, meadow things, muddy fields, a rusty can, dead 
grass, and crimson paper. But he gets dirtier. Turning to things like “three baskets / of 
dried flowers in the high // barroom window,” “the dirty snow,” or “the stubble of old // 
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weeds” (2: 108-109) in “Approach to a City” published in Briarcliff Quarterly in 1946, 
Williams’ speaker finds grime to be galvanizing: “I never tire of these sights / but refresh 
myself there / always for there is small holiness / to be found in greater things” (2: 109, 
468).37 Perhaps part of a general rather than restrictive economy,38 or what Williams 
would call the “dirt” of “poor economy” (Embodiment 186),39 the following list of 
“greater things” – one that is by no means exhaustive – shows us how Williams picks 
through society’s seedy underbelly. Dumpster diving his body of work, we find things 
like scorched ground, blue February waste, tobacco smoke, the stink of stale urine, a lice 
comber, gnats on dung, an outhouse, a dirty white coat, rank odors, slime, dirt colored 
men, an ash can, a carcass, someone soiling their pants, black fungus, slobber, a 
jaundiced woman, the corpse of a suicide, pimples, urination, bestiality, and a plague.40 
The dirty waste of the world does not just enter Williams’ work, however, it also acts on 
the form of the poem itself.  
 Williams is aware of how the real affects poetic form. In a letter to poet Henry W. 
Wells dated 12 April 1950, Williams writes the following:  
The poem to me (until I go broke) is an attempt, an experiment, a failing 
experiment, toward assertion with broken means but an assertion, always, of a 
new and total culture, the lifting of an environment to expression. Thus it is 
social, the poem is a social instrument—accepted or not accepted seems to be of 
no material importance. It embraces everything we are.  
The poem (for I never if possible speak of poetry) is the assertion that we 
are alive as ourselves—as much of the environment as it can grasp [… .] (Selected 
Letters 286) 
Well before Morton argued that the ideological construct “Nature” obscures and obstructs 
how ecological forms affect culture,41 Williams understood how the environment is built 
into cultural production, and how poetry grasps and expresses as much of the 
environment as it can. And, for Williams, the nature of this environment is dirty. Of 
course, this is not to say that Williams consciously composed with explicit ecological 
forms in mind. Rather, his awareness of how the poem subsumes the surrounds compels 
us to consider how things – maybe “meadow things” – in the environs permeate the form 
of his work. If anything, his conviction that the poem is a “failing experiment,” one that 
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asserts itself with “broken means,” is an indication of just how fundamental trashy forms 
of fragmentation are to his poetics. “Nothing is any pleasure but misery and brokenness” 
(Imaginations 57), he writes in Kora in Hell (1920). A poem brings broken things 
together like a dump does garbage: “[t]hus a poem is tough by no quality it borrows from 
a logical recital of events nor from the events themselves but solely from that attenuated 
power which draws perhaps many broken things into a dance giving them thus a full 
being” (16-17). For Williams, poetry pulls in scraps to emphasize how that which is 
beyond repair still matters, even in its unproductivity.  
Three years after Kora in Hell, Williams published Spring and All, which is 
perhaps the most conspicuous example of a shattered style given its overall fragmentary 
form. According to Williams and a number of critics,42 Dadaism influenced Spring and 
All, and, surely, we can read this influence as a variation of trash poetics. Ian D. 
Copestake offers an overview of Spring and All that nicely captures its formal chaos: 
“[t]he placement of the poems in Spring and All were designed to interrupt the chaotic 
flow of his prose, a prose characterized by its disruption of logical argument, its use of 
incomplete sentences and rapid switches of focus that took its debates in unannounced 
directions” (3). Interruption, chaos, disruption, incompletion, rapid switches, and 
sharpness—surely, Spring and All is formed by scrambled scraps, not to mention a 
strange psyche. “The prose is a mixture of philosophy and nonsense” (I Wanted 37), 
reflects Williams. “It made sense to me, at least to my disturbed mind—because it was 
disturbed at that time—but I doubt if it made any sense to anyone else” (37). Order is 
disordered, too, as Williams randomizes the enumeration of chapters and poems; he even 
prints a title upside down.43 
Spring and All’s macroscopic scraps are also mirrored in its microscopic ones. 
Excerpts from “Young Love (What about all this writing?)” – a poem that also happens 
to feature a messy melting pot of the other as trash44 – exhibits clutter with irregular 
stanzas, claustrophobically condensed words without spacing, repetition, ellipsis, 
indentation, lists, and the jarring and jolting use of line breaks:   
What about all this writing? 
 
O “Kiki” 
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O Miss Margaret Jarvis 
The backhandspring 
 
I: clean 
    clean 
    clean: yes . . New-York 
 
Wrigley’s, appendicitis, John Marin: 
Skyscraper soup— 
 
Either that or a bullet!  
……………………… 
Drunk we go forward surely 
Not I  
 
beds, beds, beds 
elevators, fruit, night-tables 
breasts to see, white and blue— 
to hold in the hand, to nozzle 
 
It is not onion soup 
Your sobs soaked through the walls 
breaking the hospital to pieces  
 
Everything 
—windows, chairs 
obscenely drunk, spinning— 
white, blue, orange 
—hot with our passion 
……………………… 
All I said was:  
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there, you see, it is broken 
……………………… 
Clean is he alone 
after whom stream 
the broken pieces of the city— 
flying apart at his approaches [.] (1: 200-202)  
Williams’ use of the words “breaking” and “broken” to describe hyperbolic, catastrophic 
images – the breakdown of the hospital, let alone the city – foregrounds the poem’s 
fragmentary form. Even the typography is a type of trash. The plethora of em dashes 
scattered throughout “Young Love” – not to mention the three hundred and thirty-four 
spread throughout Spring and All – are forms of cut up scraps. In this vein, Spring and 
All’s errata are also instances of litter on the page—for instance, “rythm,” “occured,” 
“yed,” “existance,” “writter,” “playes,” “agregate,” “acurately,” and “Dont’t” (S&A 
[2011] 95-96). These are moments when signification fails or falters; a misspelled scrap 
stalls the reader’s perception and comprehension. With Williams’ “assertion through 
broken means,” we read and consume forms of trash. Surveying the entirety of Spring 
and All, moreover, reveals the diction of twists, turns, and textures of scraps and scrap 
heaps. Take, for instance, the following words: contact, repellant (1: 177), endways, 
sideways, frontways, fringe, (1:178), destroy, crumble, ruin, mounds (1: 179), 
transpiercing, reaching, split, plunging (1: 184), cutting, broken, fragile, moist, half-
raised, cold, precise, touching (1: 195), pungency, fragmentary (1: 199), excrementa, 
folded (1: 215), juxtaposition (1: 229), and jostling (1: 231).45 These are but some of the 
ways in which Williams’ rhetoric explores forms of filth and filthy forms.  
Full of forms of waste, Spring and All is a scrapbook. Writing about it, Webster 
Schott, editor of Imaginations (1970), notes how Williams “once and for all abandoned 
the imagism and Keatsian classism of his three first books of poems” (86). “Gone from 
Williams’s poems are the reflex-action rhetoric and symbols of the nineteenth century” 
(87), writes Schott. Instead, Williams “shows us […] that some of the old symbols may 
have the means of making new associations—with the junkyards of the United States or 
the universe itself, depending on the imagination” (87). Schott’s nonchalant comparison 
of Spring and All to “the junkyards of the United States” is no accident. Although he does 
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not expand on this relative to waste, Schott offers an example of old symbols made new 
in “The Rose is Obsolete,” which opens with the following stanzas:     
The rose is obsolete 
but each petal ends in  
an edge, the double facet 
cementing the grooved 
columns of air—The edge 
cuts without cutting 
meets—nothing—renews  
itself in metal or porcelain— 
 
whither? It ends— 
 
But if it ends 
the start is begun 
so that to engage roses  
becomes a geometry— 
Sharper, neater, more cutting [.] (1: 195)  
Like the remains of a consumed good turned into garbage, the rose is now rubbish, or 
“obsolete.” The organic is inorganic: “Somewhere the sense / makes copper roses / steel 
roses” (1: 195). The geometric shape of the cutting rose petal slices up the negative space 
around it with sharp line breaks: “The rose is obsolete / but each petal ends in / an edge” 
or “The edge / cuts without cutting / meets—nothing.” The line breaks not only show off 
a shattered style, but also fracture “the reflex-action rhetoric and symbols of the 
nineteenth century” rather than just jettisoning them. “By the brokenness of his 
composition the poet makes himself master of a certain weapon which he could possess 
himself of in no other way” (Imaginations 16), writes Williams. Thus, he uses a rose to 
abuse the rose. Surely, this rose’s form is from “the junkyards of the United States,” 
especially the ones in Rutherford. Spring and All marks a moment when Williams’ work 
is trashy. Litter scatters throughout his writing; it takes different forms, perhaps the most 
important of which is his triadic line.  
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What Williams called “an assembly of three-line groups” (Selected Letters 321) 
appeared in the 1950s in The Desert Music (1954), Journey to Love (1955), and parts of 
Paterson V (1958). Aiming to express “the American idiom,”46 his work featuring triadic 
lines – three steps of variable feet – is “more conventional and more accessible than 
Williams’s earlier style and contributed to his widening readership” (MacGowan 49). In 
Paterson II (1948), we witness the stirrings of this style in a section that would be 
reprinted as “The Descent” in The Desert Music: 
 The descent beckons 
   As the ascent beckoned  
              Memory is a kind  
 of accomplishment [.] (Paterson 78) 
The triadic line is very visual. Eleanor Berry notes that, “when he first employed it in the 
‘descent’ passage of Paterson, the stepped triadic line was clearly a nonce form for a 
particular poetic occasion—a representational form, presenting a visual image of 
descent” (380-381).47 This “descent” appears to go on endlessly. Williams’ triadic lines 
are not composed of stanzas, but paragraphs: “[s]tanzas strike a reader as neat, closed 
units; stepped triads grouped in paragraphs give an appearance of running on 
continuously” (382). Instead of stanzaic organization, then, there is stichic accumulation 
(380).48 Grossly piling on top of one another, Williams’ triadic lines materialize the 
eternal return of rubbish. Here, layers of fragments litter the page. Seemingly, this 
reading is against the grain, especially when Kenneth Rexroth notes how Williams’ 
“metric flows as smoothly as water” (qtd. in Berry 371). Yet, turning to “Asphodel, That 
Greeny Flower” – “the culmination of Williams’ work in the triadic line” (Berry 384) – 
waste appears.  
 From Journey to Love, “Asphodel, That Greeny Flower” is Williams’ 
confessional, an apology to his wife Floss for his infidelities (Leibowitz 17). In the 
following excerpt, we read of worldwide waste:  
            The measure itself 
has been lost 
      and we suffer for it.  
            We come to our deaths 
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in silence. 
      The bomb speaks.  
            All suppressions, 
from the witchcraft trials at Salem  
      to the latest  
            book burnings 
are confessions 
      that the bomb 
            has entered our lives 
to destroy us. 
      Every drill 
            driven into the earth 
for oil enters my side 
      also.  
            Waste, waste!  
dominates the world.  
      It is the bomb’s work. (2: 324)  
The bomb laid the world to waste, and it broke the poem. For the first time, the poem is 
cut up according to vertical indentation, which troubles convention as his triads are 
neither stanzas nor lines exactly (Berry 378). This ambiguity marks Williams’ dirty work. 
Looking closely, the enjambment at the end of this excerpt – “Waste, waste! / dominates 
the world” – depicts the domination of debris, too, as if the excess of the exclamatory 
sentence takes over. Although enjambment has a different effect with Williams’ triadic 
line,49 it is hard not to see how the explosives affect the form of the poem and gesture to a 
world in shambles. The very repetition of the word “waste” points to how replete the 
world is with it. And the repetition of both “waste” and the triadic line reveals another 
filthy form in Williams: recycling, or “downcycling” (56), to borrow from William 
McDonough and Michael Braungart, which I explain shortly.  
 Today, recycling is utopic. It has been rhetorically rendered clean as can be—
“reduce, reuse, recycle.” This ideology is not new. In Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s novel 
Herland (1915), for instance, there is no such thing as waste: “These careful culturists 
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had worked out a perfect scheme of refeeding the soil with all that came out of it. All the 
scraps and leaving of their food; plant waste from lumber work or textile industry; all the 
solid matter from the sewage, properly treated and combined; everything which came 
from the earth went back to it” (104).50 Gilman’s world without waste exhibits a desire to 
clean up modernity’s mess through a radical form of recycling. This desire was 
warranted. At the turn of the century, more and more waste matter was merely disposed 
of rather than reused.51 Indeed, by 1899, Thorstein Veblen was writing about conspicuous 
consumption and conspicuous waste.52 Trash was and continued to be on the rise.53 A 
century or so later, Americans disposed of nearly five hundred billion pounds of refuse in 
one year (Rogers 2). With all this waste, one would think that “reduce, reuse, recycle” 
would save the day. But recycling is not salvation. Rather, “most recycling is actually 
downcycling; it reduces the quality of a material over time” (McDonough and Braungart 
56).54 
Although neither Gilman nor Williams were familiar with downcycling as such, 
the phenomenon itself has a long history.55 We can read Williams’ triadic line as a sort of 
loop leftover from the reuse culture at the turn of the century, one that formally 
downcycles through its descent taking each and every subsequent scrap with its 
movements. Describing the effect of reading the triadic line, Berry writes that when “a 
sentence concludes at the end of a first or second step, the diagonal thrust carries the 
reader on to the next step(s). At the end of a third step, syntactical expectation is needed 
to carry the reader back to the left margin—unless a definite full stop is warranted” (377). 
Perhaps not as paradoxical as what Douglas Hofstadter calls a “strange loop,”56 
Williams’ triadic line is a downward spiral that sends the reader circling around poetic 
scraps. From his early poetry to Spring and All to the triadic line and beyond, the waste 
around Williams shapes his style. 
Williams is not alone with waste. There are a number of writers who take up trash 
like Mina Loy, Carl Sandburg, John Dos Passos, Wallace Stevens, and T.S. Eliot.57 Most 
of these writers briefly refer to debris, but Eliot tarries with waste a little longer. As early 
as “Preludes” from Prufrock and Other Observations (1917), we read of “grimy scraps” 
(12), “newspapers from vacant lots” (13), “muddy feet” (12), and “soiled hands” (13), 
and, in “Rhapsody on Windy Night,” a “broken spring in a factory yard” (14). In The 
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Wasteland (1922), moreover, there are lines that exhibit ambivalence toward trash. In 
“The Fire Sermon,” Eliot writes the following: “Sweet Thames, run softly, till I end my 
song. / The river bears no empty bottles, sandwich papers, / Silk handkerchiefs, 
cardboard boxes, cigarette ends / Or other testimony of summer nights. The nymphs are / 
departed” (42). The “[s]weet Thames” is unpolluted, but its cleanliness is complicated by 
the way waste materializes itself through what Tim Armstrong calls a “negative 
catalogue” (71). The Thames comes to be defined by the waste it could, but does not 
actually, contain. Eliot’s refuse is odd: the “[s]ilk handkerchiefs” hint at a haunting 
affluence that registers conspicuous consumption and valuable waste. The Waste Land is 
dirty,58 but Eliot “thinks of waste in deeply antithetical ways” (73). Indeed, the poem 
“bespeaks a simultaneous fascination with, and revulsion from, waste” (71). While 
Williams’ representations of trash are not unlike Eliot’s ambivalently rendered detritus, 
there is, nonetheless, more of an attachment to and an acceptance of the unclean in 
Williams’ writing. The sentiment behind this attachment to waste is apparent in 
Williams’ letter to Louis Zukofsky dated 22 August 1928 where Williams embraces the 
brokenness of a typographical error: “My typewriter has not been idel. (again I refuse to 
correct)” (Correspondence of Williams & Zukofsky 14). Williams’ poetry displays an 
intimacy with waste that Eliot’s does not, one that revels in a raw aesthetic. 
 Williams’ poetry is a part of the history of trash. While Christopher Todd 
Anderson sketches the lineage of the American garbage poem, he more or less leaves out 
modernism.59 Although he starts with Whitman and mentions Eliot and Stevens, 
Anderson primarily focuses on postwar poets. Of course, his scope is sound,60 but, 
considering Williams’ wasteland, there are circumstances throughout the first half of the 
twentieth century where waste works its way into modernism, and these messy moments 
warrant critical attention. More pressing, however, is that which has been overlooked 
when it comes to trash poetics: collage. A form unique to modernism, collage is an 
aesthetic symptom of trash.  
Aware of the history of collage, Williams and other modernist poets often employ 
iterations or traces of it in their work, which is an aesthetic engagement with the form and 
matter of waste. Surprisingly, the connection between collage and trash has not been 
acknowledged in this context. Pablo Picasso, one of the first collagists with his Still Life 
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with Chair Caning (1912), said the following in conversation: “The purpose of the papier 
collé was to give the idea that different textures can enter into a composition to become 
the reality in the painting that competes with the reality in nature. […] This displaced 
object has entered a universe for which it was not made and where it retains, in a 
measure, its strangeness” (qtd. in Perloff 44; 46). Picasso’s “displaced object” resonates 
with rubbish. “Nothing is inherently trash” (5), writes Strasser, riffing off of “dirt as 
matter out of place.” The very form of collage – etymologically, the “pasting, sticking, or 
gluing” (Perloff 46) – resembles a refuse heap. Collage is, in part, born out of 
modernity’s waste. And thinking through collage as a form of trash radically affects how 
we read the work of modernism. From the scraps on the street to the open dumps, 
modernity made its own collage, one that informed artworks throughout the twentieth 
century including Cubism, Futurism, Dadaism, and Surrealism. The defining ecological 
form of collage in modernism is modernity’s surge of scraps; indeed, waste as such 
affects many modernist mediums.  
 Collage is first and foremost “a visual or spatial concept, but it was soon absorbed 
into the verbal as well as into the musical realm” (72), notes Marjorie Perloff. She points 
to the well known Futurist F.T. Marinetti’s widely disseminated and translated Technical 
Manifesto of Futurist Literature (1912) and Destruction of Syntax—Wireless 
Imaginations—Words-in-Freedom (1913) as illuminating a collage aesthetic relative to 
literary discourse (56). Perloff explains how Marinetti demanded a new verbal art, one 
that would respond to modernity’s new means of communication, transportation, and 
information; for him, verbal art needed to restrict or jettison adjectives, adverbs, finite 
verbs, punctuation, and free verse (57).“Poetry,” explains Perloff, quoting Marinetti, 
“becomes ‘an uninterrupted sequence of new images,’ a ‘strict net of images or 
analogies, to be cast into the mysterious sea of phenomena’” (58). Although Marinetti 
never used the word “collage,” notes Perloff, he describes this artistic form with his 
emphasis on “‘ever-vaster gradation of analogies’” and “parole in libertà,” or “words-in-
freedom” (58). Discussing Marinetti’s own literary collage Zang Tumb Tuuum (1914), 
Perloff offers other examples including Williams’ Kora in Hell (72), which is 
aesthetically similar to Spring and All, not to mention Paterson.61  
Williams is indebted to collage given his work’s juxtaposition of prose and 
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poetry, but even at the level of the poem we witness Marinetti’s “uninterrupted sequence 
of new images” in a poem like “The Agonized Spires,” which includes the following: 
crustaceous wedge, sweaty kitchen, rock, thrusts of the sea, waves of steel, swarming 
backstreets, shell, coral, electricity, lights, lakes, twilight, triphammer, nitrogen, pasture, 
motorcar, arm, leg, spire, peace, stanchion, ventricle, and sunburnt fingers (1: 211-212).62 
Although not strictly adhering to Marinetti’s criteria, Williams’ unpunctuated, untamed 
aggregate poem exhibits a form of collage containing a “net of images.” Williams’ 
collage work reveals him to be a bricoleur.63 Through a scrappy style founded on the 
surrounds, he shows us how collage and trash are inextricably linked.  
From the start, I set out to dumpster dive Williams’ work. At this point, I want to 
end with one more dive. Turning to Williams’ “Between Walls,” I dumpster it to exhibit 
the tension around trash in dirty modernism with specific reference to my ideas of 
litterality and waste commons, which, as noted in my introduction, involve literal and 
mimetic forms of waste relative to a public material network. Williams’ poem reads:  
Between Walls 
 
the back wings 
of the 
 
hospital where 
nothing 
 
will grow lie 
cinders 
 
in which shine 
the broken 
 
pieces of a green 
bottle [.] (1: 453) 
The speaker experiences a one-on-one with waste, and trash takes over. Like the broken 
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bottle, nearly all shreds of subjectivity are shattered. Indeed, it is Williams who 
impressively nears the impossibility of a poem leaving its speaker behind (Pickard, 
“Williams” 91), which emphasizes this poem’s broken bottle. And so the short, sharp 
stanzas are shards of poetic waste left behind for us to find. There is a message in this 
broken bottle. This poem shows us a scene of litterality lying in the waste commons. 
Starting with the title, the tangibility of matter is felt through the poem’s form, which 
anticipates the real trash to come. It is unclear as to whether or not “Between Walls” is 
the title or a line, if not both. In one recorded reading of the poem, Williams introduces it 
and says, “This is…just a…just a few more. This has no title” (“Between Walls”). 
Perhaps playful, Williams’ reading still gestures to the ambiguity of the so-called title. 
This impasse affects the reading of the poem. That is, the “title” is included in and 
excluded from the remainder of it.64 In the latter case, the word “[w]alls” in the title 
interrupts what could have been a syntactically correct sentence. As such, “[w]alls” is an 
obstacle, one that produces – if only momentarily – a semantic, sonic, and typographic 
disjuncture. Re-writing the poem’s opening lines gives us a better sense of the nature of 
this obstruction or intrusion (the first is the original and the next two are variations): (1) 
“Between Walls the back wings of the hospital”; (2) “Between Walls Between the back 
wings of the hospital”;65 and (3) “Between Walls Between the walls of the back wings of 
the hospital.”66 We also run into other walls in Williams’ poem, ones that continue to 
manifest a sense of materiality. Given the plural in the title, how many walls are there? 
Deformation helps us to answer this question. Following Jerome McGann’s point that 
“imaginative work has an elective affinity with performance” and thus “it always lies 
open to deformative moves” (113), I want to read Williams horizontally. “A deformative 
procedure puts the reader in a highly idiosyncratic relation to the work,” writes McGann, 
which “sends both reader and work through the textual looking glass” (116). Thus, 
“Between Walls” looks like this: 
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Including the title, the stanzaic structure of “Between Walls” suggests that there are six 
walls. But perhaps five is the correct answer. If stanzaic breaks stop us, then perhaps each 
negative space in between signifies one wall, adding up to five. The stanzas themselves 
mimic “fragmented objects” (Markos 136) like shards of glass or cinders that lie between 
the white walls. Read this way, the lines accumulate like waste in a space where 
presumably “nothing // will grow.” However you count and read it, “Between Walls” 
foregrounds through its form the materiality of the messy stuff in the middle. Here, we 
have literal, yet liminal litter in this “no-man’s-land” (Crawford 64) that belongs to no 
one and everyone. To think through the trashy threshold of this waste commons, we can 
turn to what Michel Serres says about the border, or the “dividing line [that] strangely 
consists of three layers” (43):  
The first is on the inside and protects the inhabitant with its softness; the exterior 
one threatens possible invaders with its hardness. The layer in the middle is 
riddled with pores, passages, portals, and porosities through which, often by 
semiconduction, a living being or a thing enters, is locked in, leaves, transits, 
attacks, or waits hopelessly. The prepositions in, for, to, from describe the first 
layer; out of and against the third strip; between and through the intermediary 
one. To defend, protect, forbid, or let through: this is the threefold way in which a 
border functions. (Malfeasance 43) 
Serres’ prepositions for the “middle” or “intermediary” layer – “between and through” – 
resonate with “Between Walls.” Imagining Williams’ scene, there is an inner and an 
outer layer or wall, and in between them is the intermediary or liminal trash “riddled with 
pores, passages, portals, and porosities.” This garbage generates an iteration of the waste 
commons. As property is pushed aside, waste is in the commons; the speaker is privy to a 
relation manifested and mediated by refuse. One could argue that this common waste 
does not warrant such attention. After all, it is just a bottle. But this bottle raises many 
questions.   
How and why did this bottle break? Where is it from? What was in the bottle? 
Medicine from the hospital? Or was it a bottle of booze? Why is the speaker transfixed by 
trash? We can endlessly ask questions about Williams’ bottle. For now, however, what is 
important is how the poem exposes trash to be a part of a shared world of brokenness and 
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failure, one that is not as desolate as it sounds. Once a commodity is consumed, it is but a 
material shell; however, afterwards, as Stallabrass notes, “there hangs about [trash] a 
certain air of embarrassment, a reminder of some promise unredeemed” (408). Indeed, 
“loosed from exchange and use value,” he continues, “it takes on an apparently more 
genuine aesthetic air” (408). Strangely, something like this happens in “Between Walls.” 
While it is but a bottle, we need to note how Williams uses an indefinite rather than a 
definite article: “a green / bottle” instead of “the green / bottle.” While the latter would 
suggest some sort of significant, symbolic value, it is the former that foregrounds 
indifference. This indifference is evidence of apathy for the surrounds, but it is also a 
form of resistance. With an indefinite article, trash is positioned in a way where it resists 
fetishization—again, it is not “the bottle,” but “a bottle.” Although its singularity is 
sidelined without a definitive article, Williams’ bottle is still an entity that is a part of a 
larger system like the waste commons. This container’s liminality is also highlighted by 
the fact that the bottle is both broken and whole. Indeed, “the bottle is insistently there—
somehow prior to the poem” (Crawford 63). The word “bottle” is intact, yet it is broken. 
There is something semantically, syntactically, and synchronically suspicious here. On its 
own, the word “bottle” refers to an unbroken one, but this is not the case; presumably, an 
unknown external agent smashed it. And so the poem prefigures a bottle while 
simultaneously presenting it in shards. The “before” and “after” of the bottle is rather 
bizarre because we read the word “broken” before the word “bottle.” By the time we get 
around to “bottle,” we imagine an unbroken one, if only for a moment; however, given 
the qualifier, this is incorrect. And so we effectively break the bottle, arriving at it with 
“broken” in mind. Seemingly, effect precedes cause. But there is no cause, or, rather, one 
is not mentioned. Instead, the object is just broken, which suggests that things are always 
already vulnerable and on the verge of being trash. Here, the reader vacillates between 
viewing the bottle as broken or whole. That is, the vague, amorphous notion of trash 
begins to take over the bottle’s objecthood, but never entirely. As this happens, the refuse 
in the text registers different states of rubbish. For instance, the poem contains and is a 
container – it does the work the broken bottle cannot – while also breaking itself and the 
bottle up through a number of sharp line breaks like “green / bottle,” one that singles out 
the object from its nature, its colour. Here, the poem’s line segmentation singles out 
	  	  
54 
waste and puts us in touch with trash, which demonstrates how “Williams points to the 
way in which the simplest facts of objecthood—the relation to light, the spatial 
arrangement—are a form of life and action” where “every object […] has its own designs 
on us as observers, if only we quiet down and pay attention” (Pickard, “Williams” 96).  
Lastly, in “Between Walls,” waste begets waste. There is a history of a trashed 
metaphor. In one of the early drafts, the poem – organized in three-line stanzas – ended in 
the following way: “the broken / pieces of / a green / bottle / are / flowering” (Markos 
137). Williams handwrote the words “are / flowering” in pencil and later crossed them 
out (138). “By crossing out the explicitly sentimental ‘are / flowering,’” writes one critic, 
“Williams left his main idea submerged and more powerful, that idea having to do with 
the power of the imagination to discover a living, restorative beauty in fragmented 
things” (140-141).67 Oddly, after being plucked from the poem, the flower lives on; the 
rhetoric of beauty and restoration trumps trash. And so the reality of refuse is lost. But 
what if Williams’ excision is an act of denial rather than affirmation? Perhaps the waste 
on the page resists, if not refuses, figurative appropriation. Here, literalism matters; the 
disposable does not just disappear.  
Dumpster diving Williams, I have uncovered one dirty side of modernism with its 
forms of filth and filthy forms. Now, taking my cue from Williams’ speaker looking out 
at “the weed-grown / chassis / of a wrecked car” in “View of a Lake” from 1935, it is 
time to consider the waste of technology and that which fuels it, like oil. In 1940, for 
instance, Williams published a poem called, “Sketch for a Portrait of Henry Ford,” which 
gets dirty with discrete parts of a car while exhibiting “a heavy sludge / of oil” (2: 13).68 
Another admirer of Ford – Gertrude Stein – does something similar. In the next chapter, I 
explore the ways in which cars, oil, and energy inform Stein’s style and reveal the 
charged tensions of dirty modernism’s natural resources. 
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1 See T.H. Crawford’s Modernism, Medicine, & William Carlos Williams (1993), 100. 
2 See also Carl A. Zimring’s Cash for Your Trash (2005), 41 ff. 
3 For a juxtaposition of clean and dirty, see Kora in Hell: Improvisations (1920), 46 in 
Imaginations.	  
4 For a historical contextualization of this letter, see Peter Schmidt’s “Introduction to 
Williams’ ‘Letter to an Australian Editor’ (1946).” In this letter, Williams discusses his 
attitude towards the issue of “the present-day writing of poetry” (“Letter” 8). Using his 
old friend Ezra Pound as a point of comparison, Williams makes a distinction between 
what he calls “‘translations’” (9) and “the direct approach” (10). For Williams, Pound is a 
translator, one who implicitly or explicitly subscribes to the idea that “[m]inds beget 
minds” (8). Here, translators are interested in “bringing down the riches of the ages either 
by direct translations from the classes […] or using that for the fixed basis of their 
divagations, forever dragging in the accomplished works of the ancients […]” (9). “Their 
work is bred androgynetically from the classics which father their every thought” (9), 
writes Williams. Strictly speaking about the forms of art, Williams suggests that those 
translators who engage the classics reproduce the “complexion of the past” (10) and, 
ultimately, “wish in their heart for political, social and economic autocracy” (10). 
Alternatively, “the direct approach” – Williams’ way – is another literary source that 
develops the greatness of the past “from the present, from the hurley-burley of political 
encounters which determine or may determine it, direct” (10). As Williams puts it, “the 
direct approach is the spectacle of our lives today, raised if possible to the quality of great 
expression by the invention of poetry” (10). Qualifying this further, he writes: “I look for 
a direct expression of the turmoils of today in the arts. Not about today in classical forms 
but in forms generated, invented, today direct from the turmoil itself—or the quietude or 
whatever it might be so long as it is generated in form direct from the form society itself 
takes in its struggles” (10-11). Compared to translation, the direct approach is contextual, 
historical, and, implicitly, democratic. Importantly, Williams explains how this pertains 
to poetry: “new modes of poetic form […] arise from the society about him of which he 
is […] a part [… .] Let me insist, the poet’s very life but also his forms originate in the 
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political, social and economic maelstrom on which he rides. At his best he transmutes 
them to new values fed from the society of which he is a part if he will continue fertile” 
(11). Also, in this letter, Williams compares himself to Pound. He suggests that Pound cut 
himself off from the social – a source of “fertility” (12) – which led to his “literary 
sterility” (12), an effect of the “scholarly thing […] adopted frequently out of disgust for 
the raw odors and other aspects of the manure heap” (12). Williams’ words against Pound 
are not unfounded. “The weeder is supremely needed if the Garden of the Muses is to 
persist as a garden” (ABC of Reading 17), writes Pound. Pound’s approach to aesthetics – 
the necessary removal of unsightly “weeds” – is but one example of his disgust of the 
manure heap. (Of course, we can also think of the terse lines of Pound’s “In a Station of 
the Metro” or his editorial excisions done on T.S. Eliot’s The Waste Land [1922]; see 
Armstrong 69-70.) To be clear, a “weed” is a construct—that is, a “‘weed’ is not a kind 
of plant, only the wrong kind in the wrong place. Eliminating weeds is obviously a 
‘problem in gardening,’ but defining weeds in the first place requires cultural, not 
horticultural analysis” (Garrard 5-6). And so through Williams’ trash poetics, he 
challenges the stigma attached to “weeds,” or that which has little to no value, and, in 
turn, embraces the productivity and unproductivity of waste. 
5 For a discussion on what has been said about “Epigramme,” see Barry Ahearn’s 
William Carlos Williams and Alterity: The Early Poetry (1994), 59-63; also, see John 
Marsh’s “‘Thinking/ Of the Freezing Poor’: The Suburban Counter-Pastoral in  
William Carlos Williams’s Early Poetry,” 98, 99, 114. 
6 Etymologically, “dumpster diver” is linked to the invention of the Dempster Dumpster 
in 1934 (well after Williams started his creative career). That is, in 1934, George Roby 
Dempster, a native of Knoxville, Tennessee, invented the Dempster Dumpster, which 
was a “‘large steel container fully enclosed with a curved steel top, entry doors, and 
dump release bottom, […] designed to be hoisted mechanically onto a truck for transport 
to the dump site’” (Jacobson qtd. in Weinberg et al. 95n12; Weinberg et al. 95n12; W. 
Wheeler 73). 
7 For a more contemporary discussion of waste poetics, see Christopher Schmidt’s The 
Poetics of Waste: Queer Excess in Stein, Ashbery, Schuyler, and Goldsmith (2014). Also, 
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consider Eleanor Wilner and Maurice Manning’s The Rag-Picker’s Guide to Poetry: 
Poems, Poets, Process (2013).	  
8 This quotation is from Benjamin’s discussion of Charles Baudelaire’s “Les Vin des 
Chiffonniers,” or “Ragpickers’ Wine,” in Les Fleurs du mal (1857). For a discussion of a 
European history of the ragpicker, see H. Sutherland Edwards’ Old and New Paris: Its 
History, Its People, Its Places, Volume I (1893); for a discussion of the ragpicker in 
relation to modernist movements, see Janine A. Mileaf’s Please Touch: Dada and 
Surrealist Objects after the Readymade (2010). 
9 Adorno is writing on Samuel Beckett’s Endgame (1957). 
10 For a discussion of Williams’ nativism, see Walter Benn Michaels’ Our America: 
Nativism, Modernism, and Pluralism (1995), 82-95. 
11 Eileen McGurty uses this moniker, and so too does David Wheeler in Wild New Jersey 
(2011), 57. 
12 For more details, see The Autobiography of William Carlos Williams, 279. 
13 “In 1896,” writes Jamie Benidickson, “a commission examining sewerage along the 
Passaic Valley concluded that the lower Passaic constituted a public nuisance, a health 
menace, and a growing threat to property interests from the Great Falls at Paterson to 
below Newark. The district population had risen by 43 percent during the 1880s and a 
further 22 percent between 1890 and 1895, when the daily discharge of sewage reached 
seventy million gallons. A state sewerage commission established shortly after release of 
the Passaic findings declared existing arrangements to be wholly inadequate” (224). 
14 In the later version of “The Wanderer,” the word “filthiness” is replaced with the word 
“rottenness” (1: 116). 
15 Paul Mariani writes about Williams’ plunge into the Passaic: “Williams also 
remembered idyllic moments frustrated, of swimming bare-assed with the boys at 
Santiago Grove on the Passaic and the Vreeland girl swimming with them, also nude, 
under that watchful eye of her big brother, whose look threatened to kill anyone who 
dared to so much as touch his sister” (21). And, of course, Williams’ Paterson would be 
loosely structured by the river, too: “From the beginning I decided there would be four 
books following the course of the river whose life seemed more and more to resemble my 
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own life as I more and more thought of it: the river above the [Great] Falls, the 
catastrophe of the Falls itself, the river below the Falls and the entrance at the end into the 
great sea” (Patersion xiii). If and when it appears in his long poem, Williams maintains 
the dirty details: “Half the river red, half steaming purple / from the factory vents, spewed 
out hot, / swirling, bubbling. The dead bank, / shining mud” (36). 
16 Williams’ emphasis on contact is apparent in the opening of Spring and All; however, 
this theme has a history. For instance, the January 1921 issue of Contact contains a blurb 
by Williams (one of the editors) regarding their modus operandi; he writes: “We, 
Contact, aim to emphasize the local phase of the game of writing. We realize that it is 
emphasis only which is our business. We want to give all our energy to the setting up of 
new vigors of artistic perception, invention and expression in the United States. Only by 
slow growth, consciously fostered to the point of enthusiasm, will American work of the 
quality of Marianne Moore’s best poetry come to the fore of intelligent attention and the 
ignorance which has made America an artistic dessert be somewhat dissipated. We lack 
interchange of ideas in our country more than we lack foreign precept. Every effort 
should be made, we feel, to develope [sic] among our serious writers a sense of mutual 
contact first of all. To this also we are devoted” (n.p.). 
17 Melosi tracks this transition of the Passaic river when he writes: “The ‘death’ of New 
Jersey’s Passaic River in the late nineteenth century was a classic illustration of how 
factories defiled their environment. Before it became badly polluted, the Passaic was a 
major recreational area and also the basis for a thriving commercial fishing industry. As 
urbanization and industrialization expanded after the Civil War, the volume of sewage 
and industrial waste that poured into the river forced the city of Newark to abandon the 
Passaic as a water supply. Pollution also ruined commercial fishing in the area, and soon 
homes along the waterway disappeared. During hot weather the river emitted such a 
stench that many factories were forced to close” (Effluent America 27). The “death” of 
the river led to the establishment of the Passaic Valley Sewerage Commission (PVSC) 
that same year followed by the Newark Bay Treatment Plant in 1924 (Passaic Valley 
Sewerage Commission). Even with this initiative, however, the Passaic seemed doomed 
to be plagued with pollution. In 1918, The New York Times reported on how the river 
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caught fire because it was the “receptacle for the waste of many industrial plants,” 
accumulating a number of “combustibles” (“Passaic River Afire”), which, 
retrospectively, seems like a harbinger for what was to come—namely, the Diamond 
Alkali Company’s Agent Orange. This company, notes Kenneth T. Jackson, “made 
pesticides along the Passaic River from 1951 to 1969, as well as ingredients for the 
chemical defoliant Agent Orange” (201). “During the Vietnam War,” Jackson continues, 
“when the firm was operating twenty-four hours a day, Diamond Alkali and other 
companies released dioxin, a cancer-causing compound that is a byproduct of chemical 
processing, in the water, putting the lower Passaic River on the Environmental Protection 
Agency’s list of the nation’s most endangered waterways” (201). 
18 For information on the Meadowlands prior to European settlement, see Stephen 
Marshall’s “The Meadowlands Before the Commission: Three Centuries of  
Human Use and Alteration of the Newark and Hackensack Meadows,” 4-5. 
19 For a brief historical account of the Meadowlands, see Robert Sullivan’s Meadowlands 
(1998), 16. 
20 Ibid. 
21 “In 1970 it was the human practice of dumping garbage into the wetlands that hindered 
development. According to the HMDC plan, waste was the central obstacle to developing 
the Hackensack Meadowlands. ‘The map, which summarizes a century of waste disposal, 
is as much a determinant of future lands uses in the Meadowlands the map of its geology, 
which summaries ages of momentous natural history’” (McGurty 34). Following this 
chronology, I do the math to get 1870 (I subtract a century from 1970). 
22 “‘New York rubbish is being turned into Jersey soil by scow after scow from 
Manhattan’” (Marshall 11), one Newark newspaper reported in 1909. 
23 Stephen Marshall explains this in more detail when he writes the following: “Although 
construction of Teterboro Airport started during World War I, most of the development 
of the Hackensack Meadows came several decades later, and in much smaller increments 
than the giant construction projects of Port Newark and Newark Airport. However, from 
the 1920s through the 1960s, more than half the acreage of the Meadowlands lying north 
of Newark Bay was filled in to make new upland” (11-12). 
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24 Marshall notes some of the factors for why this happened: “The most important factor 
was the growing population of New York City and adjacent municipalities, which 
generated ever-increasing amounts of garbage. In addition, the automobile revolution of 
the 1920s also provided relatively inexpensive trucks to transport garbage out of the city 
to the Meadowlands on the growing network of paved streets and highways” (13). And 
there is, of course, a history of illegal dumping associated with the Meadowlands, too. “In 
1957,” writes Marshall, “New York City stopped providing municipal garbage removal 
for commercial firms, which required companies to hire private garbage collectors. Some 
of these private haulers were associated with organized crime and chose to eliminate the 
expense of garbage dump ‘tipping fees’ by simply depositing refuse at any available 
unwatched location. Its highway access to the city, as well as its low population density 
and corresponding difficulty of identifying illegal dumpers, made the northern portion of 
the Meadowlands attractive for unregulated garbage dumps. The explosive growth of the 
local garbage collection industry after 1957—and corresponding increase in the 
frequency and quantity of illegal dumping in the Meadowlands—created a situation that 
might be called the Tony Soprano version of the tragedy of the commons” (13-14). 
25 For more information on sanitary landfills and the inventor of them, Jean Vincenz, see 
Melosi’s The Sanitary City, 162-163. 
26 “Anyone who has made the trip along the upper gullet of the New Jersey Turnpike as it 
disgorges traffic toward the George Washington Bridge is familiar with the Hackensack 
Meadowlands” (81), write William Rathje and Cullen Murphy. As Rathje and Murphy 
note, moments manifesting “the awesome sweep of this wetland in its nativity” are “rare” 
(81). One sees, instead, the “massive mounds of garbage, some of them fifteen stories 
high, that have been dumped in the Meadowlands” (81). Rathje and Murphy not only 
gesture towards a long history of dumping in the Meadowlands, which, at one point, 
involved more than a hundred communities, but also offer a helpful archaeological tool to 
understand the nature of this mess (82). To get a better sense of these mounds, they refer 
to the Australian archaeologist Rowland Fletcher’s term “MVSes,” or “Monstrous Visual 
Symbols,” and note that the “Hackensack Meadows are a potent reminder that the largest 
MVSes in American society today are its garbage repositories” (82). Compared to the 
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largest prehistoric MVS in the New World – the seventy-five million cubic feet Pyramid 
of the Sun in Mexico – the “garbage dumps in the Meadowlands exceed that volume 
many times over, as do most big-city landfills” (82). 
27 McGurty notes how “[g]arbage has been dumped in the Meadowlands in the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, yet shifts in American’s [sic] relationship to waste during 
the postwar period propelled the garbage problem to new levels” (34). After quoting 
Strasser to emphasize how the postwar economy came to rely on the disposal of old 
things, McGurty quantifies the “new levels” of the “the garbage problem” when she 
writes: “In 1960 the United States generated a total of 88.1 million tons of municipal 
solid waste, which amounted to 2.68 pounds per person, per day. Within only ten years, 
the total amount of municipal solid waste generated had increased by 37.5 percent to 
reach 121.1 million tons. While population growth accounted for some of the increase, 
the per capita waste generation had increased 21.3 percent to reach 3.25 pounds per 
person, per day. All projections predicted more and more waste because waste and wealth 
went hand in hand” (34). 
28 Williams’ world included the Meadowlands. There are many municipalities with land 
in the Meadowlands, one of which is East Rutherford; the others include Secaucus, 
Newark, Harrison, Kearney, North Arlington, Lyndhurst, East Rutherford, Carlstadt, 
Wood-Ridge, Moonachie, Little Ferry, Teaneck, Teterboro, Leonia, Ridgefield, 
Ridgefield Park, North Bergen, and Jersey City (Sullivan 20-21). Technically, Williams 
lived in Rutherford, not “East Rutherford, ‘cross the track, divided from us by the 
railroad” (1: 156), as he put it. However, his house at 9 Ridge Road is only a one minute 
drive or a seven minute walk – 0.3 miles, or 528 yards, or 1584 feet – from Erie Avenue, 
a border street where Rutherford turns into East Rutherford (“East Rutherford, New 
Jersey”; “East Rutherford”). As Robert Sullivan puts it, however, “Secaucus is the 
Meadowlands’ most conspicuous address” (20), not East Rutherford. For Williams, 
Secaucus was further away: it was approximately 5 miles or an hour and a half walk – if 
not more – from his house (“Secaucus”). But at the turn of the century the Meadowlands 
would be Williams’ backyard. In 1896, a state geologist’s survey noted how the 
Meadowlands extended from northern Hackensack to southern Elizabeth, covering a 
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large area compared to later in the twentieth century (Marshall 5). A hand-drawn map 
from the same year shows how Rutherford is adjacent to the western perimeter of the 
Meadowlands, which is – measuring from Williams’ home to an area near Rutherford 
Park and Berrys Creek – about a mile, or just over a twenty minute walk (22; Google 
Maps; N.B. Stephen Marshal credits the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Services for the hand-
drawn map [“1896 Map of Hackensack Meadows”]). Between 1896 and 1913 – the year 
Williams settled into Rutherford – the acreage of the Hackensack Meadowlands more or 
less stayed the same. Indeed, the development of the land would not begin until the 1920s 
(Marshall 12). And so the remains of Williams’ neighborhood junkyard remained. 
29 Williams was a walker, one who traveled through trash. Williams’ son – William Eric 
Williams, M.D. – notes how his father, uncle, and grandfather “walked hundreds of miles 
for the fun of it” (qtd. in Laughlin 29). Referring to his father, Williams junior writes how 
“[h]e would take a trolley out of town 8 or 10 miles and then walk home” (29). (See 
William Eric Williams’ recently published Williams Carlos Williams: an American Dad 
[2014], too.) Attesting to this footwork, Williams – in a letter addressed to his brother 
Edgar Irving Williams dated 1 August 1910 – recalls walking what ends up being forty-
one miles in one week. Williams writes the following: “On Tuesday of this week Pop and 
I took a fifteen mile walk back toward Great Notch, then along the old Canal and then 
home via Delawanna. On Wednesday we read and chopped wood and gardened but on 
Thursday we did twenty one miles starting from Haledon and ending up just south of 
Oradel where a man picked us up in his carriage and carried us into Hackensack. Toward 
the beginning of the walk we were picked up by a fellow in an auto who drove us about 
three miles on our way, we were lucky weren’t we. On Friday we did the Bronx which 
almost finished us both altho we only walked ten miles […]” (WCW&EIW 233). In this 
particular case, Williams’ destinations on Tuesday and Thursday were west of the 
Meadowlands; however, on Friday, walking eastward to the Bronx, Williams could not 
avoid the Meadowlands. Despite the details, though, this anecdote is an indication of how 
Williams’ penchant for perambulation places him in an 8, 10, 15, or 21-mile radius of 
Rutherford, which, of course, encompasses the Meadowlands, remembering that they are 
only a mile from his home. 
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30 Specifically, during this walk, they traveled and “they saw the Hackensack River, 
eastward, winding through the meadowlands below; to the west, closely parallel to the 
roadway, the Passaic River headed toward its union with the Hackensack into Newark 
Bay” (East xiii). 
31 Discussing the history of the Meadowlands, specifically the effort to stop landfilling, 
McGurty details the Hackensack Meadowlands Reclamation and Development Act of 
1968, which formed the Hackensack Meadowlands Development Commission (HDMC). 
The HDMC’s purpose was to “‘provide for urgent needs for more space for industry, 
commerce, residences and public recreation’” (32). Given that the landscape was laden 
with waste in 1969, waste accumulated over the decades, the HDMC needed to address 
the issue of trash disposal (32), especially because, as McGurty notes, slightly expanding 
Sullivan’s list of municipalities in the Meadowlands, “[g]arbage disposal had become an 
overriding concern of the fourteen municipalities within the district as well as the eighty-
six additional towns in New Jersey that depended on the Meadowlands for disposal of all 
their waste” (35). 
32 Oddly, however, thirty years after his walk in the Meadowlands with Burke, 
Josephson, and McAlmon, Williams – in one of the rare references to the Meadowlands – 
decides to nostalgically note his childhood memories of the “romantic ground” of “The 
Meadows”; in his Autobiography, he writes:  
The Meadows, the marshland separating the ridge where Rutherford lies from the 
next ridge, a continuation of the Palisades in Weehawken, was romantic ground 
for us growing boys. We didn’t dare go into the dense cedar-swamps that 
flourished there in which blueberry pickers in the fall were often lost; the 
mosquitoes were so thick you could almost grasp in the air at random about your 
head and kill a half-dozen of them. (283) 
The abject is absent. Although he alludes to “the dense-cedar swamps,” Williams’ 
revisionism and censorship conceals what was referred to as “blurs upon the fair face of 
Nature” in 1867 and “worthless,” “detriment,” and “nuisance” in 1907. The remainder of 
Williams’ remarks about the Meadowlands includes observations about flora and fauna 
(283). 
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33 Take, for instance, “ a rubbish heap / aflame” in the “dead weeds” (1: 292) from The 
Descent of Winter (1928), the “miscellany” of “garbage dumps” (1: 364) in “Our 
(American) Ragcademicians” published in The New English Weekly in 1933 (1: 535), and 
the “dust- / hung acreage” (2: 84) and “the polluted stream and dump / heap” (2:85) near 
a “monastery in / the suburbs” (2:84) in “The Semblables” published in Partisan Review 
in 1943. (The editors note how the monastery referred to in “The Semblables” is in 
Secaucus, New Jersey, and it is close to the Giants football stadium, a munitions works 
called “Black Tom,” and a garbage dump that fed the “most foul-smelling piggery on the 
East Coast” [2: 464].) (For a discussion of the history of Secaucus’ pig farming see 
Robert Sullivan’s The Meadowlands [1998], 22-23.) 
34 For a discussion of “Invitation,” see Ahearn, 59. 
35 “We are born into a detritus-strewn world” (323), writes Patricia Yeager in a similar 
context, one where she discusses what she calls a “rubbish ecology,” which “can be 
defined as the act of saving and savoring debris” (329). In her article, Yeager explores 
how the “old opposition between nature and culture has been displaced in postmodern art 
by a preoccupation with trash” (323). “Trash becomes nature, and nature becomes trash” 
(332), she writes. I engage Yaeger in my article, “Poetry, Garbage, Gift: Scrap Poetics in 
Contemporary North American Poetry,” which I cite in another note. 
36 This idea of a putrescent pastoral – a pastoral presenting us with a dirty object 
orientation – is a part of and indebted to John Marsh’s discussion of Williams’ counter-
pastoral, which involves representations of abject rural labour and country life (100). 
37 The word “greater” in the last line of “Approach to a City” is changed to “braver” in 
The Collected Poems of Williams Carlos Williams: Volume II, 1939-1962 (2: 468). 
38 For a discussion of the general economy, see George Bataille’s The Accursed Share, 
Volume I, 22, 25-26. 
39 In one of his philosophical essays – “Waste and Use” – from The Embodiment of 
Knowledge, Williams writes: “Thus we can say that ignorance, since it ignores laws it 
cannot know, is always poor economy, and since dirt seems dependent upon ignorance, 
personal filthiness I mean, why then dirt must be poor economy. Then it is economy to be 
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clean and if it is economy it is law and inevitable if we will survive. This is a mere 
example. And so all excess is plainly poor economy” (186-87). 
40 The page references of this litany are as follows: 1: 65, 69, 72, 81, 82, 82, 84, 89, 92, 
97, 101, 101, 106, 107, 145, 215, 216, 226, 251, 457; 2: 139, 200, respectively.  
41 In Ecology without Nature (2007), Morton argues that the very notion of nature is an 
ideological construct, which obscures and obstructs “ecological forms of culture, 
philosophy, politics, and art” (1). As he puts it elsewhere, however, he contends that, as I 
have previously noted, “[e]cology permeates all forms” (The Ecological Thought 11). For 
him, “[e]coriticism has overlooked the way in which all art—not just explicitly ecological 
art—hardwires the environment into its form” (11). Boldly stated, “all texts—all 
artworks, indeed—have an irreducibly ecological form” (11). 
42 Williams writes the following in I Wanted to Write a Poem: “The pieces in this book 
[A Novelette and Other Prose] show the influence of Dadaism. I didn’t originate Dadaism 
but I had it in my soul to write it. Spring and All shows that” (48). Indeed, Williams did 
go through a “Dada phase” (qtd. in Boone 2), notes Dickran Tashjian in Skyscraper 
Primitives: Dada and the American Avant-Garde (1975), “one of the first scholars to note 
that Dada had never been sufficiently explored in relation to Williams’s work in general” 
(Boone 2). “Williams was acquainted personally with the Dadaists who lived and worked 
in New York from 1915–21,” writes April Boone, “including Marcel Duchamp, Walter 
and Louise Arensberg, Man Ray, and Francis Picabia” (Boone 3). Tashjian, in William 
Carlos Williams and the American Scene, 1920-1940 (1978), moreover, discusses how 
Williams was “attracted to Dada” (56), but, ultimately, he “remained ambivalent toward 
Dada” (58). “Williams was clearly intrigued by and influenced by what the Dadaists were 
doing, yet he never came to agree with the segment of Dadaism that would decry the 
value of all art, and he resisted the term ‘anti-art’ sometimes applied to his own projects” 
(Boone 4). 
43 The “order” is as follows: Chapter 19, Chapter XIII (printed upside down), Chapter VI, 
Chapter 2, Chapter XIX, I, C I, III, IV, V, VI, VIII, X, XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV, XVI, 
XVII, XVIII, XIX, XX, XXI, XXIII, XXIV, XXV, XXVI, and XXVII. Although the 
typography is not altered in The Collected Poems of Williams Carlos Williams: Volume I, 
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1909-1939, Williams references Springs and All’s strange typography in I Wanted to 
Write a Poem: “Chapter headings are printed upside down on purpose, the chapters are 
numbered all out of order, sometimes with a Roman numeral, sometimes with an Arabic, 
anything that came in handy” (36-37). Also, New Directions recently published Spring 
and All (2011), a facsimile that includes the original interior of Williams’ well-known 
work; as such, it maintains all of the typographic idiosyncrasies like the inverted 
“Chapter XIII.” Williams himself remarks on this aleatory assemblage, too, in Spring and 
All: “I realize that the chapters are rather quick in their sequence and that nothing much is 
contained in any one of them but no one should be surprised at this today” (1: 182). 
44 As Ahearn notes, Williams’ poem presents us with an other—namely, Margaret Blake 
Purvis: “the principal ‘other,’ an emotionally upset woman, as Margaret Blake Purvis, a 
student nurse at the French Hospital during the time Williams served as an intern. It 
seems there was a brief romance between Williams and Purvis. She appears thinly 
disguised in the poem as ‘Miss Margaret Jarvis’” (148). Also, the poem’s reference to 
“Kiki” most likely refers to the “notorious model-whore of Montparnasse” (Leibowitz 
103)—that is, Alice Ernestine Prin. 
45 Others include: ramshackle, bump, (1: 180), paralleling (1: 181), microscopic, rigidity, 
surge (1: 182), scattering, forked, upstanding, twiggy, sluggish (1: 183), asunder, break 
through (1: 187), splitting, undulant (1: 190), crushing (1: 192), breaking, obscenely, 
spinning, broken (1: 201), chaotically, redundancy (1: 202), rejected (1: 203), gummed 
(1: 210), transparent, cardboard, sweaty, overtopping, swarming, pulverize (1: 211), 
aggregate, decay, efflorescent, growth, destruction, creation, perpendicular, cleaving, 
closeness, supple-jointed (1: 214), fruitless, (1: 215), stale (1: 219), divided, dead, 
dissections (1: 224). 
46 In 1959, Williams surveys the scene: “During the past ten years modern poetry has got 
completely over the ‘free verse’ phase. Measure is the sine qua non of verse. But our 
recourse to loose meters which we adopted in the last fifty or sixty years had its uses. 
Whitman’s practices were the practices of, at times, a great poet however much he went 
astray. He introduced to us a new spoken language, the American idiom, which brought 
in its train the variable foot” (2: 511-512). “For a fuller account by WCW of these 
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concepts [the American idiom] see ‘Measure—A Loosely Assembled Essay on Poetic 
Measure,’ Spectrum (1959), 131-157, and WCW’s essay ‘The American idiom’ in New 
Directions 17 (1961), 250-51)” (Litz and MacGowan qtd. in Williams 2: 512). 
47 Berry classifies all of the interpretations of the variable foot; they include 
understanding it as a temporal unit, a stress-based unit, a syntactical unit, a unit of 
meaning or attention, a unit of phrasing in reading, and, as noted, a visual unit (364). For 
Berry, however, what is missing is the “intonation unit” (365). Reviewing the work on 
intonation as such, Berry concludes that “the divisions in Williams’ triadic-line verse 
typically delimit syntactical/semantic units that, in a performance of the text, could be 
intonation units, set off by pauses and each containing an accented syllable with a pitch 
obtrusion” (368). 
48 Berry footnotes Paul Fussell, Jr.’s Poetic Meter and Poetic Form (1965). According to 
Stephen Adams, “stichic” is a type of continuous form that includes verse paragraphs 
(26). 
49 As Berry notes, “[i]n the triadic-line arrangement, however, the same enjambment has 
a very different effect—making one triad flow over into the next, with no particular 
tension” (384). 
50 Eleven years before Herland, Gilman published The Home, which features passages 
that address domestic waste; she writes, for instance, the following: “We, in our far larger 
homes, with our far more elaborate processes of living, and with our ancient system of 
confining women to the home entirely, have evolved a continuous accumulation of waste 
matter in the home. The effort temporarily to remove this waste is one of the main lines 
of domestic industry; the effort to produce it is another” (25-26). 
51 As Strasser points out, the “demise of the system that recycled waste materials […] is 
an integral part of the history of American mass production and distribution at the end of 
the nineteenth century” (108). Indeed, American changed: “By the close of the nineteenth 
century,” writes Carl A. Zimring, “material reuse in the United States had undergone 
several important transformations. Reuse of old materials in the household began to 
decline amid concern over hygiene and affordable alternatives in mass-produced goods. 
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As American households began to throw away more materials, American manufacturers 
began to seek out more discarded materials” (35). 
52 On these phenomena – the connections between consumption and waste – Thorstein 
Veblen writes the following: “Throughout the entire evolution of conspicuous 
expenditure, whether of goods or of services or human life, runs the obvious implication 
that in order to effectually mend the consumer’s good fame it must be an expenditure of 
superfluities. In order to be reputable it must be wasteful” (67). 
53 “Americans became more affluent in the last quarter of the nineteenth century,” writes 
Zimring, “enjoying a standard of living that continued to improve into the early twentieth 
century. With affluence came waste; more goods available meant more refuse. Solid 
waste disposal escalated. [...] Other metropolitan areas saw their garbage increase to the 
point that many engineers, chemists, city officials, journalists, and sanitarians voiced 
concern over excessive waste being a problem. [...] Consumption at the turn of the 
century was on a much smaller scale than that of the throwaway society of the late 
twentieth century, but the trend of consumption and disposal was rising” (41). 
54 As an example of downcycling, William McDonough and Michael Braungart write the 
following: “When plastics other than those found in soda and water bottles are recycled, 
they are mixed with different plastics to produce a hybrid of lower quality, which is then 
molded into something amorphous and cheap, such as a park bench or a speed bump” 
(56). More broadly, Heather Rogers notes how recycling is not as effective as we think: 
“Recycling was presented as a solution to the garbage crisis, but it can’t keep pace with 
the staggering output of throwaways. About 80 percent of U.S. products are used once 
and then discarded. Although there are more than 9,000 curbside recycling programs in 
the country, many towns do not collect the stuff. And even if the dutiful separate their 
metal from glass, much of it still ends up at the landfill or incinerator, having found no 
buyer on the other end. If substances sent to recovery centers can’t compete with lower-
priced ‘virgin’ materials, they get dumped. And, further limiting the expansion of 
recycling, U.S. producers are not required to use reprocessed materials even though most 
manufacturers now stamp their containers with the eco-friendly recycling symbol” (6). 
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55 Recall my earlier discussion in the introduction about how Williams was in the middle 
of a transition from reuse to disposal throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century; also, see Strasser’s Waste and Want, 12-13. 
56 Hofstadter defines a “strange loop” as follows: “What I mean by ‘strange loop’ is…not 
a physical circuit but an abstract loop in which, in the series of stages that constitute the 
cycling-around, there is a shift from one level of abstraction (or structure) to another, 
which feels like an upwards movement in a hierarchy, and yet somehow the successive 
‘upward’ shifts turn out to give rise to a closed cycle. That is, despite one’s sense of 
departing ever further from one’s origin, one winds up, to one’s shock, exactly where one 
had started out” (101-102). 
57 Specifically, Loy’s “Love Songs to Joannes” first published in Others in 1915 opens 
with Pig Cupid’s “rosy snout / Rooting erotic garbage” (91); Sandburg’s “Population 
Drifts” from Chicago Poems (1916) depicts how “six children / played on the stones and 
prowled in the garbage cans” (15), and in The People, Yes (1936), he writes of “women 
and kids […] searching alleys and garbage dumps for scraps” (484); Dos Passos wrote a 
play called The Garbage Man (1926), which marginally includes the titular character and 
focuses on the bourgeois; and Stevens’ metaphysical meditation “The Man on the Dump” 
from Parts of a World (1942) is rooted in waste, but, ultimately, it disavows debris: 
“Between that disgust and this, between the things / That are on the dump (azaleas and so 
on) / And those that will be (azaleas and so on), / One feels the purifying change. / One 
rejects / The Trash” (202). 
58 Tim Armstrong lists some of the dirty corporeal features of The Waste Land; he writes: 
“The materials of abjection include bodily parts (dirty ears, hands, feet; teeth, parted 
knees, bones, hair), clothing (underwear), places (dead land, desert), animals (scorpions, 
bats), acts (rape, abortion, copulation), and actors. The draft is particularly productive of 
dirt though Pound and Eliot’s editing intrudes here: in ‘The Fire Sermon’ the ‘dirty 
camisoles’ of the draft lose their adjective; the young man’s hair, ‘thick with grease, and 
thick with scurf’ is excised; his urination and spitting are cut” (69). 
59 Generally, Anderson’s article “Sacred Waste: Ecology, Spirit, and the American 
Garbage Poem” works toward delimiting a genealogy of the American garbage poem. 
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With both breadth and depth, Anderson acutely attends to traces of trash littered in and 
around the canon starting with Walt Whitman’s “This Compost.” Anderson explains how 
representations of trash and waste places like dumps and compost heaps are positioned as 
sites of self-reflection and spiritual and ecological renewal (37). Anderson argues that 
these poets avoid reiterating ecopoetry’s hackneyed tropes – condoning the beautification 
of wild nature and condemning environmental destruction – and instead pursue the way 
in which waste mediates and networks nature and culture: “garbage serves as a meeting 
point of human culture, the natural world, and the spiritual realm” (37). Anderson’s 
analysis implicitly, if not explicitly, expands the parameters of what constitutes ecopoetry 
by positioning and subsequently exploring the garbage poem from an ecocritical 
framework. 
60 “It should not be surprising that several garbage poems appeared during the economic 
boom of postwar America, for the underside of that era’s prosperity was the rampant 
wastefulness of an emerging throwaway society” (Anderson, “Sacred Waste” 41). This 
line of reasoning is not uncommon. In an earlier article on poetry and trash, Gyorgi Voros 
says something similar to Anderson’s emphasis on trash in the latter half of the twentieth 
century: “In its material versions, it takes on special significance for post–World War II 
American consumer culture, whose garbage, both because of sheer volume and because 
of its unbiodegradability, threatens altogether to clog both the physical and metaphysical 
cycles of degeneration and renewal” (162-163). 
61 Peter Halter also points out that, “Paterson is unthinkable without the collage form” 
(7). 
62 For an in depth discussion of Williams and collage see Nicole Cooley’s article “‘The 
Act is Disclosed by the Imagination of It’: Frottage, Collage, and the American Origin in 
the Work of William Carlos Williams” in Sagetrieb 13.3, 1993, who explores “the 
alliance of Williams makes here between language, ‘words,’ Surrealism, and the notion 
of ‘locality’ in order to delineate the points of intersection between Surrealist writing 
practices and Williams’s texts” (31). 
63 “When a man makes a poem, makes it, mind you,” writes Williams, “he takes words as 
he finds them interrelated about him and composes them—without distortion which 
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would mar their exact significances—into an intense expression of his perceptions and 
ardors that they may constitute a revelation in the speech that he uses. It isn’t what he 
says that counts as a work of art, it’s what he makes, [… ]” (2: 54-55). 
64 After the fact, the verb “lie” brings the title back into the fold (Townley 118). 
Alternatively, this poem could have repeated the word “between” in order to follow the 
laws of syntax (Halter 186-187); however, this does not happen, which creates a gap 
between the “title” and the rest of the poem. 
65 Here, I am adapting this configuration from Halter’s discussion of “Between Walls” 
(186-187). 
66 And here I am adapting this version from Perloff’s analysis of “Between Walls” (The 
Dance of the Intellect 106). 
67 Ultimately, Markos seems to kowtow to authorial intention in his reading of “Between 
Walls” when he references the following excerpt from one of Williams’ letters: “‘All it 
means as far as I know, is that in a waste of cinders loveliness, in the form of color, 
stands up alive’” (Williams qtd. in Markos 138). 
68 For a discussion of the relationship between Williams and cars see Cecelia Tichi’s 
Shifting Gears: Technology, Literature, Culture in Modernist America (1987). 
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Chapter 2: Energizing Gertrude Stein 
 
 
“In the Twentieth Century you feel like movement” (How Writing Is Written 
153), writes Gertrude Stein. Compared to the nineteenth century – one that “didn’t feel 
that way” (153) – Stein insists that “you feel movement all the time” (153). For her, 
America had the first instance of what she calls, “Twentieth Century writing” (153), 
where “the American thing is the vitality of movement” (Writings 1932-1946 292), which 
appeared in the work of Walt Whitman.1 Stein’s Whitman is a surveyor of America’s 
“sacred industry” (Whitman, Leaves of Grass 344), one who celebrates the “thud of 
machinery” (343) with “the latest connections” of the “inter-transportation of the world” 
(347), including steam power, the great express lines, gas, petroleum, and the Pacific 
Railroad (347-348). Not unlike Whitman’s attention to industry, Stein suggests that the 
“Twentieth Century conceived an automobile as a whole, so to speak, and then created it, 
built it up out of its parts” (How Writing Is Written 152-153). We know that the car is 
central to Stein and her style.2 Indeed, she named her Fords “Aunt Pauline” and 
“Godiva.”3 Without gas, however, the car stays still. This chapter looks at gas and the 
ways that this resource informs Stein’s poetry.  
In doing so, I respond to Patricia Yeager’s ruminations on the ecology and energy 
of literature, specifically when she asks, “what happens if we sort texts according to the 
energy sources that made them possible?” (“Literature” 305). How, she adds, do “we 
think about utility and poetry together?” (310). To address these questions, I explore 
forms of energy – primarily oil, but also wood, coal, and electricity – in Stein. Doing so 
may seem strange, because her poetry seldom comes up in ecocritical debates.4 While it 
is a critical commonplace to remark on Stein’s energetic experiments with language, 
scholars stop short of heralding her as a prophet of energy. Yet, a close consideration of 
excerpts from her oeuvre reveals a largely overlooked concern with the materiality of 
natural resources. This sentiment most directly appears in “Work Again” when she 
writes: “In leaning can we encounter oil” (Geography and Plays 399). Here we have the 
“Oil Encounter.”5 This allusion to oil provides a useful direction for reading because 
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Stein’s encounters with oil were oblique, whether leaning near linseed oil paintings 
gracing the walls of 27 rue de Fleurus or over the engine of her Ford.  
The energy humanities is a growing field.6 There is, however, a gap when it 
comes to research on the modernist avant-garde. This is especially strange because, as 
Imre Szeman notes, modernism is either “a small subset of a long period of oil literature” 
or “anticipates and participates in the birth of the hegemony of oil” (“Literature and 
Energy Futures” 324). Szeman’s explanation is that, like every contemporary social 
narrative, literature participates in rather than challenges the fiction of surplus energy 
(324). Yet, as I show, Stein does not necessarily have a “faith in surplus” (325); rather, 
she is acutely aware of the nature of energy and, in turn, this affects her own cultural 
production. While Stein might be one of Szeman’s “exceptions,” like Upton Sinclair’s 
Oil! (1927), we can and should scrutinize modernism’s avant-garde aesthetics if we are to 
address and perhaps rectify our “epistemic inability or unwillingness to name our energy 
ontologies” (324). Starting with Stein, I am interested in reading the “difficult” 
modernists with energy in mind. After all, their forms are fueled by something, and their 
experimental poetics might offer us some answers. 
Energy and natural resources preoccupied Stein as early as “Normal Motor 
Automatism” (1896).7 “As I say a motor goes inside and the car goes on,” writes Stein, 
“but my business my ultimate business as an artist was not with where the car goes as it 
goes but with the movement inside that is the essence of its going” (Writings 1932-1946 
305). Here, “essence” is the French word for “gasoline.”8 Aware of energy, Stein needed 
it, too. Nearly a thousand pages, The Making of Americans – started in 1903, finished in 
1911, and published in 1925 – is but one example of Stein’s prolific nature.  
Yet, the materiality of Stein’s energy is overlooked. Instead, she is often seen as a 
conceptual artist experimenting with language or a self-conscious scribe engaging 
irresistible dictation.9 When considered in this way, the view of Stein’s approach to 
“language as a living, moving, acting entity” (Meyer 147) loses sight of the natural 
resources and labour that go into her cultural production. “I am occupied by coal” (As 
Fine As Melanctha 63), Stein writes, and, elsewhere, she refers to the act of “cranking my 
machine” (Bee Time Vine 194).  
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This chapter, then, recovers the energy of Stein’s Whitmanian side. Indeed, we 
see her channeling his celebratory side, too, in a poem about Aunt Pauline when she 
exclaims, “Hurrah for America” (Geography and Plays 392). And so we see this Stein, 
for instance, in “Yet Dish” from 1913, which is a playful poem – “Yet Dish” is “Yiddish” 
– composed of sixty-nine numbered stanzas with anywhere from one to seven lines; the 
fifty-second stanza reads: “Leaves of gas, leaves of get a towel louder” (Writings 1903-
1932 370). From Leaves of Grass to “Leaves of gas,” Stein shows off her Whitman, the 
one who admires “the great derrick” (Leaves of Grass 360) in “A Song for Occupations.” 
Moreover, she gestures to how the uncanny nature of oil as millennia old organic matter 
(“Leaves”) constitutes the biochemical make-up of petroleum. Stein’s playfulness is part 
of a petropoetics, a relationship between art and oil that I unpack in this chapter through a 
close reading of her works. This petropoetics is evident, for example, elsewhere in “Yet 
Dish”:  
Nice oil pail. 
No gold go at. 
Nice oil pail. 
Near a paper lag sought. 
What is an astonishing won door. A please spoon. (Writings 1903-1932 367) 
In this subterranean Stein, it is an astonishing wonder (“won door”) what can be found 
underground as “Nice oil” slips into sounding like “soil.” Indeed, there are other dirty, 
dripping sounds resonating throughout Stein’s work, as in “Guillaume Apollinaire” from 
1913, which reads:  
Give known or pin ware. 
Fancy teethe, gas strips. 
Elbow elect, sour stout pore, pore caesar, pour state at.  
Leave eye lessons I. Leave I. Lessons. I. Leave I lessons, I.  
(A Stein Reader 279)  
As the strange “gas strips” sounds like “gas drips,”10	  we might take a lesson from Stein 
and keep our eyes and ears open for the sights and sounds of her energy consciousness.  
By attending to this energy consciousness, I tell a largely unknown story of Stein, 
one which foregrounds the energy that fuels her work and world. This overlooked 
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fascination with oil and other resources in Stein’s writing points to an incipient energy 
consciousness that does not flourish until much later. Analyzing samples of Stein’s 
oeuvre, I explore her latent yet manifest energetic materiality. This enables us to account 
for how Stein’s famously complicated style engages a system of material relations in 
modernism that is not necessarily ecologically or environmentally oriented per se, but 
still foregrounds the ways in which nature and culture are entangled. Her work helps us to 
think about the stuff that goes into poetry, the objectness of poetics, and the energy of 
poetic expression. Accordingly, I explore the characteristics of her energy consciousness 
through representations of wood, coal, and electricity, which, ultimately, exhibits the 
transformative, powerful, and erotic nature of energy. Moreover, I focus on features of 
Stein’s petropoetics, an idea I explain later, with special attention to representation, form, 
temporality, agency, and biotechnology. To close, I turn to the notion of the embodiment 
of energy in and through the figure of Stein’s car. Like dumpster diving, my attention to 
petropoetics here sustains an interest in how a text engages with the material world; 
however, unlike dumpster diving, petropoetics focuses more on the oblique ways in 
which the sensuousness of a substance affects the work based on varying realities and 
forms of surplus and scarcity. Garbage does not generate energy, but oil does, and so the 
latter permeates the world in a different way. Yet, energy can be and is wasted, too.11 
Similar but different, waste and oil, dumpster diving and petropoetics, both register a 
tension around the entangled relationship between nature and culture in dirty modernism.  
In 1874, Stein was born into oil. A native of Allegheny, Pennsylvania (now 
Pittsburgh), she spent her early years in the home of the first oil well in America, or what 
is known as “The Oil State.”12 Black gold made its mark on her. Indeed, Stein famously 
collected oil. Once in Paris, she encountered it daily while living at 27 rue de Fleurus, 
which on Saturday nights doubled as an upstart artists’ salon (Mellow 6). Shocking the 
senses, avant-garde art covered the walls, but, more importantly, the salon’s spotlight on 
oil painting discloses the link between petroleum and culture. According to one 
biographer, the sheer quantity of paintings was overwhelming: Gertrude and her brother 
Leo collected “so industriously that the three available walls of the studio […] were 
crammed with pictures hung row above row” (6-7). Indeed, the oils spilled into nearby 
rooms (7). Although this metaphor – an oil spill of art – is slippery, I invoke it to draw 
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attention to the resources of these artworks. Whether or not Stein singled out the 
relationship between oil painting and oil as a resource is less important than the fact that 
this scene illustrates the importance of teasing out the tension between art and the 
production of it, especially when it comes to the energetic materiality of oil in Stein’s 
writing. 
Where does Stein find the energy to write the way she does? At times, her stamina 
is surprising. In “An Instant Answer or A Hundred Prominent Men,” she writes the word 
“one” a hundred times (Writings 1903-1932 484). Also, the level of concentration 
required by Stein to play with the semiotics of one word is extraordinary. Ironically, the 
following excerpt from “Play” reveals just how much work Stein puts into what Ulla E. 
Dydo describes as “an exercise in disciplined writing with a reductive vocabulary” (A 
Stein Reader 147):  
Play, play every day, play and play and play away, and then play the play you 
played to-day, the play you play every day, play it and play it. Play it and 
remember it and ask to play it. Play it, and play it and play away. Certainly every 
one wants you to play, every one wants you to play away, to play every day, to 
play and play, to play the play you play every day, to play and remember it and 
ask to play it and play it and to play away and to play every day and to-day and all 
day. (147) 
“Free time is shackled to its contrary” (187), writes Theodor W. Adorno; indeed, he 
continues, “free time is nothing more than a shadowy continuation of labor” (194). 
Stein’s freewheeling play is work, which requires energy. The effort of Stein’s labour 
lives in each and every sentence, like this one from “Patriarchal Poetry”: “To be we to be 
to be we to be to be to be we to be we to be to be to be to be to be to be to be we we to be 
to be to be we to be” (Writings 1903-1932 575). Surely, this is an iteration of the Steinian 
sentence – a ubiquitous type – but it also gestures to Stein’s awareness of the work of 
reading her writing. The repetition of the infinitive with the inclusive pronoun 
foregrounds a shared existence and exertion of energy between reader and writer. Stein is 
conscious of energy operating in her writing and world as she forgoes mimesis or realism 
and opts for materializing the stuff of work.  
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Self-reflexive about consumption, Stein’s energy consciousness is fueled by 
economic forces like scarcity. In a letter postmarked 23 February 1917 to Carl Van 
Vechten, she reports that she is “running a little Ford into the country for the American 
relief committee and […] enjoying it,” while also noting that, “Paris is nice, looking for 
coal is xciting and now we have it” (1: 58). Twenty-four years later, Stein is still 
cognizant of resources; in a letter to Thornton Wilder, she writes: “I am having my car 
changed to burn alchohol [sic] instead of essence [gasoline], we can make alcohol, and 
the days and weeks go by so quickly” (285). Her artworks reveal this, too. In “Painted 
Lace” she writes: “The search for food and fuel became secretly cooking potatoes” 
(Painted Lace 2). The frustration of trying to find resources yields the shame of 
consuming the poor person’s potato. An awareness of the economy of energy is evident, 
especially in “A Sonatina Followed by Another”: “We do not use coal, we burn wood, we 
find it more economical and pleasanter. Before the war we use to wish that we could 
afford to burn wood instead of coal, now that we are no richer and wood is dearer we find 
it more economical to burn wood” (Bee Time Vine 5). Often, the rarity of a resource is 
reflected by a marginal reference in a poetic list:   
Offal slow. 
Slowly.  
With fern.  
Deal term.  
Reckless manner.  
Naughty spoon.  
Murder. 
……… 
Spit.  
Tender toe binder.  
Paper coal gas. (119)  
Seemingly inconsequential, there is energy around natural resources in the unpunctuated 
line, “Paper coal gas.” Writing about commas in “Poetry and Grammar,” Stein says, “for 
a long time I felt very definitely about them and would have nothing to do with them” 
(Writings 1932-1946 320). For her, “commas are servile and they have no life of their 
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own” (320); a comma, moreover, “keeps you from living your life as actively as you 
should lead it” (320). Ultimately, “a comma is a poor period that it lets you stop and take 
a breath but if you want to take a breath you ought to know yourself that you want to take 
a breath” (321). Without commas, then, the line, “Paper coal gas” produces a short burst 
of energy. The syntax of this line also shows us how paper is Stein’s natural resource, 
which is equal to coal and gas; moreover, it gestures to an inverted order of events. Paper 
does not grow on trees; rather, it comes from them. Through multiple steps and 
mediations, the energy derived from coal and gas yields a product to write on. Reading 
forward – from left to right – we are going backward: we trace the truncated path of 
paper back to the earth all within the span of three words. In this poem, energy 
materializes around object relations. Surely, Stein is a writer who is conscious of how she 
consumes the energy of the environs, which is perhaps best articulated with the opening 
of “Americans”: “Eating and paper” (Writings 1903-1932 373). “To step outside of 
petromodernity would require a step outside of media, including the contemporary book” 
(“The Aesthetics of Petroleum, after Oil!” 64), writes Stephanie Le Menager. At some 
level, Stein is aware of “the inescapability of petroleum infrastructure” (64)—that is, how 
“[e]lectricty, fuel oil, and natural gas have kept press equipment running” (64). 
“There are very many who are very serious ones in going to be doing something 
in the way of artistic creation. There are very many who are working many hours every 
day with serious intention” (The Making of Americans 693), writes Stein, who is one of 
these “very serious ones.” Thinking about “working many hours every day,” I want to 
focus on the transformative, powerful, and erotic nature of energy in Stein through wood, 
coal, and electricity, respectively. Turning to these areas of analysis helps us to explore 
the characteristics of Stein’s energy consciousness.  
“It is snowing all day, and I have cut wood all day” (qtd. in Mellow 443), writes 
Stein in a letter to William Rogers, or the Kiddie, as she chops away at the block 
elsewhere, too: “Cut wood cut wood” (A Stein Reader 328). From kindling to a basket of 
wood to the fireplace,13 Stein spent time with nature’s bounty. With her woodwork in 
mind, we can consider how there is a transformative energy in her wordplay. That is, a 
form of energy can be found when similar sounds produce possibility within the realm of 
meaning. Wavering between one signified and another, the work of the pun generates a 
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brief, yet frenetic act of signification. While the push and pull of puns are everywhere in 
Stein, producing a range of affects, it is the “would” of “wood” that is at the core of her 
energetic wit. “Wood has not that meaning” (Geography and Plays 108), she writes. Like 
wood’s ability to be otherwise, Stein’s philosophy of the “would” for words is one of 
possibility, condition, and intention. Experimenting with encoding, Stein opens up 
decoding to more movement and activity. At every turn, she seems to ask, “What would 
this mean if I did that?” For this reason, Stein loves wood for its energy-to-be really or 
linguistically other:  
In This Shape Wood 
 
Indeed I do love wood.  
And coal.  
And speak of horses.  
We do not mind coughs.  
You mean of a machine. (Bee Time Vine 208-209) 
In this early poem dated around the arrival of Stein’s Ford (c. 1917), one that 
anthropomorphizes the car’s horsepower, the title tells all with its reference to the shape 
of wood, or what “would” be. Here we find Stein’s transformative energy in terms of 
both pun and potentiality. As Stein writes elsewhere, there is an “Object that is in wood” 
(Writings 1903-1932 322) – one that is inward (“in wood”) – to be pulled out of the plane 
of possibility. Iterations of Stein’s wordplay, then, point to a polysemic transformative 
energy.  
Stein’s energy consciousness also registers the power of coal, which is, perhaps, 
felt in its heft—“coal is tonny” (Geography and Plays 87). As a biochemical entity, coal 
works wonders. In “Turkey and Bones and Eating and We Like It,” a character named 
“Anthony and coal” says, “I believe that coal is better than wood. If coal is good it burns 
longer. In any case it is very difficult to get here” (Writings 1903-1932 397). For Stein, 
the resource’s radiant luminosity reveals its energy: “Colour is in coal. Coal is outlasting 
roasting and a spoonful, a whole spoon that is full is not spilling. Coal any coal is copper” 
(330). The hue and heat of this fuel receives preferential treatment as a commodity on the 
marketplace in Stein’s “Advertisements”: “I do not want the gas stove. It has a round 
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oven. It does not bake. We use coal by preference” (Geography and Plays 344). Stranger 
than Stein’s direct endorsement of how “Evian water is very good” (346), coal is still a 
“natural thing” (344). There is, however, a dirty side to this lauded lump of combustible 
carbon. On more than one occasion,14 we find coal paired with coffee in Stein—for 
instance, a passage from “A Piece of Coffee” reads as follows: “A single image is not 
splendor. Dirty is yellow. A sign of more in not mentioned. A piece of coffee is not a 
detainer. The resemblance to yellow is dirtier and distincter. The clean mixture is whiter 
and not coal color, never more coal color than altogether” (Writings 1903-1932 315). A 
form of fuel, coffee and coal are comparable, yet the “clean mixture” that is “not coal 
color” conceives of the rock as a contagion. This dirty dissonance also rings out in “Third 
Day Not Thirsty”:  
Clamor in coal.  
Coal white.  
And wood.  
Wood sore.  
And lambs.  
Put in bouquets. 
You think I am fooling. Not at all. Sheep put in bouquets.  
This is that door.  
They are perfectly capable of eating their mutton. (Bee Time Vine 183-184)	  
The noise or “clamor” found in coal with the suggested tension between black and white 
in “Coal white” expresses an intensity, one that is amplified by the subtle suggestion that 
the sheep are fed their own flesh (“mutton”). Coal is powerful, but precarious; indeed, 
Stein gestures towards its coup de grâce in “IN,” a poem that is primarily “a study in 
vowel contrasts and consonant relationships” (44):  
(A.H.A.) A brew sue, portal.  
Breathe, breathe little plain page with collapse with collapse thick 
it.  
 
  A never in knee needles.  
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  Coal lapse, coal it, will he.  
  A leave center pill to lent. (48) 
The sonic similarity between “collapse” and “Coal / lapse” reveals the remnants of a pun, 
one that fails like a lapse in memory and, importantly, evokes the collapse of a coalmine. 
In 1903,15 Stein arrived in Paris where she would live for the rest of her life, aside from 
periodic travels. Three years later, Europe’s worst mining disaster happened less than half 
an hour away from where Stein resided (“Courrières”; “Courrières mine disaster”). While 
Stein never mentions the Courrières mine disaster, it is hard to believe she would not 
know about it given the gross number of casualties. A source of energy and a cause of 
death, coal comes off quite powerfully in Stein’s writing.  
“I do not understand electricity” (Geography and Plays 246), writes Stein in one 
of her plays. Elsewhere, she suggests that there is no need to comprehend it because it is 
autonomous: “Electricity takes care of itself” (Bee Time Vine 9). But she is enthralled by 
the “blaze of electric light” (Writings 1932-1946 577) that we see surrounding the lead in 
Doctor Faustus Lights the Lights (1938).16 Indeed, Stein’s energy consciousness features 
the erotic poetics of electricity. In 1914,17 Stein upgraded the infrastructure of 27 rue de 
Fleurus: “We planned that we would have a little passage-way made between the studio 
and the little house and as that entailed cutting a door and plastering we decided that we 
would paint the atelier and repaper the house and put in electricity” (The Autobiography 
of Alice B. Toklas 140). Around this time, Stein’s poetry is electrically and erotically 
charged, especially in “Sacred Emily.” This poem – the one where Stein’s rose first 
appears – is known for its erotic and amatory nature. Analyzing it, one critic notes how, 
“Stein links sexuality and textuality in a poem that makes sacred the union of women” 
(Ford 82); moreover, it is “a poem that legitimizes femininity” (83). This is quite clear 
given the opening line’s reference to “beds” (Writings 1903-1932 387), the pun on 
peignoir with “pin nor” (387), the illocutionary line, “I do love honor and obey I do” 
(387), and the sexually suggestive repetition of the word “cunning” eight times (389, 392, 
394, 395). Yet, “Sacred Emily” has not been read through the frame of the energy of 
electricity, which is strange given that one of its lines contains what could be read as a 
“tender button”: “Electrics are tight electrics are white electrics are a button” (389). 
Additionally, there are references to luminosity, wires, and humming (393, 395, 388). 
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And so the intimacy of electricity, or “tight electrics,” reveals the poem’s erotic nature, 
which is immediately underscored by the following phrase, “Singular pressing” (389). As 
the speaker writes, “we are one and indivisible” (388), it is clear that “Sacred Emily” 
expresses a sexualized friction, which is also apparent in its moments of repetition and 
juxtaposition:  
Next to barber. 
Next to barber bury. 
Next to barber bury china. 
Next to barber bury china glass.  
Next to barber china and glass. 
Next to barber and china.  
Next to barber and hurry.  
Next to hurry. 
Next to hurry and glass and china. 
Next to hurry and glass and hurry. 
Next to hurry and hurry. 
Next to hurry and hurry. (389-390) 
This climactic crescendo captures the momentum of desire with its anaphoric phrase 
“Next to,” which gestures to an intimate proximity between bodies. Connected and 
energized by rhyme, the repetition of “hurry” – sparked by “bury” – highlights a libidinal 
energy that is driven by and drawn towards the fear and erotic nature of death. We also 
hear the sonic sexuality of Stein’s poem in this line: “Push sea push sea push sea push sea 
push sea push sea push sea push sea” (387). Surely, “the sensual auditory sibilance” of 
this line points to “the erotic motion of advancing and retreating waves,” which can be 
read as “lovers moving together or experiencing waves of pleasure” (Ford 80). Read 
aloud, moreover, the propulsive energy and repetition of the phrase “push sea” transforms 
it into “pussy” – a word repeated three times in the poem (Writings 1903-1932 395) – 
which is Alice’s nickname,18 not to mention a “tender button.”  Stein’s style of writing is 
charged with an energy consciousness, one that presents us with a petropoetics, too.  
“It is oil’s saturation of the infrastructure of modernity that paradoxically has 
placed a significant bar on its cultural representation” (81), notes Peter Hitchcock. Yet, if 
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and when oil appears, however obliquely, we can discern a petropoetics. Simply put, 
petropoetics is an aesthetic oriented towards the ways in which oil and its forms enter and 
affect a work. Perhaps peculiar, petropoetics involves a stereoscopic mode of looking at 
both word and world. With material production in mind, one considers how objects of 
energy fuel and form our reading and knowledge of texts. In this regard, Yaeger writes 
that 
energy sources also enter texts as fields of force that have causalities outside (or 
in addition to) class conflicts and commodity wars. The touch-a-switch-and-it’s-
light magic of electrical power, the anxiety engendered by atomic residue, the 
odor of coal pollution, the viscous animality of whale oil, the technology of 
chopping wood: each resource instantiates a changing phenomenology that could 
re-create our ideas about the literary text’s relation to its originating modes of 
production as quasi-objects. (“Literature” 309-310) 
Petropoetics places aesthetics and environment in dialogue; it explores how the “fields of 
force” are represented in the very make-up of the text. Whether simmering, seeping, or 
gushing, Stein’s work exhibits a petropoetics in modernism, a phenomenon that has gone 
largely unrecognized because the cultural logic of oil is defined and dictated by 
concealment, at least until catastrophe strikes.19 Up until the spectacle of an oil spill, say, 
energy is unconsciously (mis)understood as power ex nihilo: energy that appears out of 
nowhere, a form of fuel with a forgotten history. Oil is ancestral, however, an age-old 
substance from time immemorial uncannily removed and rendered usable today. 
Unrecognized until now, Stein does, indeed, have a relationship with this substance; she 
is well aware of its iterations, too:  
Arouse yourself you are dormant. Arouse yourself land of promise. Be proud of 
oil, olive oil, wood oil, ground oil, cotton seed oil, ginger oil, palm oil, and 
gushing oil. Be proud of yourselves all of you together and sing peaceably. Gather 
yourselves together for an education. Read the notices. Decide the parts. And be 
gracious. If you must do it do it graciously. (Painted Lace 7)  
From “Coal and Wood” (1920), Stein gestures towards oil above and below ground and 
arouses an energy through pride around that which is dormant but soon to be a geyser like 
the Lakeview Gusher in 1910.20 As oil appears, it affects her style, too. In “Why Are 
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There White To Console,” Stein writes: “When I was young I suddenly decided not to 
smother grass with water or oil with water not to smother oil with water or water with 
water. I decided not to smother oil or grass or water or any other addresses” (As Fine As 
Melanctha 200). Although the speaker decides, “not to smother,” the sentence still does 
through its repetition of different pairs of grass, water, and oil. Moreover, Stein’s 
syntactical stutters disorient the reader’s apprehension, if not comprehension, of the 
passage, which produces a sense of being overwhelmed, smothered even, by oil. While 
the “opportunity to think of oil as nature and/or art opens broad possibility for thinking 
about how oil has expressed fundamental notions of humanness” (Le Menager, “Fossil, 
Fuel” 378), I am, instead, interested in how oil as such operates in Stein.  
In Stein, there is a sense of puzzlement around representations of petroleum. 
“How can oil be thick and thin” (Bee Time Vine 6), she asks. Bewildered by its viscosity, 
Stein still asserts the integrity of oil as an entity: “A drop of oil remains just what it is” 
(Painted Lace 35). Pondering its properties, moreover, Stein is fascinated with oil’s 
fluidity:  
One. 
An oil in a can, an oil and a vial with a thousand stems. An oil in a cup 
and a steel sofa.  
One.  
An oil in a cup and a woolen coin, a woolen card and a best satin. 
(Geography and Plays 199) 
From can to vial to cup, oil is capable of taking the shape of its container. Oil’s ability to 
shape-shift speaks to Stein’s penchant for sonic play, too. “Oil in join, oil in join show, 
oil in join shoulder shoulder shoulder show” (Bee Time Vine 174), she writes. Here, we 
enjoy (“in join”) the sound of the oil engine (“in join”) on the shoulder of the road. The 
odd ways in which oil operates fascinates Stein, especially given its form of 
formlessness. Slipping and sliding around, Stein’s writing is energized by oil.  
The form of petropoetics is also evident in slick, sticky, and slippery “Susie 
Asado” written in 1913 and published in 1922. Although the poem does not explicitly 
refer to a resource, I propose that we can read it with the form of oil in mind, a mode of 
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interpretation that might be useful in turning to the energy of modernism to uncover the 
aesthetics of an influential infrastructure. “Susie Asado” reads:  
 Sweet sweet sweet sweet sweet tea.  
  Susie Asado.  
Sweet sweet sweet sweet sweet tea.  
 Susie Asado.  
Susie Asado which is a told tray sure.  
A lean on the shoe this means slips slips hers.  
When the ancient light grey is clean it is yellow, it  
is a silver seller. 
 This is a please this is a please there are the saids to jelly.     
These are the wets these say the sets to leave a crown to Incy. 
 Incy is short for incubus.  
 A pot. A pot is a beginning or a rare bit of trees.  
Trees tremble, the old vats are in bobbles, bobbles which  
shade and shove and render clean, render clean must.  
  Drink pups.  
 Drink pups drink pups lease a sash hold, see it shine 
and a bobolink has pins. It shows a nail. 
 What is a nail. A nail is unison. 
 Sweet sweet sweet sweet sweet tea. (Writings 1903-1932 362) 
Critics turn to “Susie Asado” to talk about a wide range of themes, including Cubism, 
Stein’s muse (the Flamenco dancer Antonia Mercé y Luque, or “La Argentina”), and 
conversational relations and friendship, but not oil, not petropoetics.21 This poem shows 
how profoundly oil seeps into and shapes Stein’s consciousness and style. From sticking 
to the constant consonance of “sweet” so “sweet tea” sounds like “sweetie”; to sensing 
the sticky and slippery side-by-side “slips slips” that slides into, yet slips up, the metre of 
the two lines yielding the rhyme, “sure” / “hers”; to encountering the insoluble clusters of 
doubled words or phrases (“pot,” “trees,” “bobbles,” “render clean,” “drink pups,” and 
“nail”), Stein is aware of the substantial and sonic sensuousness of oil, especially as the 
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sibilants signify oil dripping. It seems like part of the allure here is oil’s strange 
temporality.  
Stein’s petropoetics highlights how the time of oil is odd, uncanny even. Oil is 
simultaneously past and present; its eons spent underground mix with the present moment 
when the repressed returns by the derrick’s drill. Stein’s energy consciousness registers 
the synchronicity of oil’s temporality in the following excerpt from “Natural 
Phenomena”: “Let us consider coal and wood and candles. Let us consider paper and 
stones and oil. Let us consider chances and distance and origin. Let us consider it all at 
once” (Painted Lace 168). What links these disparate materials is their origin in the 
ground; bringing them together discloses a synchronic relation that pursues the 
impossible (“Let us consider it all at once”). Rather than a mere litany separated by 
commas, Stein forms groupings that group relations and sub-relations at once with a 
conjunction. Paper, stones, and oil: paper and stones; paper and oil; stones and oil. Here 
we have a sort of Steinian set theory that seeks to subsume the surrounds while 
maintaining an awareness of how each entity exists independently and collectively at the 
same time. As this synchrony sounds itself out, it is clear that intentionality is shared 
between human and nonhuman: we intend things, things intend us, and things intend 
things. Existing in an odd kind of time, Stein’s strata of stuff suggests that they have a 
life of their own.  
In Stein’s writing, oil is alive and agential, even if it happens to be dormant. To 
varying degrees, her writing exhibits the energetic livelihood of oil. At a telling point, for 
instance, the poem “Oval” – “an abstraction full of rhymes, puns, and other wordplays” 
(Bee Time Vine 119) – instructs us to “Respect oil will” (119). Here we have some mixed 
messages. On the one hand, this line suggests that oil is an agential entity with a will of 
its own. Like our relations with humans, we need to respect the reality of a co-existence 
with the organic and inorganic in our environs. On the other hand, this line appears 
antithetical to an environmentally conscious disposition: the word “will” is a misspelling 
of the word “well” as in an “oil well.” This reading is not implausible because Stein got it 
right elsewhere: “Oil well is a well” (A Stein Reader 330). Thus the imperative to 
“Respect oil will” ironically undercuts itself as it disrespects that which it claims to 
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respect through its deliberate misspelling. Stein reveals an anxiety around this strange 
substance, one that is oddly animated elsewhere in “Oval.”  
“Oil sleeping. / Oil sleeping sleeping” (Bee Time Vine 132), writes Stein. The 
anthropomorphization of oil situates it as animate, yet temporarily inactive. Although 
asleep, oil is alive, and it can geyser up from the underground when we wake it from its 
slumber. Oil is in potentia. “Oil sleeping sleeping” complicates this narrative, however, 
because it suggests that the very idea of oil sleeping is asleep. Typically, we do not think 
about oil, but if we do, then it is readily in reserve. Up until the point when fossil fuels 
appear to energize us, oil idles in the unthought. At the same time, however, these lines 
show off how oil is in action even if we are not thinking about it. As oil sleeps, it spreads: 
the repetition of “sleeping” suggests that dormant does not necessarily mean inactive. 
There is an insomniac under our feet. Both asleep and awake and neither asleep nor 
awake, oil is a strange subterranean substance that slips and spills in and out of any 
dichotomous understanding when we analyze it anthropomorphically.  
“Oval” expresses the diffuse energy of oil, too, as an agent attached to everything 
in one way or another. We see this in the following passage:  
Or white.  
Or white.  
Or white.  
Oil. 
Oily.  
Not oily.  
Not beside.  
More.  
More. (Bee Time Vine 139) 
The repetition of the phrase, “Or white” is important because it frames the subsequent 
references to and readings of oil by foregrounding a polarity. When we read or hear, “Or 
white. / Or white. / Or white,” it is hard not to think about the expression “black or 
white.” Because most of “Oval” consists of a narrow column that includes short one to 
four word lines, “Or white. / Or white. / Or white” not only directs us to how there is 
white space to the left of each iteration – indeed, the white space performs the poem’s 
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references to whiteness – but also compels us to imagine the word “black” in this white 
space to the left of the type. The reader fills in the blanks with the word “black” and, in 
turn, recognizes the dialectic of black and white, which demonstrates how “Oval” 
represents oil’s black gold as all around. To emphasize this, the poem encircles oil to 
reveal its all-encompassing capabilities through the aligned “O”’s or circles as “Or white” 
continues. (To visualize this, we can alter the text: “Or white. / Or white. / Or white. / 
Oil. / Oily.) The behind-the-scenes “black” rears its head in another form—oil. 
Following the correspondence between black and white, oil is in the margins, but it is not 
necessarily marginal. “Oval” reminds us that something can be pervasive, yet invisible, 
ubiquitous, but underground. And the antithetical or negating lines, “Not oily” and “Not 
beside” support this reading because they encourage the act of negation and dialectical 
thinking. As the shift from the repeated “Or white” to “Oil” to “Oily” suggests that 
attempts at masking modes of production actually manifest them, “Oval” asks us to 
consider if there are circuitous routes in which oil seeps into the social.  
The biotechnology of oil marks the entanglement between nature and culture, or a 
hybrid moment when a source of energy comes into contact with a cultural object in 
some way, shape, or form. This happens in Stein’s “Tillie”:  
Tillie labor Tillie labor eye sheds or sheds, Tillie labor Tillie labor late in 
shells ear shells oil shells, Tillie labor Tillie labor shave in sew up ups ups, Tillie 
Tillie like what white like white where, like, Tillie labor like where open so or 
Tillie labor. Tillie lay Tillie laying Tillie laying, Tillie lime, Tillie Tillie, next to a 
sour bridge next to a pan wiper next to ascent assent, next to, assent, assent. (Bee 
Time Vine 173) 
One of Stein’s editors suggests that this piece “may be a portrait” (173). Although it 
cannot be verified, there is reason to belief that Stein’s “Tillie” refers to Tillie Lerner 
Olson (1912-2007), a revolutionary, writer, war-relief patriot, crusader for equal pay, 
figure in the Civil Rights, and feminist icon (Reid 3). In fact, Stein and Olsen crossed 
paths on more than one occasion.22 If “Tillie” is Olsen, then Stein’s repeated references to 
“labor” make sense. Of interest here, however, is the reference to “oil shells.”  
According to a blurb in an issue of Popular Science from May 1921 entitled, “Oil Shells 
to the Rescue,” an oil shell is a shell full of oil fired from a coast guard station’s life-line 
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gun to calm the waters around a stranded ship (72). Apparently, an “ideal oil shell would 
be one that could carry a gallon of oil” (72). Seemingly coincidental, Stein was attuned to 
nautical matters; at one point, a character in one of her plays asks, “Why does the german 
boat give out oil” (Geography and Plays 225). Although speculative, we can read Stein’s 
portrait as a document that archives a biotechnological object of oil.  
Energy brings nature and culture together in Stein’s “One Sentence,” too, a piece 
that has received next to no critical attention except for its reference to Stein’s falling out 
with her brother.23 Indeed, there is a weird line that appears out of nowhere: “Gas roses” 
(As Fine As Melanctha 95). What happens when we stop and smell the roses? Like the 
pressure put on organic matter under the earth’s surface that slowly turns it into future 
fuel, and like the work of metaphor superimposing two images together, “Gas roses” is a 
rhetorical condensation of the olfactory vapors emitted from roses that we can smell, if 
not natural gas heating a room. A pleasant odor, sure, but I smell a trace of petroleum—
did Stein as well? “Gas roses” is a strangely succinct juxtaposition that evokes some 
surreal images. The first image – gas made of roses – contains disparate and temporally 
distant entities that are causally connected despite the incalculable gap. That is, gas made 
of roses makes more sense than roses made of gas because the former follows a 
biochemical logic where the gas we burn today is a descendant of dinosaur roses. 
However, the second image – roses made of gas – is the byproduct of what happens when 
repressed organic matter returns, when a rose turns pitch black and is burnt up. A 
vaporous rose is impossible, but not unfathomable. Roses made of gas is the 
doppelgänger, the uncanny other of gas made of roses, for the former imagines a twisted 
temporality through syntax that reverses the order in which petroleum is typically 
produced—roses then gas rather than gas then roses. As strange as the second image is – 
roses made of gas – it yields a critique. “Gas roses” gives off an air of energy-to-be, it 
exhibits the way in which we see nature as enframed, a standing reserve to borrow from 
Heidegger. My gaze sees nothing but gas. It is not about the flower, but the future of it. 
“A rose is rose is a rose is a rose”, sure, but a rose will be gas, too. Stein’s floral 
figuration features the biotechnology of oil that, sure enough, fuels and foregrounds the 
embodiment of energy in the car. To fully understand the material nature of Stein’s 
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energy consciousness, then, we need to turn to how it is mobilized through a mode of 
transportation, which starts with looking at Stein’s own experience as a driver.  
Stein started learning how to drive in 1916 when her American artist friend 
William Cook gave her lessons in his Renault taxi beyond the fortifications of Paris 
(Mellow 226-227). Once Stein had a grip on the wheel, she and Alice contributed to the 
war effort by working for the American Fund for French Wounded (A.F.F.W.) in 1917. 
After soliciting $550 from her cousin Bird Gans in New York to purchase and ship a Ford 
van to France, Stein and Toklas transported medical supplies to hospitals around 
Perpignan, Nîmes, and, later in 1919, Alsace (Mellow 226; Burns 1: 58; Tylee 36). And 
so Stein served the A.F.F.W. with style. Her Ford was named “Auntie,” or “Aunt 
Pauline” after her aunt because she “always behaved admirably in emergencies and 
behaved fairly well most times if she was properly flattered” (The Autobiography of Alice 
B. Toklas 172). Anthropomorphizing “Auntie” not only signals a materteral relationship 
with materiality – “materteral” is the opposite of “avuncular”24 – but also points to how 
Stein’s car is alive, and how it embodies energy.  
In “The Work” – a poem printed in the A.F.F.W. Bulletin (Bee Time Vine 189) – 
Stein gestures to an intimate knowledge of the mechanics of her car: “we know how 
much oil we use for the machine” (189). Here, Stein implicitly registers how “Auntie” is 
a vehicle of energy when she writes about the loss of its lifeblood in “Won”:  
Thousands of trucks. 
And hundreds of marines. 
And in between then. 
Aunt Pauline losing oil. 
We will see.  
Can you think about a dish.  
We will have a dish. 
Radish. 
That is good as food. 
Aunt Pauline will justify herself. (187-188)25 
Here, the metaphorical blood – accentuated by the red radish – and the hesitant sentiment 
in the line “We will see” expresses an awareness of what is required to win the war. 
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Indeed, Aunt Pauline will sacrificially “justify herself.” Witnessing the trauma and 
tragedy of the war, the speaker – and surely Stein – direct their psychic energy into a 
sympathy for Aunt Pauline. The car is a synecdoche for the dehumanized soldiers who 
were injured or lost their lives in the war. Also, this poem reveals an understanding of the 
material expenditure and wreckage war yields, human or otherwise. And so “Won” notes 
a reliance on human and nonhuman infrastructure and resource to fuel action. 
Of course, when it comes to technology and energy, one cannot help but think of 
Futurism, especially the work of F.T. Marinetti. “We intend to sing the love of danger, 
the habit of energy and fearlessness” (“The Founding” 51), writes Marinetti in his 
enumerated manifesto of Futurism. We see this “habit of energy” play out in his poem 
“To My Pegasus,” which is rife with dromological, demonic rhetoric; the first stanza 
exhibits Marinetti’s electric eloquence:  
Vehement god of a steel race,  
Automobile thirsting for space  
shuffling and trembling in anguish, 
pulling at the bit with strident teeth!  
O formidable Japanese monster, 
with a forge’s eyes,   
fed by flames and mineral oils,  
hungry for horizons and sidereal preys… 
I will set free your heart with its diabolical beat 
and its gigantic pneumatic tires, 
for the dance that you will lead 
on the white roads of the world!... (425) 
Here we have Marinetti’s macho car, a formidable figure fixated on domination with its 
“strident teeth” that are “hungry for horizons and sidereal preys.” Marinetti’s “crazed 
monster” (426) of a car tempts the speaker to “Let go of the breaks” (427) and experience 
the “bottomless Infinite” (426) and, in turn, celebrate having “No more contact with this 
disgusting earth” (427). Veering away from this vertiginous aesthetic, Stein is grounded:  
Little axes. 
Yes indeed little axes and rubbers. 
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This is a description of an automobile. 
I understand all about them. (Writings 1903-1932 428) 
This scene shows off an intimacy and identification with the car. It circumvents 
Futurism’s Romantic flourishes in favour of featuring an actual participation in and with 
an aggregate of nonhuman objects in the world. And, importantly, her energy in and 
around the car is earnest:  
The Ford 
 
It is earnest. 
Aunt Pauline is earnest.  
We are earnest.  
We are united. 
Then we see. (Bee Time Vine 183)  
Far from a work of Futurism, Stein’s energy is sincere; it is embodied through 
interpersonal and technological immersion. “We are energetic” (A Stein Reader 309), she 
writes in a piece that puns on Marinetti entitled, “Marry Nettie, Alright Make it a Series 
and call it Marry Nettie,” which “evokes a comic but also mercilessly satiric portrait of 
the impresario of Futurism” (Perloff, Wittgenstein 100). As Marjorie Perloff notes, “the 
text cleverly replaces one word (‘Marinetti’) by two (‘Marry Nettie’), as if to say that the 
domineering chef d’école of Futurism must be replaced by two women in dialogue” 
(100). Less masculine and more feminine, Stein’s work demonstrates a different kind of 
energy, one that is driven by circularity.  
“Rose is a rose is a rose is a rose” (Writings 1903-1932 395), writes Stein. “Gas 
roses” fuel Stein’s energetic line. Like a car wheel going round or a feedback loop of 
sound, Stein’s roses figure into the form of her energy throughout her work.26 We are told 
in The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas that Stein composed in her car:  
During these early restless years after the war Gertrude Stein worked a great deal. 
Not as in the old days, night after night, but anywhere, in between visits, in the 
automobile while she was waiting in the street while I did errands, while posing. 
She was particularly fond in these days of working in the automobile while it 
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stood in the crowded street. […] She was much influenced by the sound of the 
streets and the movement of the automobiles. (206)27 
That Stein was “influenced” by “the movement of the automobiles” is perhaps an 
understatement. The first edition of this circularly informed work – one where Stein 
writes as Toklas writing about herself and Stein – has an insignia of Stein’s roses in the 
shape of a circle on the cover.28 This iteration of “rose is a rose is a rose is a rose” reflects 
its own repetition through circularity, a geometry that gestures toward a genuine 
geometria, or earth-measuring, as it outlines a poetic earth with her words. Surely, Stein’s 
“The World is Round” attests to this given that it begins with a section called, “Rose is a 
Rose” and the following sentence: “Once upon a time the world was round and you could 
go on it around and around” (Writings 1932-1946 537). Stein did not drive in circles, but 
they drove her. Her A Circular Play / A Play in Circles – composed around the time Stein 
started to experiment with writing in her car29 – features one hundred instances of the 
word “circle” in one form or another. One passage reads:  
Consider a circle. 
  
 In the car there are four three if you like and outside two, four if you 
like. Four necessarily more than. Two necessarily more than two.  
 Four if you like. 
 Expressly a circle.  
 Were we at home. In messages, in sending messages, in quarreling, in 
shooting, in endangering, in resolving and in destroying there is a course of 
events. Honeysuckle grows and peas. Can you sing together. (A Stein Reader 332)  
Stein’s circles encircle us; the indeterminate number of circles – two, three, or four – 
marks the movement of the vehicle. Also, reading the line, “In the car there are four three 
if you like and outside two, four if you like” produces a sense of movement given the 
stutter “four three.” Here, the reader experiences the energy of the machine in and 
through Stein’s writing.  
Stein registers an energetic materiality in her lesbian love poem “Lifting Belly,” 
too, which is driven by “roses and carnations” (Writings 1903-1932 423), or “a nation of 
cars” (Mark xx).30  In the poem, we see Stein’s proto-product integration generating an 
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assembly line of brand name references. She namedrops “Ford” a number of times: “Can 
you buy a Ford,” “It is necessary to have a Ford,” “We can have a pleasant ford,” and 
“We are in our Ford” (436, 447, 447, 448, respectively). While Stein admired Ford, these 
cultural references register ambivalence towards masculine mass production given the 
symbolic typographical demotion of the name “ford.” The materiality of this cultural 
signifier gets picked up with an interesting misuse of car parts, which surely emphasizes 
the relationship between aesthetics and environment. With what is most likely a reference 
to Stein and Toklas’ ten-day stay in Avila, Spain, “Lifting Belly” exhibits the evolution 
of sandals made out of car tires: “Using old automobile tires as sandals is singularly 
interesting. It is done in Avila” (424; The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas 115-116). 
Citing Stephen Jay Gould, Carl Zimmer points out how exaptation – how an old structure 
gets used to perform a new function – applies to technology with the example of tire 
sandals in Nairobi (377).31 Taken aback by this exotic object, the speaker in “Lifting 
Belly” is incredulous: “Did you believe in sandals. When they are made of old 
automobile tire.” Importantly, “Lifting Belly” presents car parts, but it is also part car. 
Although “Lifting Belly” limits its allusions to the automobile, the poem functions as 
one. Later in “Lifting Belly” there is a one-word line that stands out—namely, “Motor”:  
Lifting belly shines. 
 Lifting belly nattily.  
 Lifting belly to fly.  
 Not to-day.  
 Motor.  
 Lifting belly for wind. (Writings 1903-1932 445) 
“Motor” is only mentioned once, but its mechanisms are manifest through the repetition 
of the poem’s title four hundred and sixty-seven times. It is painfully obvious that 
“Lifting belly is a repetition” (422), but this redundant, yet reflexive line asks us to 
acknowledge the way in which the word “Motor” drives the repetition machine that is 
“Lifting Belly.” This moment pushes us to reflect on how the iterations of “lifting belly” 
simulate the perpetual perspectival shifts one experiences while driving. Through the 
energetic materiality and repetition in “Lifting Belly,” Stein works away at embodying 
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automobility. Her poem is a sort of song about Aunt Pauline (458), for we see her looking 
at a new world through the windshield in motion:  
How do you like your Aunt Pauline. 
She is worthy of a queen. 
Will she go as we do dream. 
She will do satisfactorily.  
And so will we. 
Thank you so much. 
Smiling to me. 
Then we can see him.  
Yes we can. 
Can we always go. 
I think so. 
You will be secure. 
We are secure. 
Then we see. 
We see the way. 
This is very good for me.  
In this way we play. 
Then we are pleasing. 
We are pleasing to him. 
We have gone together. 
We are in our Ford.  
Please me please me.  
 We go then. 
 We go when.  
 In a minute. (448) 
With short little speedy sentences, the speaker – or speakers – are on the go, pleasurably 
seeing what they want, when they want “In a minute.” “In speeding I speed” (Geography 
and Plays 399), she writes. Without a doubt, Stein encoded the way in which the 
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“automobile offered the eye new challenges” (Duffy 161); in this regard, the blur in the 
following passage exhibits a visual energy:  
And yes and yes and better and yes and more and yes and better and yes, and yes 
and yes and more and yes and better and yes and more and yes and yes and yes 
and more and best and yes and yes and better and most and yes and yes and more 
and better and best and most and yes and yes and most and better and yes and yes 
and most and more and yes and yes, and more and yes and yes and better and yes 
and yes and most and yes and yes and better and yes and yes and better and yes 
and more and yes and best and yes and better and yes and more and yes and most 
and yes and more and yes and yes and better and yes and yes and most and yes 
and yes and best and yes and yes [… .] (A Stein Reader 489) 
Enda Duffy notes how “it was in the interface between the human eye and the car as 
viewing mechanism that the mutual dependence of machine and body was most evident, 
and most fraught with tension” (192). Given her aesthetics of excess, it is clear that 
Stein’s senses were overwhelmed. Behind the wheel, Stein felt and witnessed the frisson 
by the speed and energy embodied in her car.  
In this chapter, I have addressed the ways in which different forms of energy enter 
into both Stein’s work and world, which gestures to a preeminent awareness of energy 
well before our current conversations and concerns about it. Scrutinizing Stein’s body of 
work, I have demonstrated how her aesthetic practice materially engages her surrounds in 
a way that does not draw any hard or fast line between nature and culture. Reading her 
representations of wood, coal, and electricity, then, I have shown how energy is rendered 
transformative, powerful, and erotic. Importantly, I have explored Stein’s petropoetics, 
which involves a specific way of writing about energy that requires an energetic form. 
Petropoetics pays heed to oil’s characteristics and technologies like the car, and how they 
affect the nature of a text, especially when it comes to ideas of representation, form, 
temporality, agency, and biotechnology. Reading Stein in this way, its evident how dirty 
modernism is chalked full of animated, intensified forces and forms that reveal an 
energized tension at the core of a messy modernity.  
At the outset of this chapter on Stein’s emergent energy consciousness and the 
embodiment of it, we encountered Stein encountering oil. As a sort of reprise, I want to 
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return to this scene to conclude my discussion of Stein because it gestures to something 
strange happening in modernism that I take up in the next chapter. In “Work Again,” 
Stein writes:  
In comparison what are horses. 
Compared with that again what are bells. 
You mean horns.   No I mean noises. 
In leaning can we encounter oil. 
I meant this to be intelligible.  
We were taking a trip. We found the roads not  
noisy but pleasurable and the shade there was pleasant. 
We found that the trees had been planted so as to make 
rows.  This is almost universal. (Geography and Plays 399) 
Here, we have an odd scene that equivocally relates horses with cars. Leading up to oil, 
we read an awkward analogy: “In comparison what are horses. / Compared with that 
again what are bells. / You mean horns. No I mean noises.” The missing referent – “car” 
– is evoked through a number of negative analogies – a car is not a horse, a car’s horn is 
not a bell, and a car’s horn is not a bull’s horn – and, as a result, produces a collage effect 
characteristic of Stein’s Cubist portrait mode (Watten 121). One analysis of this passage 
points to how the absent, yet present car forms the crux between verse and prose, or 
between portrait and landscape writing, which not only signals a transition from the car 
as object to the car as a vehicle for viewing, but also marks the displacement of a Fordist 
assembly line form of repetition onto nature as the rows of trees are “almost universal” 
(121). Instead of displacement, however, there is entanglement; instead of juxtaposition, 
there is superimposition. Here, nature and culture are one.32 The heteroglossic line, “You 
mean horns. No I mean noises” establishes that there is a confusion – one that remains 
unresolved – between the speaker’s and his or her interlocutor’s meaning. This impasse is 
noise. Or, reflexively, this impasse is noise about “noises.” This noise disrupts and 
distorts any chance of clear communication. But this is not to say that nothing is said at 
all. There is an extra-linguistic dimension to this noise: horses, bells, horns, and cars 
make noise; all of these entities make noise or “noises” together. The car’s engine is as 
	  	  
98 
alive and loud as the horse. This monstrous cacophony expresses not only a materiality in 
and around oil, but also a weird transformation between animal and object.  
 “A object a little dog called Basket” (Last Operas and Plays 178), writes Stein in 
Paisieu (1928). In 1928, Stein purchased a new Ford and a poodle she named Basket 
(Shaughnessy xii). A year later, we read of Stein writing to Virgil Thomson from 
Bilignin: “Here we are and very nice it is even nicer and Basket and the car and the 
country and the house and everything has been so xciting” (The Letters of Gertrude Stein 
and Virgil Thomson 113). Such a scene ends up in one of Stein’s film scripts, too, which 
features a car, two women, and a white poodle: “Ils sont tous les trois alors ensemble et 
tout à coup elle passe, l’auto, avec les deux dames et il y a avec elles un vrai caniche 
blanc et dans la bouche du caniche est un petit paquet” (The Gertrude Stein Reader 
437).33 So, what is the relationship between animal and object exactly? This might seem 
like an off-kilter question to ask of Stein; however, in the recently published To Do: A 
Book of Alphabets and Birthdays (2001), she writes about an interesting horse named 
“Active”:  
…Active forgot everything and he said ploughing was not so bad, and he could 
always be glad, and anyway, what was the use of saying anything since 
everybody did what they pleased with him. So he said he thought an automobile, 
just one day he said he thought he would be an automobile not a new one an old 
one and he was one, he was an automobile and an automobile never has a name 
and it never has a mane and it has rubber shoes not an iron one and finding rubber 
shoes does not mean anything like finding iron horse-shoes did and that was the 
end of everything. (8) 
Through the power of his will, Active turns into an automobile with “rubber shoes” 
instead of “iron horse-shoes.” Once this transformation occurs, it is “the end of 
everything.” This is a scene showcasing a tension between animacy and inanimacy, one 
that registers what I call in the next chapter “the inanimal.” 
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1 “You see it [the vitality of movement] first in Walt Whitman. He was the beginning of 
the movement” (How Writing Is Written 153), writes Stein. 
2 In The Constructivist Moment (2003), Barrett Watten notes that there is a profound 
 identification with Ford in Stein’s work. From the product to the mode of production, 
Watten contends that the “Ford and the automobile are sites of a periodic meditation on 
mass production, social mobility, and repetition for Stein, a synecdoche for social 
modernity as interpreted in the process of her work” (119).  
3 See Watten’s The Constructivist Moment, pages 118-126. 
4 In The Ecology of Modernism (forthcoming), however, Joshua Schuster employs the 
concept of ambience to read Stein’s natures. 
5 “Try to imagine a major American writer taking on the Oil Encounter. The idea is 
literally inconceivable” (140), writes Amitav Ghosh. Yet, perhaps Stein does, in fact, take 
on the Oil Encounter, but in an oblique way. 6	  See, for instance, Ghosh’s “Petrofiction: The Oil Encounter and the Novel” from 1992 
republished in Incendiary Circumstances (2005); Jennifer’s Wenzel’s “Petro-magic-
realism: toward a political ecology of Nigerian literature”; Allan Stoekl’s Bataille’s 
Peak: Energy, Religion, and Postsustainability (2007); Karen Pinkus’ Alchemical 
Mercury: a Theory of Ambivalence (2010) and her article, “Thinking Diverse Futures 
from a Carbon Present”; Ross Barrett and Daniel Worden’s edited Oil Culture (2014); 
and Mackenzie Wark’s forthcoming Molecular Red: Theory for the Anthropocene 
(2015).	  
7 In “Normal Motor Automatism,” Stein and Leon M. Solomons report about “automatic 
powers of the normal subject” (492). Specifically, they question the “limit of 
automatism” and consider its relation to consciousness (492). Here, we have an interest in 
energy at the level of the psyche.    
8 See Stein’s letter to Thornton Wilder on 6 March 1941, which I cite later in my chapter. 
Moreover, the word “essence” appears in the context of it as a fuel resource in the early 
poem “The Work” from 1917; Stein writes: “Then say the essence. Here I must confess I 
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am introducing my own troubles. There is always a certain amount of trouble in getting 
essence but everybody is so kind” (Bee Time Vine 190).  
9 In Irresistible Dictation (2001), Steven Meyer contextualizes Stein’s writing relative to 
Ralph Waldo Emerson’s notion of “irresistible dictation.” And so Meyer suggests that in 
“tracing Stein’s highly self-conscious, although no less contextually sensitive, 
compositional practices, one may better understand not just the organic mechanisms that 
operate in her own compositions but also those investigated by several generations of 
radical empiricists in very different, yet not altogether different spheres” (124). For him, 
moreover, Stein “reconfigured science as writing and performed scientific experiments in 
writing (xxi).  
10 “Guillaume Apollinaire” is jarring and odd, but I take my cue from Dydo. She offers a 
brief but convincing analysis of the piece, especially when she emphasizes how we have 
to move from sense to sound when reading it: sense is found in the sound of the poem as 
the first line resembles the resonance of the name “Guillaume Apollinaire,” for instance 
(A Stein Reader 278-279). Interestingly, however, she does not offer an interpretation of 
what “gas strips” phonetically signifies. Also, Dydo points out that the word “teethe” is 
from Stein’s manuscript rather than her typescript and, in turn, speculates as to what the 
implication might be of having two verbs rather than an adjective modifying a noun 
(279). 
11 For a discussion of energy and waste, see Allan Stoekl’s Bataille’s Peak (2007). 
12 See information on Edwin L. Drake in The History of the Standard Oil Company (8-12, 
17-19, 22, 35). For more on the Oil City in Venango County, Pennsylvania visit 
Netstate.com.    
13 See A Stein Reader (232, 244, 358, 388) and Geography and Plays (87). 
14 See “No” (1915) in As Fine as Melanctha (38).  
15 Although Stein’s chapter entitled, “My Arival in Paris” from The Autobiography of 
Alice B. Toklas opens with the year 1907 (6), she was there earlier—that is, in 1903 (Will 
21). 
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16 Dydo dates this play’s composition around February to June 1938; it was published in 
Last Operas and Plays (1949) (xi).  
17 “According to a letter Picasso wrote to Stein on August 8, 1914, he went to rue de 
Fleurus while she was in London to see how the pictures were hanging in the newly 
repainted studio, which had just been equipped with electricity and connected to the 
pavilion” (Giroud 38).  
18 “Miss Stein calls Miss Toklas ‘Pussy’” (qtd. in Burns 1: 352n3).  
19 My evocation of concealment as a defining feature of the cultural logic of oil is, in part, 
an allusion to a Heideggerean understanding of resources that are enframed and, in turn, 
relegated to the backdrop of a world of equipment only to appear when something is 
amiss, like an oil spill. In “The Cultural Politics of Oil,” moreover, Imre Szeman gestures 
to one feature of the cultural logic of oil, which emphasizes just the absence, yet presence 
of oil. He notes how oil is “everywhere, connected to everything” (34), and yet 
“something [is] missing” (34). Szeman points out how, despite the proliferation of 
writings on petroculture, “it still seems to be difficult to capture the fundamental way in 
which access to petrocarbons structures contemporary social life on a global scale” (34). 
That is, as foundational as oil is as energy resource, history, and ontology (34), there is 
something very “inaccessible” about it; as he puts it, oil is “the structuring ‘Real’ of our 
contemporary sociopolitical imaginary, and perhaps for this reason just as inaccessible as 
any noumenon in the flow of everday experience from the smoggy blur of sunrise to 
sundown” (34). For a discussion of oil and modernism, see Schuster’s The Ecology of 
Modernism (forthcoming).  
20 In 1910, the Lakeview Gusher spewed a total of 9.4 billion barrels over a period of 18 
months in Taft, California, which is more than the Gulf War spill in the Persian Gulf and 
the Deepwater Horizon spill in the Gulf of Mexico (Read 48). 
21 Writing on “Susie Asado,” Marjorie Perloff’s The Poetics of Indeterminacy (1981) 
nuances the typical reading of Stein’s style relative to Cubism through a discussion of 
verbal planes (phonemic, semantic, and erotic codes, for instance) to suggest that the 
poem is “not at all ‘about’ the Flamenco dancer whose performance she and Alice Toklas 
admired on their trip to Spain” (73), but, instead, that “Susie Asado has no fixed center” 
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and is another instance of the way in which her style parallels “the instability, 
indeterminacy, and acoherence of Cubism” (77); Felicia McCarren’s Dancing Machines 
(2003) notes the tension between the representational and the musical and a present yet 
absent dancer, experimentation with exactitude (or as Stein puts it in Lectures in 
America, “[t]he strict discipline […] of never using a word that was not an exact word all 
through the Tender Buttons and what I may call early Spanish and Geography and Plays 
period finally resulted in things like Susie Asado […]” [qtd. in McCarren 84]), a desire to 
express the rhythm of the visible world, and the contentious interpretations of words like 
“wet” (84-86); and Dana Watson’s Gertrude Stein and the Essence of What Happens 
(2005) focuses on recuperative conversation, repairing relationships, food, the sound of 
social intercourse, a Shakespearean allusion to Macbeth, and meaning-making and 
miscommunication (83-88). 
22 See Panthea Reid’s Tillie Olson (2010) (95, 102, 105, 107). 
23 Following up on the tenuous relationship between Gertrude and Leo one year after the 
latter left Paris’ 27 rue de Fleurus for Italy, Brenda Wineapple cites American novelist 
and playwright Neith Boyce Hapgood’s journal – specifically an entry from 1914 when 
she was visiting the patron of the arts Mabel Dodge’s Villa Cuornia in Arcetri, Italy 
where Stein and Toklas often frequented – where Hapgood recounts a conversation she 
had with Dodge about Dodge’s talk with Leo about Gertrude (352, 385). According to 
Hapgood’s account of Dodge’s account of Leo’s remarks about his sister, Leo said that, 
“Alice was making herself indispensable. She did everything to save Gertrude a 
movement” (386), and it was this – Alice’s subservience – that Leo took umbrage with. 
Wineapple then offers another, more succinct and less labyrinthine account – and this is 
where “One Sentence” comes in – where the American inventor and art collector Albert 
Barnes recounted Leo saying that “‘Gertrude is crazy’” and “‘I can’t stand her anymore’” 
(386), for which Wineapple makes the connection that this sentiment finds its way into 
“One Sentence” with the lines, “I believe she is crazy” and, directly after this one, “He 
was as he often is extremely disagreeable” (Stein qtd. in Wineapple 386 from Melanctha 
75).  
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24 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s discussion of the avunculate in Tendencies (1993) has 
overshadowed its cousin concept: materterality, or what is characteristic or typical of an 
aunt. In another project, I explore and theorize this concept through Gertrude Stein’s 
stylized work regarding Aunt Pauline, her Ford car named after her father’s brother’s 
wife. Stein’s car marks a non-normative network or familial framework that features 
human and nonhuman object relations under the rubric of an affinity with the aunt as 
such. This reveals an unorthodox genealogy of materiality in modernity. “Aunt” is 
without an object of desire and thus without relationality, argues Sedgwick, but this is not 
a drawback; rather, “aunt” is opened up. Thinking etymologically, I suggest that 
“materterality” creates a connection to the strange stuff in the surroundings and 
reconfigures relations with the real through an unfamiliar family. “There is too much 
fathering going on just now and there is no doubt about it fathers are depressing” (133), 
writes Stein in Everybody’s Autobiography (1937), a remark not unlike Sedgwick’s 
exclamation to “Forget the Name of the Father!” (58). Turning to Stein’s lesbian love 
poem, “Lifting Belly,” I am interested in a different, deviant kind of family, one that 
includes atypical things.  
25 In Bee Time Vine, the editor dates “Won” as 1917; however, in Stein’s papers, it is 
1919, which creates an odd discrepancy given the subject matter of the poem: the 
celebration of the end of World War I.  
26 For more on Stein and loops see Belloi, Livio and Michel Delville. “Understanding the 
Loop: Gertrude Stein, Martin Arnold.” Hidden Agendas: Unreported Poetics. Ed. Louis 
Armand. Trans. Thierry Ramais. 198-209. Námestí Jana Palacha 2, Czech Republic: 
Litteraria Pragensia Books, 2010. Print. 
27 After this excerpt from The Autobiography, Stein lists a number of the “experiments” 
(206) – pieces composed in the car – which includes, “The Birthplace of Bonnes,” 
“Moral Tales of 1920-1921,” “American Biography,” “One Hundred Prominent Men,” 
and “Mildred’s Thoughts.” 
28 In addition to the first edition of the cover of The Autobiography, Stein’s circular roses 
appear on a plate she had made for Carl Van Vechten, and as a wax seal on the bottom of 
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a miniature statue of the Madonna with child (The Autobiography 137-183; Gertrude 
Stein and Alice B. Toklas Papers, Series IX, Objects, Box 163, Folder 4304, YCAL).  
29 See note 23; also, A Circular Play / A Play in Circles is dated between May and June 
1920 (A Stein Reader vii).  
30 Rebecca Mark’s creative reading of the line, “I do love roses and carnations” in 
“Lifting Belly” underscores the ways in which Stein – consciously or not – tapped into 
the technology of her milieu. Mark, an editor of an updated edition of “Lifting Belly,” 
makes the point that Stein’s use of repetition frees words up so that they can be 
comprehended orally (xx). With this in mind, Mark notes how the word “carnations” 
“becomes a flower and a nation of cars” (xx). Mark’s reading is interested in Stein’s 
“linguistic miracles” (xx), specifically in terms of how they exhibit female creativity and 
liberation (xx). While this is not necessarily my focus, I think that Mark’s gloss of 
“carnations” as “nation of cars” is quite sharp and compels us to consider a material and 
historical context of the car in conjunction with what and how Stein writes.  
31 Arguably, exaptation works at the level of language, too, which is, in effect, part of 
Stein’s program when it comes to anything from repetition to sound. In the case of 
“Lifting Belly,” though, tire sandals signal a misuse value: “[t]ires make very good 
sandals, but one would never argue that Goodrich (or whoever) built the tires to provide 
footwear in Third World nations. Durability for sandals is a latent potential of auto tires, 
and the production of such sandals defines a quirky functional shift” (Gould qtd. in 
Zimmer 377). (I am borrowing my usage of phrase “misuse value” from Bill Brown’s A 
Sense of Things [2003]; see 75-76.)  
32 This is not a reduction. See Levi Bryant’s “Black” in Prismatic Ecology (2013) and 
Hasana Sharp’s Spinoza and the Politics of Renaturalization (2011).  
33 “They are all three then together and all of the sudden she passes, the car, with the two 
ladies and they have with them a real white poodle and in the mouth of the poodle is a 
small package” (my translation). 
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Chapter 3: The Inanimal 
 
 
Modernism is a menagerie. Its poetry is full of flourishing figures of animals. “O, 
I got a zoo, I got a menagerie, inside my ribs, under my bony head, under my red-valve 
heart” (101), writes Carl Sandburg in “Wilderness,” a poem that presents the vitality of 
animality. Likewise, Marianne Moore’s body of work includes a wide-ranging cast of 
creatures: a jerboa, swan, pelican, buffalo, fish, monkey, snake, mongoose, octopus, 
snail, peacock, whale, pangolin, paper nautilus, wood-weasel, elephant, chameleon, jelly-
fish, arctic ox, giraffe, tiger, fox, lion, bear, mouse, and rat.  
More broadly, modernism is swarming with animal life and death. Moore’s “real 
toad” (267) is met with an octopus of “ice” (71). Indeed, given that the “Curious Cat” in 
T.S. Eliot’s “The Rum Tum Tugger” “will do / As he do do / And there’s no doing 
anything about it!” (153), we are oriented to the (other) end of the animal. More 
explicitly, consider the opening of Richard Eberhart’s “The Groundhog” first published 
in 1934 in The Listener:   
In June, amid the golden fields, 
I saw a groundhog lying dead. 
Dead lay he; my senses shook, 
And mind outshot our naked frailty. 
There lowly in the vigorous summer 
His form began its senseless change, 
And made my senses waver dim 
Seeing nature ferocious in him. 
Inspecting close maggots’ might 
And seething cauldron of his being,     
Half with loathing, half with a strange love, 
I poked him with an angry stick. (743) 
“If there is a subgenre of the dead animal poem in twentieth-century American poetry,” 
writes Jerry Harp, “then Eberhart’s ‘The Groundhog’ may well be the exemplar text” 
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(49). This scene shows off both growth and decay as maggots feed off of the groundhog’s 
corpse. Encountering his or her shared “naked frailty” with the groundhog, the speaker’s 
anxiety is displaced onto the “angry stick” poking and prodding mortality.  
In modernism, there is a specific kind of animality, one that encompasses the 
tension between life and death. I call this inanimality, or the inanimal.1 The inanimal is a 
representation and blurring of the point or duration between life and death, which relates 
to the interaction between animal and object. Such an interaction occurs through different 
modes, which designate how the inanimal takes shape in modernist poetry. Thus, I turn to 
these modes and discuss them and the significance of the inanimal through close reading 
selections of modernist poetry. Specifically, I look at commodity and ethical rights 
discourses in Marianne Moore and Edward Breck; rendering in Elinor Wylie; prolepsis in 
Elizabeth Bishop and Marsden Hartley; technical innovations in William Stafford and 
William Carlos Williams; vitalism and violence in e.e. cummings and George Oppen; and 
animals and race in Daniel Webster Davis. Turning to these poets and others like 
Langston Hughes and Mina Loy, I show how animals are objectified in modernism. 
In doing so, I advance animal studies beyond its preoccupation with the 
relationship between humans and animals and, instead, focus on the frisson or unease 
around animal objects. Indeed, animals and objects share a history, one that warrants 
attention in literary criticism and animal studies. In modernity, animals became not only 
commodities in a capitalistic marketplace full of goods, but also figures embedded in 
cultural production, a phenomenon that Akira Mizuta Lippit calls “incorporated 
animality” (187).2 More specifically, Lippit, in Electric Animal (2000), nuances one of 
modernity’s clichés – human progress leads to the loss of nature – and suggests that 
modernity sustains the disappearance of animals at a constant state (1). Theorizing a new 
mode of existence for modernity’s animal, Lippit argues that animals never entirely 
vanish; instead, they exist in a state of perpetual vanishing: modernity’s animal is not 
sacrificial, but spectral (1). Undergoing a transformation between the Industrial 
Revolution and the end of World War II, the animal began to vanish from the empirical 
world and evolved into a lost object to be mourned (3). Ultimately, animal being enters 
discursive structures; however, the animal is more than a merely ubiquitous figure: the 
animal is modern subjectivity (25-26). During the modern period, the animal – denied the 
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status of a conscious subject – not only offered escape from a history in crisis, but also 
served as an ideal form for a destabilized subjectivity (25-26). And so animal being 
brings about an excess or surplus that exceeds the subject and haunts myriad forms (26). 
Yet, this argument about modernity’s undead animals veers away from recognizing the 
materiality of what I am calling the inanimal, which, for me, moves away from 
spectrality and towards substance, or the representation of animal embodiment in and 
with its material surrounds. Thus, I turn to how modernism appropriated “actual and 
phantasmatic resources of dead animals” (“…From Wild” 125), despite what Lippit says.  
 “The animal is the very first thing to be ruled out of modernism’s bounds” (20), 
writes Steve Baker. While Baker focuses on contemporary art and performance, his study 
locates a gap in modernism that compels us to consider how, if at all, the arts address the 
animal and its objecthood. Baker’s hypothesis is that there was “no modern animal, no 
‘modernist’ animal” (20). “Between nineteenth-century animal symbolism,” writes 
Baker, “with its reasonably secure hold on meaning, and the postmodern animal images 
whose ambiguity or irony or sheer brute presence serves to resist or to displace fixed 
meanings, lies modernism at its most arid” (20). Modernist poetry, however, presents 
animals oriented towards objects and objectification. Despite this marked orientation, the 
objectification of the animal has not been accounted for in modernist studies.  
 Animal studies and literary modernism leaves questions concerning animals and 
objects more or less unaddressed, yet “modernity finds animals lingering in the world 
undead (Lippit 1). The field is, instead, engaged with the relationship between humans 
and animals. “At its core,” writes Colleen Glenney Boggs, “animal studies asks what 
happens when we include other species in our understanding of subjectivity” (3). 
Offering an overview of animal studies, Boggs explains how there are two strands: first, 
the social sciences, which derived from the animal rights movement, and, second, the 
humanities, which emerged out of poststructuralism (3). “Whereas the animal rights 
movement argues that our understanding of subjectivity needs to include animals,” writes 
Boggs, “post-structuralist analysis uses animals to deconstruct our notions of subjectivity. 
One strand of animal studies has a firm investment in the subject, whereas the other has 
an equally firm investment in erasing the subject” (3-4). In this regard, Peter Singer’s 
ideas form one end of the spectrum and Jacques Derrida’s, the other.3 Both strands of 
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animal studies painstakingly problematize the human via the animal. Of course, we 
cannot preclude the human, but perhaps it is time to move on and acknowledge “accepted 
wisdom” (Pick 1)—namely, “that the distinctions between humans and animals are 
conceptually and materially indecisive” (1).  
 Critics turning to animals and modernity like Randy Malamud, Philip Armstrong, 
Carrie Rohman, Nicole Shukin, Mark Payne, and Anat Pick take up a range of issues 
including anthropocentrism and exploitation, cultural history of humans and animals, 
animal construction of the so-called human, animal and economy, affect and aggression, 
and vulnerability of the animal body, respectively.4 Despite this concern with the 
ontology of animals, a full account of their objecthood and of their ends has yet to be 
provided. “I don’t believe ecocriticism has begun, in any systematic way,” writes 
Christopher Todd Anderson, “to address the varied meanings of animal death and 
representations of animal death” (“Roadkill Theory” 1). Following Boggs’ Animalia 
Americana (2013),5 I introduce the concept of the inanimal as a way of taking up 
Anderson’s challenge to nudge the conversation in a different direction. To start, it is 
necessary to discuss the nature of the tension around the inanimal and how it is often 
caught between life and death.  
 The cessation of animal life serves as an occasion for poetic experimentation that 
draws on interruption to make the emptiness of death visible. Take, for instance, Hughes’ 
uncollected poem “Dying Beast”:  
Sensing death,  
The buzzards gather— 
Noting the last struggle  
Of flesh under weather,  
Noting the last glance 
Of agonized eye 
At passing wind  
And boundless sky. 
Sensing death,  
The buzzards overhead 
Await that still moment 
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When life— 
 
Is dead. (1: 205-206) 
Barely alive, the dying beast is abstracted and disembodied. The unspecified species 
amounts to nothing more than “flesh under weather” and an “agonized eye.” With 
“buzzards overhead” in what we imagine to be a barren, desert wasteland, the dying beast 
is basically carrion. In the end, its life is not even its own. The last two lines shift the 
focus from singular existence to life as such. Hughes’ poem formally represents the point 
or duration between life and death with the white space between “When life—” and “Is 
dead.” While the em dash gestures towards the interruption or cessation of life, the 
subsequent white space encodes liminality. That is, seemingly, there is a strict divide 
between life and death, but this space – perhaps the space of the inanimal – signals an in-
between state or transition where phenomena are a part of a continuum. With its “last 
struggle” and “last glance,” “Dying Beast” is a death rattle sounding off an afterlife, a 
poem with a speaker projecting an imaginary, yet real, moment in which the animal’s 
“agonized eye” observes the unending “passing wind” and the infinite “boundless sky.” 
Hughes’ creature is in the “still moment” between being and nothing where time seems to 
stop.  
 Between life and death, the inanimal in modernism is fragile. In Creaturely Poetics 
(2011), Anat Pick discusses the “corporeal reality of living bodies” (3). Working with the 
thought of Simone Weil, Pick considers the creature to be a living body that is material, 
temporal, and vulnerable (5). Focusing on the body and embodiment, she considers what 
it is like for thought and action to be oriented towards vulnerability as a way of existence 
and exposure (5). The foundation of Pick’s argument deviates from Giorgio Agamben’s 
discussion of bare life, or zoē, the simple fact of living common to all beings (1), given 
that Pick “do[es] not regard animal life as absolutely bare” (15). Instead, for her, “ideas 
of bare life act more as a permanent but permeable threshold than as a foundation upon 
which life’s other functions are built and to which life returns when these are taken away. 
All life is bare in the sense of being susceptible to the interventions of power” (15). Pick’s 
deviation from Agamben is key to understanding the inanimal’s fragility. To borrow from 
and play with Pick, the inanimal is not only a “permeable threshold” – the barely alive 
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and the nearly dead – but also the corporeal reality of nonliving bodies, or the materiality 
of inanimate animals.  
The emergence of the inanimal in modernism – a figure foregrounding the unease 
around animal life and death – is tied to objectification. In this regard, we can read Mina 
Loy’s “Parturition,” which also teaches us an important lesson about rhetoric. Published 
in The Trend in 1914, “Parturition” is about childbirth, a ceremonial inauguration into 
maternity, or “The-was-is-ever-shall-be / Of cosmic reproductivity” (70). Childbirth is 
also a figure for the creation of artworks: “parturition” means both the “action of giving 
birth to young” and the “action of or an act of bringing something into being,” especially 
“of a literary or imaginative nature” (OED). The two senses of creation come together 
when Loy’s speaker connects the physiological and psychological pain of creation: “The 
sensitized area / Is identical with the extensity / Of intension” (67). Intension, or the 
“internal quantity or content of a notion or concept” (OED), is born, literally and 
figuratively. There are two stanzas towards the end of the poem that follow the speakers’ 
reflection on the “Stir of incipient life” (70); here the animal emerges as a “subconscious 
/ Impression”:   
Rises from the subconscious  
Impression of a cat 
With blind kittens  
Among her legs 
Same undulating life-stir 
I am that cat 
 
Rises from the subconscious  
Impression of small animal carcass 
Covered with blue bottles 
—Epicurean— 
And through the insects 
Waves that same undulation of living 
Death 
Life 
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I am knowing 
All about 
    Unfolding (70) 
In the first stanza, Loy’s speaker identifies with the image of a female feline and her new 
litter (“I am that cat”). Subsequently, the speaker sees a perverse inverse of the cat and its 
kittens – a “small animal carcass / Covered with blue bottles” – while waxing poetic 
about how pleasure and pain, life and death transverse all forms of life from insects to 
humans. Loy’s image of an animal carcass swarming with bluebottle flies warrants our 
attention. To unpack this image we need to follow the poem’s logic. If Loy’s speaker 
identifies with the cat and its kittens, and if the fly-covered carcass is the uncanny cat and 
its brood, then the speaker foresees her part in the full spectrum of maternity, one that 
spans the living and the dead. Honing in on this corpse, it becomes apparent that it serves 
as a symbol for a shared state of inanimacy between animal and object.  
This scene in Loy’s poem reveals the rhetoric of the inanimal. Rhetoric has cast 
aside the interaction between animals and objects. Anthropomorphism addresses human-
like animals and objects, and zoomorphism, or theriomorphism, takes up animal-like 
humans, but there is no rhetorical term for the relationship between animals and objects, 
until now, the inanimal. Perhaps the closest is “mechanomorphism,” but the attribution of 
machine-like qualities to someone or something is a narrow phenomenon, and it does not 
exclusively work with and between animals and objects. While “metaphor” offers a 
possible way of capturing this sense of the relationship, it lacks specificity and misses the 
material history of animals and objects. Something like Lippit’s “animetaphor” sounds 
appropriate, but it is a thinly veiled vitalism that transcends and ignores animal objects.6 
Yet, animal objects are in dialogue with the world; inanimals register a material-semiotic 
relation. An animal is object-like, an object is animal-like, or an animal or object is 
transitioning from one to the other. Such phenomena appear in many different contexts in 
dirty modernism, and often reveal the tension associated with ecological objects and their 
entanglement in both nature and culture, which is especially evident in the context of 
animal goods.  
The life and death of the animal and its objecthood appears in and through 
modernism’s commodity and ethical rights discourses. These discourses often evoke a 
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clear stance when it comes to the mistreatment of animals, yet represent animal objects as 
both absent and present, which is a symptom of their fragility.7 In this context, we can 
consider the opening of Moore’s poem “The Arctic Ox (Or Goat)”:  
To wear the arctic fox 
you have to kill it. Wear 
     qiviut—the underwool of the arctic ox— 
pulled off it like a sweater;  
your coat is warm; your conscience, better.  
 
I would like a suit of  
qiviut, so light I did not  
     know I had it on; and in the  
course of time, another  
since I had not had to murder  
 
the “goat” that grew the fleece 
that made the first. (193) 
Causally connecting furs with murder, the speaker uses the word “kill” to communicate 
his or her conviction: the speaker’s opposition to and indictment of the fur trade.  
There is a sense of superiority here, too, given the speaker’s appeal to the notion of a 
“better” conscience. You are a better person if you wear qiviut, or muskox’s wool, rather 
than an arctic fox scarf. Moore ends her poem with a gesture towards justice and 
corporeal punishment, one that clearly situates the speaker’s stance on the 
commodification of animals: “If we can’t be cordial / to these creatures’ fleece, / I think 
that we deserve to freeze” (195). Moving beyond Moore’s moralizing poem, however, 
the inanimal is more or less absent. Other than a reference to wearing an arctic fox and to 
how “Chinchillas, otters, water-rats, and beavers, / keep us warm” (193), the inanimal is 
surprisingly silent, if not silenced. The majority of Moore’s poem functions as an 
“advertisement” (195) for qiviut, which is problematic in its own right given its uncritical 
proselytization of the production of animal goods, even if the animal does not suffer.8 
Pushed to the periphery, the inanimal’s marginal materiality is rarely registered, yet 
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undeniably present. That is, the qiviut as an actual animal object is not reflected on; 
rather, it is used as a means to an end, as a conduit for the speaker’s critique. This 
ambivalence around animal goods appears elsewhere in modernity, too. 
In 1925, shortly after witnessing a black bear’s death from a spiked jaw trap, 
Edward Breck (1861-1929) founded the Anti-Steel Trap League, an “organization 
vehemently opposed to the cruel death inflicted on fur-bearing animals by the use of steel 
traps” (Beers 113; Gillmeister 41). While World War II ended its efforts in 1942, the 
League accomplished a lot during its seventeen year run by way of education, persuasion, 
coalitions, and lobby groups, which resulted in the reformation, limitation, or banning of 
trapping measures across America (Dunlap 93-94).9 Of course, the League made 
compromises given that it was not against trapping or killing animals per se; rather, it 
aimed to minimize pain (94), which is still a utilitarian gesture. Ethically thinking about 
animals, moreover, the League launched art. Breck secretly wrote poetry. A San 
Franscisco born German-American who went on to be an American Naval Intelligence 
officer, scholar, and naturalist, Breck published a number of poems through the League’s 
widely circulated literature under the alias “F.F. van de Water” (Gillmeister 33, 41). For 
instance, Breck’s pseudonymously penned “To a Fur Scarf” captures an unnamed animal 
struggling to survive “the steel jaws” when a Christ-like figure redeems and releases him 
from his mortal coil:  
His struggles ceased; he lay at last 
With wide, uncomprehending eyes,  
And watched the sky grow dark above 
And watched the sunset turn to grey. 
And quaked in anguish while he strove 
To gnaw the prisoned leg away. 
Then day came rosy from the east, 
But still the steel jaws kept their hold, 
And no one watched the prisoned beast, 
But fear and hunger, thirst and cold. 
Oppressed by pain, his dread grew numb, 
Fright no more stirred his flagging breath. 
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He longed, in vain, to see him come 
The cruel hunter, bringing death. 
Then through the gloom that night came One 
Who set the timid spirit free; 
“I know thine anguish, little son; 
So once men held and tortured Me.” (qtd. in Gillmeister 41-42)10 
Breck’s poem offers insight into ethical movements in modernity. It is an artifact that 
highlights the anxiety around animal life and death by way of a glaring absence: the 
poem does not directly address the animal commodity referred to in its title. Exclusively 
using masculine pronouns and the word “beast,” the poem’s animal is anthropomorphized 
to evoke the reader’s sympathy. From the ominous dimming of the sun and sky to the 
animal’s last-ditch efforts to his utter resignation and redemption, this poem is 
sentimental. Aside from the first two lines, the poem’s abab rhyme scheme substantiates 
the artifice of this dramatic scene. But the incongruous, unrhymed opening – the 
exception to the abab rule – complicates this poem. “His struggles ceased; he lay at last / 
With wide, uncomprehending eyes,” writes Breck. As a result of the lines that do not 
follow the rhyme scheme, we are drawn to the poem’s juxtaposition between “last” and 
“eyes.” “To a Fur Scarf” opens with the animal’s last eyes, or what it sees leading up to 
its end. Here, the unrhyming opening is an ethical appeal that attempts to resist the 
aestheticization to come—that is, of the poem itself and the fur scarf. Instead, the poem’s 
opening gestures towards, if not simulates, an actual encounter with a suffering animal 
through synchronized sightlines: we vicariously see the animal’s last sight as we read its 
last eyes.  
The title, “To a Fur Scarf,” is also significant. Although such a title is associated 
with an ode, Breck’s poem is not an ode proper. Instead, his poem plays off of the ode 
genre as it takes seriously its subject matter and, interestingly, exhibits an alternative 
form of apostrophe – an empty, absent apostrophe – that ironically addresses its object 
without addressing it at all. As a result, the ethical inanimal is present, yet absent. Breck’s 
titular fur scarf does not make its way into the poem as such, and yet his poem 
paradoxically features and foregoes fur through an implied causal connection: the 
unknown animal will become a fur scarf. Here, “To a Fur Scarf” presents an ethics of 
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omission. Aside from the proleptic title with its foregone conclusion, Breck’s poem 
refuses to aestheticize a fur scarf and, instead, focuses on the end of a life leading up to 
the production of a commodity, one that is ultimately concealed. Modernism frames the 
inanimal through a tenuous ethics, one that is neither quiet nor loud, absent nor present. 
Occasionally, however, the animal commodity appears in the foreground through 
a process of rendering. As Nicole Shukin notes, rendering is the mimetic act of making a 
copy and the industrial process of boiling down and using animal remains, which is 
related to what she calls “animal capital” and its mode of production (20).11 Here, Shukin 
brings together aesthetics and economy in order to show how biopower, or “an explosion 
of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugation of bodies and the 
control of populations” (Foucault 140), literally and figuratively reproduces life through 
both the biological capital of species and the symbolic capital of animal signs (Shukin 
20).12 Shukin’s smart critique is useful for turning to poetic animal objects. Rendering 
resonates with the very genre of poetry because its form foregrounds the production of 
animal objects with the economy of the line and word. Regardless of the length of the 
line, the genre staple of segmentation signifies a form of industry violence, and the 
laborious process of determining the diction of the poem parallels the way in which 
rendering boils down and distills the animal body and its fats into products. More 
specifically, though, we can turn to how the inanimal is an iteration of rendering, which is 
evident in Wylie’s poem “Parting Gift” from Black Armour (1927):  
I cannot give you the Metropolitan Tower; 
I cannot give you heaven; 
Nor the nine Visigoth crowns in the Cluny Museum;  
Nor happiness, even.  
But I can give you a very small purse 
Made out of field-mouse skin,  
With a painted picture of the universe 
And seven blue tears there in. 
 
 I cannot give you the island of Capri; 
 I cannot give you beauty;  
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 Nor bake you marvelous crusty cherry pies 
 With love and duty.  
 But I can give you a very little locket   
Made out of wildcat hide: 
Put it into your left-hand pocket 
And never look inside. (95) 
Here we have two gendered animal objects – a field-mouse skin purse and a wildcat hide 
locket – that are presented as potential parting gifts from the speaker to his or her 
interlocutor. Both inanimals are products of rendering. They exemplify the use of animal 
skin to create a commodity and exhibit an aestheticized, replicated representation of 
animal objects through the repetition of rhyme (“purse” / “universe” and “pies” / “hide” / 
“inside”). Moreover, “Parting Gift” positions the inanimal in an economy – somewhere 
between a gift economy and capitalism – that reflects its indeterminate nature. The first 
four lines of each stanza itemize that which the speaker cannot give to his or her 
interlocutor including the Metropolitan Tower, heaven, Visigoth crowns, happiness, the 
island of Capri, beauty, and lovingly made cherry pies. This litany does three things. 
First, it downplays the value of the purse and the locket; second, it distracts one’s 
contemplation of animal objects through impossible, implausible, and ironic commodities 
and services; and third, it evokes the pretense of humility or inferiority to conceal two 
lavish, garish gifts. The poem offers a critique of the absurd products capitalism yields—
namely, two kitschy inanimal accessories. With the first gift, a field-mouse is turned into 
a container for currency. Its interiority is emptied out and replaced with an otherworldly 
representation, “a painted picture of the universe.” This presents an unending economy 
driven by the desire to consume everything with little to no repercussions other than 
“seven blue tears” standing in for the animal’s pain. With the second gift, a wildcat’s 
wildness is caught, commoditized, and encrypted. Here, the inanimal is inaccessible. The 
locket is both an object of and a device for concealment. The speaker not only instructs 
his or her interlocutor to take what is typically worn around the neck and place it in “your 
left-hand pocket,” but also ensures that the sentimental keepsake inside remains 
unopened, unseen. The speaker’s secrecy about the locked locket seems to gesture to that 
which exceeds representation. In this case, the way in which the often-violent process of 
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rendering results in the inanimal as such. The spirit of the fetish is absent: the animal is 
not inside. The wildcat skin hides the truth of its production. Undergirding the economy 
of the inanimal is its temporality, too. 
Another way the inanimal appears in modernism is through prolepsis. Here, the 
animal’s death is prefigured or imagined, but it may or may not be realized. In this 
moment, the animal straddles two temporal registers at the same time,13 which produces a 
paradox that evokes a tension between animal life and death. One obvious example of 
this is in the opening line of Anne Sexton’s “Hog,” which reduces the living animal to 
what it will be: “Oh you brown bacon machine” (498). This phenomenon can be subtle, 
too. For instance, Elizabeth Bishop’s “tremendous fish” (42) – one “breathing in / the 
terrible oxygen” (42) – lives to see another day; however, the speaker hints at an alternate 
ending. “The Fish,” first published in the Partisan Review in 1940 and later collected in 
North & South (1946), opens with these lines:  
I caught a tremendous fish  
and held him beside the boat 
half out of water, with my hook 
fast in a corner of his mouth. 
He didn’t fight.  
He hadn’t fought at all. 
He hung a grunting weight,  
battered and venerable 
and homely. (42)14 
Narratively, very little happens in this poem: a fish is caught, described, and released. 
“Generally,” writes Zachariah Pickard, “‘The Fish’ is read in psychological terms as an 
exercise in perception and description, and, in this way, the locus of meaning is shifted 
from fish to fisher” (Poetics of Description 25). Bishop’s fish is often overlooked. 
Returning to it, however, we find something fishy. Although released, the fish’s end is 
presaged. In the excerpt, there is a pun that reveals the inanimal. The speaker’s use of the 
word “battered” not only points to the repeated violence experienced by Bishop’s bruised 
fish, but also imagines it in a culinary context covered in milk, flour, and eggs ready to 
eat. With a forlorn foreknowledge, the poem’s fish is featured as future food. Alive and 
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dead, if only for a moment, this animal’s inanimacy is evident. In addition to figuring the 
fate of the fish, the poem presents us with a speaker whose hunger is sublimated through 
language, which assuages any anxiety around the mistreatment or consumption of 
animals. Pickard gestures towards feasting on the fish, too, when he writes that “although 
[Bishop] foregoes keeping and eating him on the literal level, this does not prevent her 
from serving up his ‘white flesh / packed in like feathers’ to her readers on the level of 
imagery” (31). Given the poem’s proleptic punning on “battered,” the inanimal appears in 
a strange twist of time.  
Similarly, Marsden Hartley’s “Mole” opens with muscle framed as meat:  
Little morsels of smoothed grey energy 
learning the secret of fresh burrowing 
called to other order by major dip 
of claw– 
Blindness is nothing to a mole  
it is the terrible gift of seeing that 
hurts,  
it is not alone legs that ache–it is  
press on breast bone 
all done for–without even lustre of  
desire. 
Mole cannot catch earthworm nor means  
of light involve 
so may face terrible beauty keeping eye 
open too long 
and you–what possible use could you  
be having for it? (229)  
Generally, Marsden’s “Mole” is a critique of what we lack by way of the mole’s mythic 
blindness. While moles are not blind, their eyesight is poor. When a mole scopes things 
out, it painfully and paradoxically sees a “terrible beauty.” Relative to its underground 
world of darkness, though, what the mole sees is magnificent. Comparatively, the 
speaker’s use of direct address – “what possible use could you / be having for it?” – 
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implies that we do not appreciate aesthetics, or sense impressions. That is, we do not 
“use” it to see the “terrible beauty” in the world. More importantly, however, it is the first 
line – “Little morsels of smooth grey energy” – that matters here because of the word 
“morsels”, which denotes a “bite or mouthful; a small piece of food” (OED). Here, the 
speaker synecdochically describes the mole with a reference to its meaty muscles read as 
morsels. It is unlikely that the speaker desires to masticate mole meat, but Marsden’s 
diction dissects the animal. Moreover, given that “morsel” also means a “small piece or 
amount” that is “cut or broken from a mass” (OED), the form of the poem presents us 
with cut-up poetic morsels of meat with its sliced sentences and missing articles: “it is not 
alone legs that ache–it is / press on breast bone / all done for–without even lustre of / 
desire.” The poem’s jilted style gestures to the animal’s fragmented future. As time is 
spent – perhaps even lost – on modernism’s animal, we are left with looking at the 
objects around it, some of which are technological.  
Modernity’s technological innovations feed into the formation of the inanimal. 
Alongside the mass production of many different gizmos and gadgets, representations of 
animals were affected by a burgeoning material culture. Often, in these instances, there 
are intimations of violence or objectification. Take the opening line of Wallace Stevens’ 
“Certain Phenomena of Sound”: “The cricket in the telephone is still” (286). Unpacking 
Stevens’ metaphor, the cricket-like sound of the phone’s dial tone is absent. Seemingly, 
technological breakdowns silence the animal, disrupting our ability to pay heed to the 
other. The cricket’s stillness is a euphemism for inanimacy, but it also signifies the idea 
of something being “temporarily out of order”: an animal-object connection that once 
was and could be. Unraveling cross or cut wires leads to a world of poetic animal and 
object relations, which includes – perhaps more gruesomely – roadkill.  
Roadkill signifies a fleeting moment when human, animal, and machine meet. For 
Mike Michael, this meeting marks the moment when automobility and animobility 
intersect: when cars on roads run into species on verges (282, 292). Michael’s metaphor 
for this moment is frottage – an artistic practice perfected by surrealist Max Ernst – that 
captures the collision of automobility and animobility (292). Michael unpacks his 
metaphor in the following passage:  
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The process of rubbing and the transfer of matter (particles of the thing that is 
rubbed or does the rubbing—wood or paper or crayon) and form (indentation in 
the paper, erosion of brass plates, blunting of the crayon) across the two surfaces 
suggest both the movement of material stuff (animal bodies, appropriate plants on 
verges) and signs (notions of species and corridor, signals of danger, and care). 
Roadkill lies at the hub of this, or rather is the “moment” at which the surfaces of 
animobility and automobility frottage. (292) 
As automobility and animobility meet, there is a juncture in which the cultural, natural, 
semiotic, and material combine (278). Michael’s scope is sociological; however, given 
that frottage foregrounds an exchange between mediums, we can consider how roadkill 
rubs up against the poem. For instance, in 1962 William Stafford published a collection 
of poems entitled Traveling Through the Dark; the titular poem opens with this stanza: 
“Traveling through the dark I found a deer / dead on the edge of the Wilson River road. / 
It is usually best to roll them into the canyon: / that road is narrow; to swerve might make 
more dead” (11). The remainder of the poem details the speaker’s ethical dilemma, or a 
“narrow” (11) road: what to do with a dead doe whose unborn young are still alive. 
Ultimately, the speaker mercifully “swerves” and makes “more dead”: “I thought hard for 
us all—my only swerving—, / then pushed her over the edge into the river” (11). While 
the accident is absent in Stafford’s poem – the speaker arrives after-the-fact – there is still 
a trace of frottage. The speaker’s idling car gestures to the vehicular predator: “The car 
aimed ahead its lowered parking lights; / under the hood purred the steady engine. I stood 
in the glare of the warm exhaust turning red” (11). Moreover, the form of the opening 
stanza features the friction of frottage. From one line to the next, from life to death, the 
line break between “deer” and “dead” signifies and simulates the instantaneous moment 
when car collides with animal. To be clear, the speaker does not witness this collision, 
but it is formalistically encoded in the poem. The post-positive adjective “a deer / dead” 
(rather than “a dead deer”) ironically communicates the chronology of events – the deer 
is alive then dead – while simultaneously swerving from what would be the “proper” 
order of syntax. This disjunctive grammar is a form of frottage.  
With the development of infrastructure and the automobile industry, other roadkill 
poems appear in the latter half of the twentieth century, too, ones that carry with them a 
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modernist sentiment. For instance, Gary Snyder’s “The Dead by the Side of the Road” 
from Turtle Island (1974) and Robert Penn Warren’s “Going West” from Rumor Verified 
(1981).15 For me, it is the graphic lines of Williams’ “The Sparrow” from Journey to 
Love (1955) that really recognizes and represents how the inanimal encounters 
technology in this context. The poem’s ending reveals the roadkill scene:  
   a wisp of feathers 
flattened to the pavement, 
 wings spread symmetrically  
  as if in flight, 
the head gone, 
 the black escutcheon of the breast  
   undecipherable, 
an effigy of a sparrow,  
 a dried wafer only, [… .] (2: 294) 
Herbert Leibowitz notes that the poem is dedicated to Williams’ father; the speaker 
looking over the dead sparrow sings a homily to an imagined congregation of mourners 
(50). Mark Payne reads “The Sparrow” as an analogy for how particular forms of 
expressive behaviour are expended in humans and animals (54), but he does not address 
the cause of the bird’s death.16 As figurative as we find “The Sparrow,” it is, nonetheless, 
a representation of roadkill: a decapitated, “flattened to the pavement” inanimal. There is 
something tragically beautiful about this bird because its death is a form of flight. “The 
Sparrow” presents the production of roadkill as a form of art: the bird is flattened to fit on 
the road’s canvas in a surprisingly symmetrical way. The aesthetics of roadkill abound in 
“The Sparrow,” with the self-reflexive flattening of the bird into the word, the ironic use 
of the word “escutcheon,” or shield, to describe a broken breast, the “undecipherable” 
hermeneutics surrounding this pièce de résistance, and the metafictional sparrow “effigy” 
as a reminder of artifice.  
Modernism’s inanimal also reveals an antithetical relationship between vitalism 
and violence.17 We can understand this paradoxical pairing in and around modernism’s 
conflicted creature if we turn to the spurious species line. As Shukin notes, “the meaning 
of the animal fluctuates with the vicissitudes of culture and history and, more 
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particularly, with the vicissitudes of a species line that can be made either more porous or 
impregnable to suit the means and ends of power” (15). This phenomenon affects the 
aestheticization of modernism’s animals. Back and forth between vitalism and violence, 
life and death, modernism’s animals are in a Sisyphean state. This oscillation reflects an 
anxiety around what constitutes the human as such, the dissolution and reinscription of 
the divide between human and animal, and the slow unveiling of an unknown nonhuman, 
inanimate world through domains such as art and science. With all this tension in the air, 
the undead animal appears.  
Cummings poem “r-p-o-p-h-e-s-s-a-g-r” from No Thanks (1935) exhibits an 
instance of both vitalism and violence through its fragmented form. It reads:  
           r-p-o-p-h-e-s-s-a-g-r 
            who 
a)s w(e loo)k 
upnowgath 
      PPEGORHARASS 
  eringint(o- 
aThe):l 
eA 
     !p: 
S                                                                    a 
(r 
rIvInG        .gRrEaPsPhOs) 
       to 
rea(be)rran(com)gi(e)ngly 
,grasshopper; (396) 
As Stephen Adams puts it, cummings’ poem is “unpronounceable” (166). Adams notes 
that cummings uses language to simulate “the gradual coming into visual awareness of 
the startling blur” (166). Jumping around from “r-p-o-p-h-e-s-s-a-g-r” to 
“PPEGORHARASS” to “gRrEaPsPhOs” to “grasshopper,” cummings’ poem replicates 
recognition through rearrangement and reveals the signifier. The poem does the work for 
you, but it solicits your labour, too. When the reader comes across the first iteration of 
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grasshopper, he or she will either decipher or gloss over it. Decoding “r-p-o-p-h-e-s-s-a-
g-r” produces a sense of lag. After a brief glimpse of the poem prior to reading it, the 
reader knows that this puzzle continues after the word “r-p-o-p-h-e-s-s-a-g-r”; deciding to 
solve it, the reader experiences delay, unable to keep up with what he or she will come to 
know as a lively, leaping grasshopper. Scanning “r-p-o-p-h-e-s-s-a-g-r” creates a sense of 
speed, too. Encountering the obfuscated grasshopper, the reader skims over it with the 
expectation that the signifier can and will be inferred after finishing the poem. 
Consequently, the reader’s eyes race over each disparate letter, which mimics the 
grasshopper’s leap. Either way we read the poem, something escapes us, something stays 
behind or jumps ahead. And so the inability to pin down the insect points to its precarity. 
Belabouring the phenomenology of reading cummings’ “r-p-o-p-h-e-s-s-a-g-r” helps us 
to understand how we do not fully see it. What we do see, however, in cummings’ nearly 
inscrutable poem is fragility.  
Based on its critical history, cummings’ poem has been and continues to be met 
with difficulty.18 “How [“r-p-o-p-h-e-s-s-a-g-r”] works is another question,” writes Jen 
Webb, “and one that people still wrestle over (is it a sonnet, though arranged oddly on a 
page? Is it an acrostic? Is it an attempt to represent the movement of a grasshopper 
gathering itself to leap?” (42). Webb’s answer is that “r-p-o-p-h-e-s-s-a-g-r” is mimetic: 
“It doesn’t tell, but shows and in this is closer to resemblance than the representative 
mode” (43). Webb argues that the reader extracts the portrait of the grasshopper by the 
way in which his or her brain must hop around the jumbled letters, phrases, and words 
(43). In relation to the nonsense words, Webb notes the nonsense sounds: “Try to read 
those lines out loud: what you will probably hear yourself doing is fumbling, straining, 
stretching out sound – moving erratically; in short, your voice will ‘do’ a grasshopper” 
(43). If you cannot see the insect, then you might be able to hear it. Trying to sound out a 
strange signifier like “r-p-o-p-h-e-s-s-a-g-r” produces a noise, one that signals the 
residual materiality of the evasive grasshopper. Here, there are only traces of the creature. 
Semantically and sonically, the animal is thinly spread across the page with scattered 
signifiers, which is a form of violence to the whole of the animal. The aestheticization of 
the grasshopper veers towards vulnerability as cummings’ fragmented figure 
disassembles the animal. This is exacerbated by the way in which the poem exhibits an 
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entity that is many. How many grasshoppers appear exactly? There is no definitive 
answer, but cummings’ poem hints at moving from gestalt to group as the singular is 
pluralized through difference and repetition. There is no indication that each iteration of 
“grasshopper” refers to the same insect. The speaker’s focus is directed at one (nearly) 
leaping grasshopper, but this does not preclude others. Moreover, the poem’s form casts 
doubt on the speaker’s assertions, ones based on shifting stimuli. The possible 
multiplicity of this poem points to an unease surrounding the speaker’s encounter with an 
animal other – or others – that avoids absolute appropriation. Overall, cummings’ poem 
exhibits a blurred bug existing as an echo of the unpronounceable “r-p-o-p-h-e-s-s-a-g-r,” 
one that is alive and active, yet violently stretched across the page to the point of 
defamiliarization.  
Another poem that presents us with the push and pull between vitalism and 
violence is Oppen’s “Psalm,” one that appeals to verisimilitude with the speaker’s 
description of a wild deer sighting. It reads:  
Veritas sequitur . . . 
 
 
In the small beauty of the forest  
The wild deer bedding down— 
That they are there!  
 
      Their eyes  
Effortless, the soft lips  
Nuzzle and the alien small teeth  
Tear at the grass 
 
         The roots of it  
Dangle from their mouths  
Scattering earth in the strange woods.  
They who are there. 
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         Their paths  
Nibbled thru the fields, the leaves that shade them  
Hang in the distances  
Of sun 
 
          The small nouns  
Crying faith  
In this in which the wild deer  
Startle, and stare out. (20) 
 
The vitalism of “Psalm” takes the form of immanence. There is a life force found in how 
the deer are in their environment: words like “Nuzzle,” “Tear,” “Dangle,” “Scattering,” 
and “Nibbled” point to “bites or jerks of energy” (Swigg n.p.). The “crux of the poem lies 
in the absolutely simple recognition of the ‘primary fact’ ‘That they are there!’” (Nicholls 
73).  
Oppen’s unfinished epigraph attests to this, too. Following “Veritas sequitur,” or 
“the truth follows,” the Thomas Aquinas quotation reads, “esse rerum,” which means 
“the existence of things” (Swigg n.p.; Nicholls 73). Given Oppen’s omission and ellipsis, 
however, it is the poem to come that is. Richard Swigg notes how the poem’s “open 
ended dots” lead into “a moment-by-moment test of truthfulness in uttering a continuity 
beyond human predetermining” (n.p.). “Psalm” simulates that which exists outside—the 
life of the other. Commenting on the epigraph, Lyn Graham Barzilai notes that Oppen’s 
poem attempts “to reveal the truth of those rare occasions where one seems to have been 
immersed for a moment in a dimension of experience not normally encountered” (57). 
This “dimension of experience” is signified by the space after the ellipsis and in between 
the stanzas; here, the reader enters a lively world with wild deer. But the poem’s vitality 
vanishes when “Psalm” self-reflexively reveals its artifice (“small nouns”), which 
disrupts our suspension of disbelief. “The wild deer” are but marks on the page. Self-
aware, “Psalm” problematizes the very existence of the deer “who are there,” but this 
does not discount the poem’s representation of animal vitality. In fact, the poem enlivens 
the animal through the reader: the vitality of the animal manifests through reading as 
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such. “Psalm” registers a vital connection between poet, text, reader, and animal in the 
last two lines: “In this in which the wild deer / Startle, and stare out.” Back and forth and 
between intersecting sightlines and gazes, we share in this moment of vitality.  
Oppen’s poem is vital but also violent. Language and representation are not 
neutral here. Rather, this poem’s violence emerges when realism meets reflexivity, a shift 
that abstracts animal materiality. Even though Peter Nicholls notes that Oppen’s deer are 
“figures for a non-symbolizing, non-appropriative approach to the world” (73-74), they 
are still “figures,” ones that have been rendered. While my objection is true for any 
signification of an animal, it is Oppen’s reflexive “small nouns” that gestures to the built-
in violence of representation. When Barzilai writes that “Oppen has captured an essential 
‘moment of being,’ a primary experience in a wood” (58), I am inclined to read 
“captured” in a different light. And so the violence of “Psalm” appears in the last stanza, 
which features a scene of disruption and threat.  
Leading up to the end, the scene is serene: the deer are at peace with their 
effortless eyes and soft lips. But language, a predator, frightens the calm creatures. “For 
as if roused by the cry,” writes Swigg, “the wild deer ‘Startle and stare out’ – out indeed 
from the close-knit intrication of human language, as verb jolts free from verb and the 
animals gaze right beyond the page into the yet-unspoken and unknown” (n.p.). This 
“unknown” affirms and negates the animal. As noted, the deer’s gaze establishes a vital 
relation with the reader. Finishing the poem, however, the reader puts an end to the 
existence of the deer; they are silenced by space. While the wild deer are embedded 
(“bedding down”) and rooted (“roots”) in the world (Weinfield 188), the animal is nearly 
nothing. Roots are uprooted, torn from the ground by the one who is and is not: “the alien 
small teeth / Tear at the grass // The roots of it / Dangle from their mouths / Scattering 
earth in the strange woods.” Indeed, Oppen’s ostensibly innocuous, yet insidious poem 
sings a song of both vitalism and violence around the inanimal. 
 The inanimal also emerges out of the relationship between animals and race.19 
Often, modernism features instances of racialized anthropomorphism. In Rosalie Jonas’ 
“Ballade des Belles Milatraisses” – a poem about “Octoroon Balls in New Orleans” – an 
unmixed black man is named, “Cocodrie,” or crocodile, and an octoroon man is named, 
“Trouloulou,” or turtle (22). Or consider Hughes’ “Me and the Mule” where the speaker 
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identifies with the animal: “I’m like that old mule— / Black / And don’t give a damn!” 
(2: 33-34). Such a phenomenon continues with animal objects. To explore this, I turn to 
the poem “Hog Meat” from ’Weh Down Souf (1897) by the relatively unknown African-
American poet Daniel Webster Davis.20 
Taking issue with the easily satisfied or shiftless figure (Sherman 471), Davis’ 
“Hog Meat” reads:  
Deze eatin’ folks may tell me ub de gloriz ub spring lam’, 
An’ de toofsumnis ub tuckey et wid cel’ry an’ wid jam; 
Ub beef-st’ak fried wid unyuns, an’ sezoned up so fin’— 
But yo’ jes’ kin gimme hog-meat, an’ I’m happy all de tim’. 
  
When de fros’ is on de pun’kin an’ de sno’-flakes in de ar’,         
I den begin rejoicin’—hog-killin’ time is near; 
An’ de vizhuns ub de fucher den fill my nightly dreams, 
Fur de time is fas’ a-comin’ fur de ’lishus pork an’ beans. 
  
We folks dat’s frum de kuntry may be behin’ de sun— 
We don’t lik’ city eatin’s, wid beefsteaks dat ain’ don’—         
’Dough mutton chops is splendid, an’ dem veal cutlits fin’, 
To me ’tain’t like a sphar-rib, or gret big chunk ub chine. 
  
Jes’ talk to me ’bout hog-meat, ef yo’ want to see me pleased, 
Fur biled wid beans tiz gor’jus, or made in hog-head cheese; 
An’ I could jes’ be happy, ’dout money, cloze or house,         
Wid plenty yurz an’ pig feet made in ol’-fashun “souse.” 
  
I ’fess I’m only humun, I hab my joys an’ cares— 
Sum days de clouds hang hebby, sum days de skies ar’ fair; 
But I forgib my in’miz, my heart is free frum hate, 
When my bread is filled wid cracklins an’ dar’s chidlins on my plate.       
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’Dough ’possum meat is glo’yus wid ’taters in de pan, 
But put ’longside pork sassage it takes a backward stan’; 
Ub all yer fancy eatin’s, jes gib to me fur min’ 
Sum souse or pork or chidlins, sum sphar-rib, or de chine. (16-18) 
Composed of regular six-beat accentual lines with an aabb rhyme scheme, Davis’ poem 
opens with a clear cultural divide between the speaker and the haughty “eatin’ folks” 
symbolized by two different classes of food: lamb and turkey versus hog meat. Clearly, 
the speaker values hog meat; however, he or she also subscribes to the ideology of the 
“eatin’ folks” by employing morally good rhetoric to describe their meat: “de gloriz ub 
spring lam’” and “de toofsumnis ub tuckey.” As simple as this sounds, the speaker’s 
conscious or unconscious value judgment is, actually, problematized by the dialect. As 
Michael North argues, despite the existence of actual black speech, acted, sung, and 
published versions of it are “white products” (24). “Hog Meat” is a “white product”, but 
it is also a “black product.” “Davis worked seriously at his dialect poetry,” writes Joan R. 
Sherman, in order to present “limited portraits of antebellum black life ’weh down Souf’” 
(475). Indeed,’Weh Down Souf ends with a glossary that “translates” sixty-nine words 
from dialect to “standard” English (134-136), which attests to how he aimed for 
something more than blackface on the page or an essentialized racial discourse. With the 
illusion of authenticity, then, Davis articulates a voice for the racialized other that is more 
than a laughable parody; it is, instead, an empowered voice, one that is in dialogue with 
the hegemony.  
After stating his or her preference for hog meat, the speaker anticipates what “hog 
killin’ time” yields. The speaker’s excitement exceeds his or her waking life, too. 
Hyperbolically playing with the pretense of prescience, or “vizhuns ub de fucher,” the 
meat-minded speaker dreams of “de ’lishus pork an beans.” As if to justify this fetishistic 
fantasy, the speaker moves on to qualify the noted cultural divide by way of a rural 
(“kuntry”) versus urban (“city”) split. Acknowledging, yet advancing from a form of 
primitivism – the implied darkness of “behin’ de sun” – the speaker’s stance stands out 
through the voice of solidarity: “We don’t lik’ city eatin’s.” While making a concession 
to the city’s splendid mutton chops and fine veal cutlets, the speaker notes how they pale 
in comparison to “a sphar-rib, or gret big chunk ub chine.” A case of personal preference, 
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yes, but the speaker’s taste is contingent on class, too. As Pierre Bourdieu notes, “it is 
probably in tastes in food that one would find the strongest and most indelible mark of 
infant learning, the lessons which longest withstand the distancing or collapse of the 
native world and most durably maintain nostalgia for it” (79). For the speaker, hog meat 
is home. The speaker is willing to sacrifice “money, cloze or house” for “plenty yurz an’ 
pig feet made in ol’-fashun ‘souse.’” The speaker’s hedonistic happiness is fundamentally 
tied to hog meat, for even hearing someone talk about it induces pleasure: “Jes’ talk to 
me ’bout hog-meat, ef yo’ want to see me pleased.” Self-consciously aware of his or her 
hog meat mania, the speaker is sincerely “humun,” too. Affected by the ups and downs of 
life, susceptible to other emotions like hate – after all, the speaker has enemies (“in’miz”) 
– he or she is still able to find happiness from a full plate.  
The pig is the panacea. Of course, this exaggerated sentiment is unrealistic; 
however, it profoundly points to the speaker’s investment in history through a cultural 
artifact, even if it is ostensibly at the cost of reductively equating the racialized other’s 
sole pleasure to the consumption of meat. As the poem comes to a close, the by now not-
so-subtle class antagonism mediated through different forms of food is clear. To be sure, 
there is a tone of disdain in the speaker’s phrase, “fancy eatin’s.” Along with this class 
divide, there is, as noted, a racial one, too. “Pork was clearly the main source of meat for 
slaves” (96), notes Herbert C. Covey and Dwight Eisnach in What the Slaves Ate (2009). 
They point out that slaves ate possom, too; in fact, it was considered a delicacy (120), as 
the refrain of the following slave song demonstrates: “Carve dat ’possum, / Carve dat 
’possum, chillum. / Carve dat ’possum, / Oh, carve ’im to de heart” (121).21 Yet Davis’ 
“Hog Meat” hints at a hierarchy. For the speaker, “’possom meat” takes a “backward / 
stan’” to “pork sassage.” Hog meat is higher than possom. In fact, it is elevated above 
and beyond the modifications of Davis’ speaker’s dialect: the unadulterated word “hog-
meat” is only mentioned twice in the poem. Here, the category of “hog-meat” is clean, 
uncontaminated, as it were, by an “impure” form of English. But we cannot say the same 
about the synonyms of this swine. Aside from the words “pork” and “pig feet,” all the 
other parts of the pig are subject to the speaker’s dialect—specifically, “chine,” 
“chidlins,” “sphar-rib,” and “sassage.”22 As North notes, “dialect is a ‘chain’” (11). It is a 
“constant reminder of the literal unfreedom of slavery and of the political and cultural 
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repression that followed emancipation” (11). Davis’ poem exhibits a contested site where 
a history of violence intersects with the identity politics of food.  
In “Hog Meat,” then, the inanimal is aestheticized through a racial discourse, a 
history of objectification. Hog meat is not of the same caliber as lamb, turkey, beefsteak, 
muttonchops, or veal. Rather, it is both above and below these meats depending on one’s 
point of view: the speaker or the “eatin’ folks.” Here, hog meat is the reification of racial 
and social domains and tensions. As the pig is parsed out piecemeal in the poem – flesh, 
backbone, entrails, ribs, sausage, and feet – we start to see how the inanimal is subject to 
fragmented and disembodied forms like the marginalized, racialized other. But the 
repressed returns. “Hog Meat” presents us with a pun: Davis’ word for “for” is “fur” 
(“Fur de time,” “fur de ’lishus pork,” “Fur biled wid beans,” and “jes gib to me fur 
min’”). Davis’ poem features byproducts once belonging to animals, some of which were 
furry. Inanimal remains remain. Through the aesthetics of Davis’ dialect, then, we see 
how the inanimal is racialized. 
 This chapter’s focus on modernism’s representations of the inanimal through 
different modes reveals a tension between animal life and death through processes of 
objectification. The inanimal is a figure and a form of relation between animal and object. 
That is, the inanimal is a site of intersecting registers and phenomena that disturb and 
disrupt modes of being and knowing. Grounded and uprooted, thing and concept, real and 
imaginary, the inanimal occupies a strange space because it is a mediator between life 
and death, word and world. Built into a material-semiotic matrix, the inanimal marks the 
point at which representation and referent blur given that it is an assemblage of language, 
animality, and materiality. Importantly, the inanimal is part of a larger phenomenon in 
modernity—namely, animal reification. This process points to how animality is literally 
or figuratively abstracted, assimilated, and impressed upon objects, like the way in which  
“the social characteristics of men’s labour” appear as “objective characteristics of the 
products of labour themselves, as the socio-natural properties of these things” (Marx 164-
165). By exploring the relationship between animals and objects, my aim was to provide 
a way of taking account of the objecthood of dirty modernism’s bestiary.  
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1 I came up with the word “inanimal” prior to reading José Saramago’s novel The Double 
(2004), which is about a history teacher named Tertuliano Máximo Afonso who sees his 
doppelgänger in a film. Shocked to see his uncanny twin, Tertuliano sets course to find 
him. Saramago’s novel features an omniscient, self-reflexive, metafictional narrator with 
a penchant for digression. In one tangent the narrator briefly theorizes the inanimal:  
“everything that is animal is destined to become inanimal and that, however great the 
names and deeds inscribed by human beings on History’s pages, it is from the inanimal 
that we come and toward the inanimal that we are going” (66). Alluding to and playing 
with evolution and the death drive, the narrator emphasizes the inclusive way in which 
animality undergirds humanity. Ultimately, the narrator’s reflection on the inanimal is 
only a parallel for the protagonist’s quest. Saramago’s inanimal does not reappear, but 
there is more to be said about it. I agree with Saramago’s Freudian proposition, but I am 
interested in exploring a different dimension of the inanimal. 
2 When Lippit talks about “incorporated animality,” he is talking about something when, 
say, “horse-drawn carriages gave way to steam engines, plaster horses were mounted 
upon tramcar fronts in an effort to simulate continuity with the older, animal powered 
vehicles” (“…From Wild” 124). For other examples featuring figures like James Watt, 
Henry Ford, Thomas Edison, Alexander Graham Bell, Walt Disney, and Erwin 
Schrödinger see also “…From Wild Technology to Electric Animal,” 131-132n7-10.  
3 See Singer’s Animal Liberation (1975) and Derrida’s The Animal That Therefore I Am 
(2008) as tutor texts.  
4 See Malamud’s Poetic Animals and Animal Souls (2003), Armstrong’s What Animals 
Mean in the Fiction of Modernity (2008), Rohman’s Stalking the Subject (2009), Nicole 
Shukin’s Animal Capital (2009), Payne’s The Animal Part (2010), and Pick’s Creaturely 
Poetics (2011). 
5 Boggs’ study brings together American literature, animal representations, and 
biopolitical subjectivity in groundbreaking ways. For instance, she unsettles 
anthropocentrism by arguing that the human is a relational category that cannot be cut off 
from the animal, which leads her to move away from mapping a history of human-animal 
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ontology to delineating a genealogy of human-animal sexuality (27, 25). Importantly, 
although Boggs changes the nature of the conversation to human-animal sexuality, she 
does take the time to question and comment on animals and objects by way of Bill 
Brown’s thing theory. Specifically, in discussing her idea of biopolitical objects, Boggs 
asks, “how we might read the animal as a ‘thing’ in a way that is not associated with—or 
at least not limited to—the denial of subjectivity but rather is productive of alternative 
subjectivities. If one of the conditions of biopolitics is not just the control over but also 
the commercialization of animal life, how might we locate alternative subjectivities at its 
very core in those processes of objectification?” (162). In this section of Animalia 
Americana, Boggs suggests that “animal autobiographies locate us at the nexus between 
these different ways of thinking about objects—as the ‘mere’ objects of commodity 
culture or as the recalcitrant transitional objects that function as biopolitics’ vexing and 
exhilarating surplus” (164). Ultimately, however, Boggs brings in the humans; she is 
interested in exploring subjectivity, or subject-object relations in a biopolitical context 
when it comes to the animal’s life because, as she puts it, “[b]iopower blurs the 
distinction between subjects and objects” (161). Given that I turn to animal objects, 
Boggs’ focus is different than mine. And while I think we can, yes, read the inanimal in 
and through biopolitics, which I do later in this chapter relative to Nicole Shukin’s 
arguments in Animal Capital, I wonder if something like thanatopolitics or necropolitics 
would be helpful as well.   
6 For Lippit, animals in modernity are perpetually vanishing and undead (1): “Since 
animals are denied the faculties of language, they remain incapable of reflection, which is 
bound by finitude, and carries with it an awareness of death. Undying, animals simply 
expire, transpire, shift their animus to other animal bodies” (187). And so Lippit qualifies 
what he calls the “animetaphor” in the following passage from Electric Animal (2000): 
“One finds a fantastic transversality at work between the animal and the metaphor—the 
animal is already a metaphor, the metaphor an animal. Together they transport to 
language, breathe into language, the vitality of another life, another expression: animal 
and metaphor, a metaphor made flesh, a living metaphor that is by definition not a 
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metaphor, antimetaphor—‘animetaphor’” (165). Nicole Shukin’s Animal Capital (2009) 
critiques Lippit’s overly idealistic configuration and analysis of the animal (see 40-41).  
7 What I am gesturing towards here is not unlike what Carol J. Adams calls the “absent 
referent,” which is a process that “permits us to forget about the animal as an independent 
entity. […] The absent referent is both there and not there. […] We fail to accord this 
absent referent its own existence” (51-53). 
8 “In ‘The Arctic Ox (Or Goat),’” writes Randy Malamud, “people are ridiculed for the 
way we exercise the seminal act of imperial dominance over animals, naming them (as 
Adam did in Genesis)” (70). Here, Malamud gestures to how even without a trace of 
physical violence, there is, nonetheless, a different kind of injustice. Like Malamud, I am 
gesturing towards how the non-violent consumption of animals still implicates the 
consumer in a speciest ideology. Or, perhaps exaggeratedly, Moore’s speaker is an 
animal rights activist, but not a vegan.  
9 Thomas R. Dunlap notes that the League “sponsored or wrote at least ninety-nine anti-
trapping measures introduced in eighteen states. Five states and municipalities either 
banned trapping or the leg-hold trap. Where it could not get a ban it sought other, lesser 
measures with considerable success. Thirty-seven states passed new trapping laws that 
ranged from new regulations on seasons to requirements that trappers check their lines at 
regular intervals (93).   
10 Gillmesiter does not name the poem; however, in Thomas R. Dunlap’s Saving 
America’s Wildlife (1988), the poem is quoted – specifically, the last four lines – and 
referred to as “To a Fur Scarf” (94). Moreover, there are some textual variations with 
Dunlap’s last four lines—that is, he quotes Breck’s poem’s conclusion in the following 
way: “Then through the gloom that night came ONE / Who set the timid spirit free: / ‘I 
know thine anguish, little son— / So once men trapped and tortured ME” (93-94). Dunlap 
citation is as follows: “Theodore W Cart, ‘The Struggle for Wildlife Protection in the 
United Sates, 1870-1900: Attitudes and Events Leading to the Lacy Act’ (Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1971), 115. Poem in Edward Breck, ‘Blood 
Money for the Audubon Association,’ 2, credited to F.F. Van Water; copy in Folder 24, 
Box 291, Rosalie Edge Papers, Conservation Center, Denver Public Library, Colorado. It 
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later appeared on the back of the stationery of Defenders of Wildlife (1963); example in 
Olaus J. Murie Papers, Denver Public Library, Box 265, ‘Predators—Coyotes’ file. See 
also Gentile, ‘The Anti-Trapping Movement,’ 62” (201n41). 
11 Nicole Shukin’s argument in Animal Capital (2009) takes an unwavering materialist 
approach to animal studies and turns to market discourses that attempt to produce a 
perfect mimicry of animal and capital (6-7, 15). In her book, she develops unorthodox 
genealogies when it comes to the imbricated relationship between animals and capital in 
the twentieth and twenty-first century with the aim of foregrounding “capital’s terrestrial 
costs” (7, 14). And so Shukin historicizes cultural and material processes that have 
produced animals as forms of capital (7). That is, her idea of animal capital turns to both 
animal representations and referents – signs and substances – and emphasizes the 
existence of a biopolitical entanglement between the economic and symbolic capital of 
the fetishized currency of animal life (7). As for biopolitics, it enters Shukin’s argument 
through speciesism. Discourses and technologies of biopower rely on an ambivalent 
rather than absolute line between humans and animals, which results in the consistent and 
paradoxical dissolution and reinscription of the species divide (11). Scrutinizing the 
system, Shukin suggests that it is founded on a feedback loop: “capital becomes animal, 
and animals become capital” (16). The idea of animal capital is not only a metaphor for 
the way in which capital subsumes and copies nature, but also a material history that 
hones in on paradoxical phenomena in pursuit of making capital animal (17-18).  
12 Part of her biopolitical critique, Shukin explains how that which is materially and 
metaphorically rendered from animals circulates as capital (24). Moreover, she situates 
rendering as both a hegemonic discourse and a critical practice (28). As diagnosis and 
directive, rendering is a stereoscopic mode of analysis where the critic needs to look at 
both literal and figurative features of animal capital to foreground how they are 
contingent and related (24).  
13 For a discussion of philosophy, temporality, and animals, see Lippit’s Electric Animal, 
43 ff.  
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14 George Monteiro notes the publishing history of “The Fish” in Elizabeth Bishop in 
Brazil and After: A Poetic Career Transformed  (2012) (49). 
15 Snyder’s poem depicts “a great Red-tailed Hawk […] on the shoulder of / Interstate 5” 
(7) and Warren’s exhibits a “fool pheasant” (26) that hits the speaker’s windshield in a 
“bloody explosion” (26). As early as 1919, moreover, we start to see casualties connected 
to the car with Williams’ “Romance Moderne” (see Others, 5.3, 1919 or Sour Grapes 
(1921) in Collected Poems [1: 147-150]). Indeed, there is a certain kind of “roadkill” in 
this poem: “A car overturned and two crushed bodies / under it” (Williams CP 1: 150). 
16 In The Animal Part, Payne offers a thorough reading of Williams’ “The Sparrow.” 
Starting with the sparrow’s identification with sexuality, Payne points to something other 
than instinct: Williams’ sparrow enacts certain behaviours (52-53). For Payne, the 
emphasis placed on performativity in the poem foregrounds the way in which actions and 
characteristics of individual animals emerge against the backdrop of their species’ norms 
(53). From Williams’ poem, then, according to Payne, we are to consider how experience 
can and does take on a specific shape, which, ultimately, recognizes a life lived by a 
particular individual, human or otherwise (53). Teasing out the interplay between general 
and specific, Payne notes how the form of the “The Sparrow” underscores the idea of 
individuality: for Payne, the dried wafer sparrow body is only understandable because of 
Williams’ verse form, a form that is both an achievement within the genre of poetry and a 
device for featuring particularity—that is, the particularity of one sparrow’s life (53-54).  
17 For a discussion of animal violence, see Richard Iveson’s Zoogenesis: Thinking 
Encounter with Animals (2014). 
18 As early as 1960, “r-p-o-p-h-e-s-s-a-g-r” is translated as follows: “grasshopper, who, as 
we look, now upgathering into himself, leaps, arriving to become, rearrangingly, a 
grasshopper” (Friedman 123). This critic is taking liberties with the poem because the 
word “himself” does not appear. Granted, “r-p-o-p-h-e-s-s-a-g-r” offers many interpretive 
opportunities, tempting the reader to endlessly entertain one after another, but any prosaic 
translation of cummings’ poem risks losing too much materiality. For instance, the quasi- 
superimposition of “become” and “rearrangingly” offers two alternatives that can and 
should be concurrently considered while reading the poem. Specifically, “to / 
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rearrangingly become / ,grasshopper;” and “to / become rearrangingly / ,grasshopper;”: 
these options coexist and create a sense of change or becoming that are attributed to the 
animal. What does not change, however, is, again, the complexity of cummings’ poem. 
19 For a work on race and animality, see, for instance, Kalpana Seshardi’s HumAnimal: 
Race, Law, Language (2012) or Christopher Peterson’s Bestial Traces: Race, Sexuality, 
and Animality (2012).  
20 For more information on Davis’ life and critical reception, see Joan R. Sherman’s 
“Daniel Webster Davis: a Black Virginia Poet in the Age of Accommodation” in The 
Virginia Magazine of History and Biography. 81.4 (1973): 457-478. Also, for other 
remarks on Davis, see James Weldon Johnson’s The Book of American Poetry (1922), 
81; Sterling A. Brown’s Negro Poetry and Drama, and The Negro in American Fiction 
(1969), 37; J. Saunders Redding’s To Make a Poet Black (1939), 53; Jean Wagner’s 
Black Poets of the United States (1973), 138; John H. Smythe quoted in Chidi Ikonné’s 
From DuBois to Van Vechten (1981), 60-61.  
21 Herbert C. Covey and Dwight Eisnach write the following in What the Slaves Ate: 
Recollections of African American Foods and Foodways from the Slave Narratives: 
“Opossum was abundant in the South and popular among southern whites and African 
Americans. Archeologists have often found opossum remains near the slave quarters 
[…]. Because opossums were nocturnal, they were an ideal animal for slaves to hunt 
because they came out when the slaves were home from the fields. They were easy to tree 
[sic] and, because they feigned death, were effortless for hunters to capture. […] They 
were typically prepared by roasting and served with sweet potatoes and brown opossum 
gravy” (120).  
22 Chine is the “backbone and immediately adjoining flesh of a bacon-pig, which remains 
when the sides are cut off for bacon-curing” (OED); chidlins are, according to Davis’ 
glossary, “hog’s entrails” (134); sphar-rib is, of course, spare-rib, or “a cut of meat, 
[especially] of pork, consisting of the ribs somewhat closely trimmed” (OED); and 
sassage is, clearly, sausage, or “finely chopped pork, beef, or other meat” (OED). 
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Chapter 4: Sticky Black Tools 
 
 
It is not just animals that are objectified in dirty modernism. Material figures like 
tools become a handy, yet problematic means of racialization, too. Daniel Webster Davis’ 
Weh Down Souf (1897), for example, features a poem called, “Stickin’ to de Hoe,” which 
opens with this stanza:  
Dar’s mighty things a-gwine on, 
     Sense de days when I wuz young, 
An’ folks don’t do ez dey did once, 
     Sense dese new times is kum; 
De gals dey dresses pow’ful fin’, 
    An’ all am fur a sho’, 
But de thing dat I’ze in favor ub 
     Is stickin’ to de hoe. (57) 
Davis’ poem features a speaker who is witness to a sea change. Observing a shift from 
manual to intellectual labour, the speaker questions the value of education when it is at 
the expense of experiential knowledge. While the speaker prefers to see “de cullud gal” 
ironing, scrubbing, and cooking, and the boys sawing, he or she acknowledges that, 
“Larnin’ is a blessed thing” (57-58). As noted in the previous chapter, Davis uses 
stereotypical dialect with a reactionary sentiment for different purposes. Likewise, this 
ambivalent poem draws on dialect to exhibit one facet of the complex relationship 
between African Americans and labour. With slavery in the not so distant past, Davis’ 
titular phrase “stickin’ to de hoe” is evocative, if not unsettling. His title is a synecdoche 
for an agrarian way of life, which conjures a pastoral scene of a worker gripping a hoe 
and tilling the field. This image attempts to exalt labour, but it actually harbors a harsh 
reality. If one is “stickin’ to de hoe,” then one is stuck to it, and the phrase not only 
gestures to a paradox of progress and stagnation, but also reveals a relationship between 
race and objects. Through a kind of stickiness, the speaker’s tenacious attachment to the 
tool discloses a process of objectification and racialization. Written at the turn of the 
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century, Davis’ poem anticipates modernism’s engagement with labour and the 
materiality of race. 
In this chapter, I address a crisis in the dirty work of modernism: the extent to 
which the interchange of African American workers with their tools troubles the 
valorization of labour. The relationship between race, labour, and tools in modernism has 
not been thoroughly investigated.1 This is surprising given the abundance of “hammer” 
songs and other work-related artifacts in the early twentieth century, like “Take this 
Hammer.”2 Indeed, the very notion of race as a problem in the twentieth century, 
following W.E.B. DuBois’ account of the colour line, is, in part, linked to the tense 
relationship between the representation of African American workers and their tools. We 
are aware of how the representation of a racialized labourer can be and often is 
objectified; however, we have not fully considered how and why this happens in 
modernism, which is peculiar given just how often object and objectification come 
together. Turning to the intersection of race, labour, and tools in modernist poetry, then, I 
investigate the idea of stickiness in order to explore a black ecology, a dark side of dirty 
modernism, which offers one way of thinking through the tension around the materiality 
of race. Reading the poetry of Claude McKay, Sterling A. Brown, and Jean Toomer, I 
consider how a sticky form of relationality informs an ecopoetics of exploitation, which 
provocatively brings together human, object, and environment in a racialized, American 
context. Looking at scenes of labour through both ecocritical and phenomenological 
frames, I focus on a racial tension around degraded workers with and as tools. The 
embodiment and racialization of tools foregrounds both the power and precarity of an 
objectified black body or body part; this registers an uncanny form of alienation where 
the worker is not just a human or a tool, but both at the same time. Here, the lessons of 
Marx lead us to a messy ecology of sticky black tools. Writing about stickiness, Sara 
Ahmed offers a different way of thinking about it. Her form of stickiness foregrounds the 
relationality and history of contact between surfaces and signs, human or otherwise, 
which I engage in my analysis of race, labour, and objects in American modernist poetry. 
Sticky is gross. This association is not uncommon, but “not all sticky things are 
disgusting” (Ahmed, The Cultural Politics of Emotion 89). Nuancing the notion of 
stickiness, Ahmed shifts the focus from “using stickiness to describe an object’s surface” 
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(90) to thinking of “stickiness as an effect of surfacing, as an effect of the histories of 
contact between bodies, objects, and signs” (90). Ahmed explains her qualification of 
stickiness: “To relate stickiness with historicity is not to say that some things and objects 
are not ‘sticky’ in the present. Rather, it is to say that stickiness is an effect. That is, 
stickiness depends on histories of contact that have already impressed upon the surface of 
the object” (90). For Ahmed, there is no simple distinction between literal and 
metaphorical stickiness, between sticky surfaces and sticky signs (91). In turn, she 
argues, “stickiness involves a form of relationality, or ‘withness’, in which the elements 
that are ‘with’ get bound together” (91). Importantly, forms of stickiness range from 
bindings to blockages, from holding things together to stopping things from moving (91). 
Here, the tenacity and stagnation of stickiness provocatively resonates with the history of 
African American labourers enslaved to being and using tools—recall Davis’ speaker 
“stickin’ to de hoe.” Moreover, Ahmed notes how “stickiness becomes disgusting only 
when the skin surface is at stake such that what is sticky threatens to stick to us” (90). A 
sticky threat to the skin means so much more in the context of reading representations of 
the relationship between race, labour, and tools. As Ahmed answers the question of how 
surfaces become sticky, which includes skin, she implicitly opens up the possibility for 
thinking about sticky black tools.  
 It is difficult to determine how things become sticky because “stickiness involves 
such a chain of effects” (91). But, generally, things become sticky through encounters, 
transferences, and incorporations with other sticky things (91). Indeed, “to get stuck to 
something sticky is also to become sticky” (91). As these processes occur, sticky surfaces 
change, and degrees of stickiness fluctuate. As Ahmed notes, however, “the stickiness of 
[a] surface still tells us a history of the object that is not dependent on the endurance of 
the quality of stickiness” (91). Sticky or not, then, surfaces register traces of relations. 
The skin of the surface is deep, and it gets deeper. “In the event of being cut off from a 
sticky object,” Ahmed writes, “an object (including the skin surface) may remain sticky 
and may ‘pick up’ other objects” (91). Stickiness does not stop. Importantly, as Ahmed 
gestures to sticky skin, and how things continue to stick to it, we can consider how 
stickiness establishes and facilitates a racial relation between a human and an object, and 
how they affect one another. “Stickiness then is about what objects do to other objects” 
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(91), or, for instance, what an African American does to a tool, and what a tool does to 
his or her body. Importantly, this sticky racialization of worker and tool involves 
“othering […] as a form of extension” (Ahmed, Queer Phenomenology 115). “What is 
other than me is also what allows me to extend the reach of my body” (115), writes 
Ahmed. Here, the “body extends its reach by taking in that which is ‘not’ it, where the 
‘not’ involves the acquisition of new capacities and directions—becoming, in other 
words, ‘not’ simply what I am ‘not’ but what I can ‘have’ and ‘do’” (115). By way of 
extension and stickiness, then, objects can acquire racial impressions. That is, one effect 
of the ways in which the body reaches to and is extended by objects is racialization. This 
is evident when Ahmed uses the notion of “second skin” (131) to talk about “what bodies 
‘take in’ as objects that extend their bodily motility” (131). Although Ahmed does not 
talk about second skin in racial terms, the implication is there, especially when she notes 
how “objects […] become extensions of bodily skin” (132). Indeed, if “the skin of the 
object ‘impresses’ the skin of the body” (164),3 then the inverse of this is true, too: race 
extends itself and leaves a sticky impression on an object. After all, “[o]bjects also have 
their own horizons: worlds from which they emerge, and which surround them” (147). 
 If an object has its own world, then it is one that can be and often is coloured by 
race, as in a black ecology. Studying stickiness is a way of exploring a black ecology, 
which is, like stickiness, also stuck to relationality. In “Black,”4 Levi R. Bryant explores 
the titular colour and, in turn, describes what he calls a “black ecology.” Black ecology 
studies the relations and interactions between entities, attends to perspectives of other 
entities and how they encounter the world, views relations as precarious, or that which 
can always be broken, and acknowledges how nature is indifferent and prone to 
disequilibrium and equilibrium (294, 293, 303, 307-308, respectively). “Black ecology 
calls for us to think the manner in which signs, signifiers, ideologies, technologies, foods, 
energies, natural organic and inorganic beings, institutions, and economies are 
intertwined” (299), explains Bryant. 
 The colour black is used for theorizing a black ecology in a number of ways. 
First, black’s connotations of despair and abandonment suit the nature of current 
ecological crises (291). Second, black gestures to issues involving race, minoritization, 
and the way in which the oppression of human populations is often connected to social 
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and natural ecological relations, like how second- and third-world countries are affected 
by climate change (291, 294). Third, black takes in all frequencies of light and, in turn, 
does not reflect or emit light that we are able to see, which is a metaphor for how entities 
in mediation affect, modify, and transform one another (292). This nonreflective 
characteristic of black points to how humble, innocuous entities can surprise us with their 
often mysteriously hidden powers, which encourages attitudes of humility that help us to 
move past anthropocentrism (292-293). Importantly, then, black ecology intervenes in the 
conversation about ecology without nature.5 Focused on an unnatural nature, black 
ecology facilitates my ecocritical analysis of sticky black tools for the sake of unearthing 
a darker, dirtier modernism.6  
 “What might happen if we elaborate a genealogy of modernism in Anglo-
American literature that puts African American culture, and African American artists, at 
its center? What particular issues might be cast into relief? Where might such an 
investigation lead?” (4), asks Geoffrey Jacques. With an interest in “an understanding of 
modernism that sees a singular project, cutting across cultural lines” (4), Jacques suggests 
“not only that African American culture is a constituent part of modernism but that 
modernism cannot be fully understood unless its African American element is fully 
explored” (25). In response, I inspect modernism’s “African American element” with an 
examination of race, labour, and tools. In doing so, I expand, in an explicit way, the work 
of a number of critics that obliquely gesture towards this topic,7 like Margaret Ronda who 
has analyzed Paul Laurence Dunbar’s georgics and how the “master trope of labor bears a 
racial inflection” (864). Moving away from the depths of the material unconscious,8 
however, my phenomenology9 reads the surface of modern American poetry for what we 
have overlooked all along—sticky black tools. 
If, in Black Skins, White Masks (1952), Frantz Fanon says, “I found that I was an 
object in the midst of other objects” (109), then my intervention involves exploring the 
racialization of those “other objects” with regard to the relationship between labour, 
tools, and African Americans in modernist poetry. Accordingly, this chapter focuses on 
African Americans and their tools through a brief exploration of the visual rhetoric of 
modernism’s literary magazines, and a close reading of McKay’s “Harlem Shadows,” 
Brown’s “Southern Road,” and Toomer’s “Reapers.” Here, I consider the implications of 
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Ahmed’s thoughts on stickiness when it comes to the representation of race through 
different forms of racialization, which include the following: the embodiment of a tool, 
the way in which the skin of the body impresses upon and extends to the skin of the 
object, and vice versa, and the paradoxically empowering, yet disempowering process of 
objectification. 
Perhaps nowhere is the stickiness of black tools more visible than in the visual 
rhetoric of modernist literary magazines. Consider The New Masses, which was “the 
principle organ of the American cultural left from 1926 onward” (Foley 65). Picking up 
where The Masses, The Crisis, and The Liberator left off with their visual rhetoric,10 The 
New Masses was keen to feature both racial and social injustice in America. Take, for 
instance, the following images:11  
 
 
Plate 1: The New Masses June 1931, YCAL 
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Plate 2: The New Masses March 1930, YCAL 
 
Plate 3: The New Masses March 1930, Hugo Gellert, 36, YCAL 
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Here we have representations of provocative, if not unjust, circumstances that gesture to a 
tension surrounding race, labour, and tools. This is clearly evident in the graphic violence 
of plate 1 with the depiction of the execution of a black body. The other two figures also 
illustrate this tension, but in less obvious ways.  
From the March 1930 issue, plate 2 depicts a worker using a drill on a girder: the 
human tool. An exemplary modernist image, the artist’s angular style veers away from 
verisimilitude and, instead, moves towards a lower visual modality.12 Stripped of any 
sinuosity, this worker is a bulky stick person. Leaning his weight into his work, 
moreover, this figure’s bodily axis clashes with the upright girders around him. Neither 
parallel to nor perpendicular with the girders, the labourer’s body is slanted. From the 
bottom left to the top right corner, the worker’s body is the hypotenuse of what would be 
a right angle triangle. Ultimately, however, he falls short of making this shape because of 
his downturned head, and so the right angle triangle that the worker’s body resembles is 
incomplete. The unfinished right angle triangle signals that something is awry: this 
oblique body is less human and more machine. In fact, it is difficult to discern a divide 
between the worker’s hand and his drill. This mechanical man’s entire arm is aligned 
with it, too, which exemplifies the tool’s defining function as an “extension of the body 
that expands the functional range of a limb” (Greif and Needham 52). Here, we have “the 
prosthetic coevolution of the human animal with the technicity of tools” (Wolfe xv), or 
one sense of the posthuman.13 Moreover, the style of shading – a form of pointillism – 
draws a comparison between the worker’s body and the similarly shaded girders. With a 
skeleton made of steel and a drilling arm, the worker is empowered, yet dehumanized 
given his embodiment of a tool. This human as tool reveals a scene of exploitation.  
In plate 3, race enters the picture with what appears to be a scene of solidarity that 
still registers a sense of tension. Back to back, the white and black workers wield their 
tools together in support of each other. The caption is a quotation from Karl Marx’s 
Capital (1867), which reads: “Labor with a white skin cannot emancipate itself when 
labor with a black skin is branded.” Although misquoted,14 this excerpt from the chapter 
called “The Working Day” underscores how class is inextricably linked with race. 
Writing on America, Marx said, “every independent workers’ movement was paralysed 
as long as slavery disfigured a part of the republic” (414). Of course, the image of the 
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back-to-back workers is after Emancipation, but its seemingly anachronistic citation of 
Marx is part of the point. Writing on “human reification,” or “where people appear to be 
no more than things” (180), Bill Brown notes how “reification discloses the invisible 
persistence of the ontological effects of slavery” (181). Rather adeptly, then, Hugo 
Gellert’s illustration of tooled workers exhibits Brown’s point by gesturing to how both 
labourers are “no more than things” subjected to and subjugated by an exploitative 
political economy. While Gellert’s image of bodily contact is a rally cry for comradeship, 
it also – paradoxically – conveys the “ontological effects of slavery” as it alludes to racial 
tension. One could argue that the racial tension of this image is apparent given that 
neither worker faces the other. Indeed, their bodily positioning evokes the beginning of a 
pistol duel: after standing back to back, each person takes a set number of paces and then 
turns around to face his or her opponent. Interestingly, the white worker’s pickaxe is 
more lethal than the black worker’s wrench, which seems to suggest an imbalance. 
Although this is a contrary reading given The New Masses’ political program, it 
nonetheless gestures toward a latent tension surrounding the relationship between race, 
labour, and tools in modernity. The visual rhetoric of The New Masses foregrounds the 
question of how and why modernism takes up representations of the materiality of race, a 
question that applies to poetry, too. Published in the magazine’s February 1931 issue, the 
appropriately titled poem, “Song of the Masses” by Norman MacLeod attests to this. It 
reads:  
The bodies of machines are black, 
dark as the reach of a race from Africa  
but the future of communistic industry  
is a sun to light the world, 
and whether the skins of men be white 
or black, the song of the masses  
in the gloom is a ruddy glow. (17)  
In the interest of a revolutionary “ruddy glow,” MacLeod’s poem employs chiaroscuro to 
reveal the dark, mechanical African labourer, a figure that marks the sticky intersection 
of racialization and objectification by way of the black bodies of machines. Such a 
phenomenon appears in the work of well-known writers, too, like in Langston Hughes’ 
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“Migrant,” which features a racialized foundry worker entangled with inanimacy: “Iron 
lifting iron / Makes iron of chocolate muscles / Iron lifting iron / Makes hammer beat of 
drum beat” (2: 213). It is here that we get an inkling of what is to come in a study of the 
ways in which labour, race, and tools are represented in modernist American poetry, and 
to what end. To illustrate the nature of sticky black tools, then, I start with McKay’s 
“Harlem Shadows,” which shows us how the black body becomes and is a tool. 
Published in Harlem Shadows (1922), McKay’s titular poem about prostitution 
reads as follows:  
I hear the halting footsteps of a lass  
     In Negro Harlem when the night lets fall  
Its veil. I see the shapes of girls who pass  
     To bend and barter at desire’s call.  
Ah, little dark girls who in slippered feet  
Go prowling through the night from street to street!  
 
Through the long night until the silver break 
     Of day the little gray feet know no rest; 
Through the lone night until the last snow-flake 
     Has dropped from heaven upon the earth’s white breast, 
The dusky, half-clad girls of tired feet 
Are trudging, thinly shod, from street to street.  
 
Ah, stern harsh world, that in the wretched way  
     Of poverty, dishonor and disgrace, 
Has pushed the timid little feet of clay, 
     The sacred brown feet of my fallen race!  
Ah, heart of me, the weary, weary feet 
In Harlem wandering from street to street. (22)15 
McKay’s “Harlem Shadows” features a speaker who stalks sex workers like a sticky 
shadow. The poem opens with a depiction of the ways in which the speaker identifies and 
subsequently portrays the sex workers in “Negro Harlem.” Following this, the poem 
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describes the passing of time during the “long night” in order to underscore the strenuous, 
tiring nature of working in the sex industry, which includes the logistics of “trudging, 
thinly shod, from street to street.” While we should question the innocence of the 
speaker, “Harlem Shadows” ends with the speaker lamenting the sex workers’ 
circumstances because they have fallen victim to a “stern harsh world.”  
The figure of the sex worker in “Harlem Shadows” is represented as both 
immaterial and material, disembodied and embodied. The title of the poem not only 
gestures to how the women are surrounded by and shrouded in darkness, but also 
functions as a metonym for the sex worker’s ghostly presence. As a shadow, the sex 
worker is dehumanized and disembodied—if anything, her self is less her’s and more 
Harlem’s. Given the time of day, the sex worker is cloaked in darkness, which reduces 
her to the colour of her skin, a shadow. Although one of the sex workers is out of sight, 
the speaker identifies the invisible “lass” by the sound of her “halting footsteps.” The 
verb “halting” suggests that the lass slows down. The poem, however, does not specify if 
she has come to a complete stop, but the form of it implies otherwise. The sex worker 
does, in fact, come to a halt; this is represented by the enjambment and end stop between 
“veil” and “I see.” Spread across three lines, then, the opening sentence simulates how 
the sex worker slows down and, eventually, comes to a stop. Indeed, the end stop 
interrupts the flow of the first stanza’s iambic pentameter, which highlights the cessation 
of motion. Like the speaker hearing the halting lass, we, too, hear her abrupt stop. 
Importantly, these formal phenomena demonstrate how the poem materializes and 
embodies the sex worker as a thing, a tool. Although unseen, the lass’ presence is felt; 
this is but one example of the paradoxically existent, yet elusive sex worker. Indeed, the 
break between and juxtaposition of “veil” and “I see” is symbolic of how what the 
speaker sees will be partially or completely obscured. The speaker’s gaze grounds the 
figure of the sex worker when he or she finally sees the “shapes of girls,” but they are 
still silhouettes, abstractions, and fragments.  
Surely obscured, the sex worker is still embodied. Responding to “desire’s call,” 
the speaker sees girls who actively “pass,” “bend,” and “barter,” which demonstrates the 
agency of an empowered body at work. Of course, one could argue that the sex worker is 
disempowered and under duress. Between a rock and a hard place, she has little to no 
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agency. After all, McKay’s poem suggests that the sex worker is subjected to an 
unwanted lifestyle of “poverty, dishonor and disgrace,” especially given how she is 
characterized as diminutive, vulnerable, and youthful with words like “little,” “timid,” 
“lass,” and “girls.” This is valid, but the poem also presents the sex worker as a force to 
be reckoned with. The speaker’s use of the word “prowling” to describe how the “little 
dark girls” traverse Harlem evokes the image of a nocturnal predator stalking his or her 
prey. (Ironically, the sex worker is both hunter and hunted given the stalking speaker.)  
Problematically, though, “prowling” primitivizes and zoomorphizes the sex worker; 
however, it articulates an individual adaptively using her body as a tool to solicit money 
in exchange for sexual acts in an urban environ, a black ecology. The nature of her work 
is demanding; certainly, she is subject to entropy. From “prowling” to “trudging” to 
“wandering,” the sex worker’s body is a tool that can be and is worn down step by step. 
Perhaps ashamed to look up, the speaker focuses on feet as the sole source of 
labour. Interestingly, in a poem about prostitution, the defining nature of the sex worker’s 
labour is omitted. There are little to no explicit sexual references or innuendos. Granted, 
an exposed image of Mother Nature is evoked with the poem’s reference to “earth’s 
white breast.” The whiteness of the heavenly “last snow-flake” falling on “earth’s white 
breast” gestures to racial purity, innocence, and cleanliness, and, in turn, denigrates 
anything to the contrary. Ultimately, though, this poem circumvents any depictions of the 
erotic labour of the sex worker. The absence of any representations of sexual acts 
forestalls the reader’s vicarious experience of pleasure. Of course, the imagination is free 
to run rampant and fantasize about what happens during “the long night,” but the poem’s 
parameters preclude graphic scenes of exploitation. The poem, instead, guides the reader 
to sympathize with the plight of the sex worker. This occurs through the ways in which 
the speaker foregrounds the sex worker’s feet, which involves racialization and 
fetishization.  
As noted, the racialized title alludes to the corporeality of the African American, 
which defines the setting of the poem—again, “Negro Harlem.” Indeed, “when the night 
lets fall / [i]ts veil,” it is the “Veil of Color” (Du Bois 146). The sex workers are “little 
dark girls” who have feet that are “slippered,” “gray,” “dusky,” “tired,” “thinly shod,” 
“sacred,” “brown,” “timid,” “little,” and “clay.” Synecdochically, these descriptors – for 
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the most part – pejoratively characterize the African American sex worker as fragile, 
autochthonous, or from the soil, and dirty. Wearing “thinly shod,” or worn down slippers 
outside, the sex worker is in an uncomfortable, if not vulnerable, position. For an evening 
of walking, she is ill equipped, which appears to be a result of economic destitution or a 
sartorial norm. The sex worker’s fragile feet suggest that she is on the cusp of collapse. 
“Autochthonous,” or “born out of the earth” (OED), moreover, the African American sex 
worker is represented as mythically connected to nature with her “feet of clay,” which is 
also a biblical allusion denoting “a fundamental weakness in someone supposedly of 
great merit” (OED; see Daniel 2:33). Weakened by stereotype and scripture, the sex 
worker is but a lowly, earthen substance. Indeed, before hardened, clay is pliable, which 
means that it can be moulded into any shape. With her “feet of clay,” then, the sex worker 
is presented as a product of things beyond her control—it is, after all, the “stern harsh 
world” that has “pushed the timid little feet of clay.” Affected by external forces like 
classism and racism, then, the African American sex worker is warped into a subjugated 
role that keeps her feet on the street as the refrain at the end of each stanza makes clear 
with its end rhyme, “feet” / “street.” Walking around, the sex worker’s feet get dirty, too. 
They are described as “gray,” which is a product of filthy city streets and wear and tear. 
In this context, moreover, the sex worker’s gray feet not only point to a lack of vitality – 
“tired feet” and “timid little feet” – but also a mechanical nature. The embodiment of a 
tool, then, the sex worker’s weary feet endlessly walk from street to street. The speaker of 
“Harlem Shadows” feels for the sex worker; however, the nature of this sympathy is 
oddly, if not problematically, framed and informed by fetishization.  
In part, pleasure is anathema to the politics of this poem, yet the speaker fetishizes 
the sex worker’s feet. Given the sympathetic speaker, this form of sublimation is 
puzzling, if not problematic. A fetish is an inanimate object imbued with supernatural 
powers. Referring to the sex worker’s feet, the speaker uses the word “sacred” and 
exclaims how they belong to “my fallen race!” Like a fetish, the sex worker’s feet are 
animated with a life of their own: they “know no rest,” and they are “tired,” “timid,” and 
“weary.” Although framed as an automaton, the sex worker’s feet are enlivened to a 
degree. Alive yet lifeless, the sex worker’s feet are sacred and profane. To a certain 
extent, the speaker’s fetishization of the sex worker’s feet compromises the nature of his 
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or her sympathy. While the speaker’s fixation is problematic, it is also instructive. The 
speaker’s acute attention to the sex worker’s feet registers a blind spot. Namely, the 
speaker is unable to confront, fully comprehend, or articulate the emotional and 
psychological magnitude of what it means to prostitute one’s self. As a result, the 
speaker’s parochial scope of the sex worker’s feet is, in fact, productive, because it 
indirectly signifies the ineffable nature of the unpleasant sex industry. Ironically, it is the 
sympathetic, socially conscious speaker’s sublimated desire cathecting on the sex 
worker’s feet that reveals an implicit critique of the sex industry, which is evident in the 
form of the poem, too.  
Given the poem’s concern with feet, it is no surprise that meter is important. As 
noted earlier, “Harlem Shadows” does not explicitly represent the erotic labour of the sex 
worker; rather, it is the poem’s irregular rhythms that communicate the toil of 
prostitution. “Harlem Shadows” is set to iambic pentameter. Take, for instance, the first 
stanza, which exhibits a consistent rhythm and flows with its stressed (ʹ′) and unstressed 
(−) syllables:  
 −   ʹ′     −      ʹ′   −      ʹ′    −       ʹ′ −   ʹ′ 
  I hear the halting footsteps of a lass  
            −   ʹ′   −      ʹ′   −      ʹ′       −    ʹ′         −   ʹ′ 
     In Negro Harlem when the night lets fall  
 −   ʹ′     −   ʹ′    −     ʹ′         −    ʹ′      −      ʹ′ 
Its veil. I see the shapes of girls who pass  
         −   ʹ′     −      ʹ′   −   ʹ′    −  ʹ′    −   ʹ′ 
     To bend and barter at desire’s call.  
  −   ʹ′  −     ʹ′      −      ʹ′      −    ʹ′    −      ʹ′ 
Ah, little dark girls who in slippered feet  
  −     ʹ′     −         ʹ′        −    ʹ′          −     ʹ′      −     ʹ′ 
Go prowling through the night from street to street!  
This stanza’s regular rhythm suggests that there is an overall sense of harmony and 
control despite the illicit nature of the scenes. This rhythmic equality also produces a 
momentum that emphasizes the powerful, “prowling” sex worker, which is accentuated 
by the speaker’s exclamation, too. This is a nightly occurrence in “Negro Harlem,” and, 
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ostensibly, nothing is awry. In fact, there is a system, an economy of exchange in place: 
“I see the shapes of girls who pass / to bend and barter at desire’s call.” Things change in 
the second stanza, however. Instead of an iamb, it opens with a trochee and continues to 
diverge from the established pattern:  
    ʹ′            −      ʹ′       ʹ′     −   ʹ′   −    ʹ′    −     ʹ′ 
Through the long night until the silver break 
            −   ʹ′      −    ʹ′  −    ʹ′       ʹ′      ʹ′       −     ʹ′ 
     Of day the little gray feet know no rest; 
    ʹ′            −      ʹ′       ʹ′     −   ʹ′   −    ʹ′       ʹ′        − 
Through the lone night until the last snow-flake 
       −        ʹ′           −      ʹ′   −    −  ʹ′     −     ʹ′             −     ʹ′ 
     Has dropped from heaven upon the earth’s white breast, 
  −      ʹ′   −      ʹ′     −      ʹ′      −   ʹ′  −     ʹ′ 
The dusky, half-clad girls of tired feet 
  −     ʹ′    −        ʹ′   −      ʹ′       −       ʹ′      −     ʹ′ 
Are trudging, thinly shod, from street to street.  
From trochee (“Through the”) to spondee (“long night,” “feet know,” and “lone night”) 
to anapest (“heaven upon”), the second stanza is riddled with rhythmic variations. 
Cumulatively, these variations disrupt the flow of the first stanza’s iambic pentameter 
and, in turn, represent the use and depletion of energy required by the sex worker to 
perform sexual acts over the course of the evening. Put differently, the poem encodes the 
sex worker’s “weary, weary feet” through rhythmic disruptions, which signify a felt 
difficulty and fatigue. For the most part, it is the second stanza that signifies the behind-
the-scenes labour of the sex worker. In the last line of the last stanza, however, there is a 
pyrrhic variation on “wandering.” This deviation sonically draws out how the sex worker 
is adrift, and it alludes to and applies the notion of the pyrrhic victory to this situation: the 
sex worker can and will sustain herself, but at a devastating cost. This poem’s metre and 
rhythm work to register and critique the unpleasant, strenuous labour of the sex worker 
and, importantly, materialize the embodiment of a tool through the sex worker’s feet in 
the poem’s form. Throughout “Harlem Shadows,” then, the notion of agency and 
determinism – the “prowling” sex worker who is “pushed” by a “stern harsh world” – are 
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in conflict and, ultimately, left unresolved. Moreover, this tension is intensified because 
McKay’s poem contradictorily pairs the tropes of black autonomy with a dehumanizing 
vocation where black beauty is stuck to and situated in the sex trade. A similar tension is 
found in the way in which tools are racially coded in and through a sticky relation 
between human and hammer in Brown’s poem, “Southern Road.” 
Before taking a close look at the sticky black tools in “Southern Road,” however, 
it is necessary to contextualize it as a work song. Describing this genre, Mark A. Sanders 
notes how it is historically linked to field hollers and slave work songs, which are 
informed by laborers, or chain gangs, using their bodily actions to create a rhythm (55). 
Typically, such a scene includes a leader calling out lines with the group singing the 
chorus, and the song itself maintains a steady rhythm with guttural punctuations like the 
word “hunh” (55). More specifically, Brown himself notes how the song’s “rhythm is 
timed with the swing back and down and the blow of broad-axe, pick, hammer, or 
tamper. The shore [sic] lines are punctuated by a grunt as the axe bites into the wood, or 
the hammer finds the spike-head. The leader rings countless changes in his words and 
melody over unchanging rhythm. When he grows dull or forgets, another singer takes 
over” (qtd. in Sanders 55). One example of a work song is “Chain Gang Blues,” which is 
from Negro Workaday Songs (1926); it starts with these stanzas:  
Standin’ on the road side, 
Waitin’ for the ball an’ chain. 
Say, if I was not all shackled down 
I’d ketch that wes’ bound’ train. 
 
Standin’ on the rock pile 
Wid a hammer in my hand, 
Lawd, standin’ on rock pile, 
Got to serve my cap’n down in no-man’s land. (78) 
Surely, the work song registers a scene of restriction and exploitation, which, as 
Lawrence Gellert notes in The New Masses, continues beyond incarceration: “Chain 
gangs get no compensation. They’re what you might call ‘free’ labor. One day I 
encountered a ragged, hungry Negro plodding along the highway. He had been released 
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from jail that morning. Served eighteen months. And didn’t even have the price of a 
railroad ticket back to his home” (6). Brown borrows from and builds upon the harsh 
reality of the work song in “Southern Road”:  
Swing dat hammer—hunh— 
Steady, bo’;  
Swing dat hammer—hunh— 
Steady, bo’; 
Ain’t no rush, bebby, 
Long ways to go. 
 
Burner tore his—hunh— 
Black heart away; 
Burner tore his—hunh— 
Black heart away; 
Got me life, bebby, 
An’ a day. 
 
Gal’s on Fifth Street—hunh— 
Son done gone; 
Gal’s on Fifth Street—hunh— 
Son done gone; 
Wife’s in de ward, bebby, 
Babe’s not bo’n. 
 
My ole man died—hunh— 
Cussin’ me;  
My ole man died—hunh— 
Cussin’ me;  
Ole lady rocks, bebby, 
Huh misery.  
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Doubleshackled—hunh— 
Guard behin’;  
Doubleshackled—hunh— 
Guard behin’;  
Ball an chain, bebby, 
On my min’. 
 
White man tells me—hunh— 
Damn yo’ soul; 
White man tells me—hunh— 
Damn yo’ soul 
Got no need, bebby, 
To be tole. 
 
Chain gang nevah—hunh— 
Let me go;  
Chain gang nevah—hunh— 
Let me go; 
Po’ los’ boy, bebby, 
Evahmo’…. (52-53) 
Starting in media res, “Southern Road” features both the description and action of manual 
labour. Like a sort of speech act where what is said is done, the speaker’s instruction to 
“Swing dat hammer” is carried out. Indeed, the “hunh” signals the exertion of energy as 
the “hammer finds the spike-head,” as Brown puts it, and it gestures to other things, too, 
like time keeping, a sexual-like grunt, interjection and questioning, and resignation. Here 
the speaker’s speech act is directed at his or her interlocutor, who is, presumably, young 
and inexperienced given both the appellation “bo’” and the suggestion to recalibrate his 
or her speed to a “Steady” tempo because the end is nowhere in sight. As the poem 
continues, the speaker reveals that he or she was sentenced to life and a day, which 
implies a serious offence like murder. Although it is not stated explicitly, this is most 
likely the case because the speaker vaguely references what could have been a violent 
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event – namely, how “Burner tore his […] / Black heart away” – and, moreover, he or she 
is “Doubleshackled.” In it for the long haul, the speaker laments what has been left 
behind: an abandoned mistress, a wayfaring son, a pregnant wife, an angered father, and a 
miserable mother. Tethered to a “Ball an chain” with a “Guard behin’,” the speaker is not 
only subjected to surveillance, but also berated by a form of white supremacy mobilized 
through religion (“White man tells me […] / Damn yo’ soul”). Although the poem leaves 
off on a depressing, deterministic note – “Chain gang nevah […] / Let me go” – it 
nonetheless gestures to a sense of resistance, let alone solidarity. For instance, in the first 
stanza, the speaker’s suggestion to find a moderate pace challenges a productive work 
ethic and, in the penultimate one, he or she rejects the hegemonic ideology: “Got no need, 
bebby, / To be tole.” Typically, as Sanders notes, this poem is read as “a statement of 
resignation and defeat, the African American male hopelessly confined to oppressive 
circumstances” (57); however, he explains how this interpretation is limiting because it 
“misses entirely the figurative implications of Brown’s poetics, the artistry of the idiom, 
and the transportive possibilities of ritual” (57). Instead, Sanders argues that it is, on the 
one hand, “a tragically typical scene in the South” and, on the other hand, “a vocal 
incantation of the blues ritual, […which] asserts the road as psychic flight, a cultural 
means of resisting oppressive circumstances” (57). Like Sanders, I want to open up 
“Southern Road” to another interpretative register, one that involves the racialization of 
sticky tools.  
In “Southern Road,” the speaker and the hammer are stuck together and, as a 
result, the human is objectified and the tool is racialized. To borrow from Brown, what 
we have here is a “strange legacy.” In his poem “Strange Legacies,” he references how 
John Henry’s “steel driver’s pride” “taught us that a man could go down like a man, / 
Sticking to your hammer till you died” (86). Although a hammer is only mentioned once 
in the first stanza of “Southern Road,” it materializes each and every time the speaker 
utters a guttural grunt, which, in turn, reinforces the sticky relationship between labour, 
tools, and race. Indeed, appearing fourteen times, the “hunh” sounds out how the 
hammer’s hit never misses a beat. More specifically, the interaction between race and 
tools is apparent at the outset of the poem. From the beginning, “Southern Road” 
establishes the connection between an African American labourer and a tool through 
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dialect, work song, and typography (“Swing dat hammer—hunh”). As the opening line 
evokes the racialized worker, it employs an em dash to simulate the extension of the body 
and its attachment to the tool, which racially codes the object. The typographic mark on 
the page links “hammer” with “hunh” like a hand holding a hammer, which signifies not 
only a history of contact between human and tool, but also bridges the past with the 
present and evokes exploitative forms of labour like slavery. The em dash also constantly 
interrupts the flow of the poem. Granted, its steady appearance is part of the production 
of an overarching cadence; however, it still creates a visual and aural interruption as we 
read and listen to the poem. This interruption, then, created in part by the em dash, 
reminds us of the relationship between race, labour, and tools, which emerges as a sticky 
blockage. In “Southern Road,” then, there is not only a tenacious relationship between the 
racialized labourer and tool, but also a sticky, goopy solidity that has some weight to it. 
This messy hand and hammer relation slows down the poem and, in turn, powerfully 
presses race and tool together. As a result of the hammer-holding worker, race is reified.  
In addition to the reification of the human, there is racial reification, too: inanimate 
objects exhibit a racial inflection or impression by way of whom they are near or in 
contact with. This phenomenon plays itself out in Toomer’s “Reapers” with the added 
notion of power, or a lack thereof.  
Exhibiting a rather graphic scene of sticky black tools, Toomer’s “Reapers” 
reveals racialized, objectified labour. It reads:  
Black reapers with the sound of steel on stones  
Are sharpening scythes. I see them place the hones 
In their hip-pockets as a thing that’s done,  
And start their silent swinging, one by one.  
Black horses drive a mower through the weeds,  
And there, a field rat, startled, squealing bleeds.  
His belly close to ground. I see the blade,  
Blood-stained, continue cutting weeds and shade. (5) 
“Reapers” depicts a speaker observing two scenes of labour. The first scene involves 
black workers sharpening their scythes on hones, or whetstones. Once ready, they place 
the hones in their pockets and use their tools to begin harvesting the crops. The second 
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scene entails black horses propelling a mower through weeds, which cuts a field rat that 
squeals in pain and stains the blade with its blood. Formally, “Reapers” is made up of two 
quatrains or four sets of couplets. There are, as noted, two distinct scenes, which can be 
grouped into two quatrains. Without the stanzaic break, however, the poem’s form is 
fluid, and it facilitates, if not encourages, a reading of how the speaker juxtaposes the 
reapers and horses.  
In the poem, the speaker is unidentified. With the repetition of “I see,” he or she 
could be a supervisor who is intently watching the reapers start their work “one by one.” 
Moreover, the speaker’s use of “black” to describe the workers and the horses effects a 
comparison. Noting what is not white, the speaker is superior to the racialized, 
dehumanized reapers who are nothing but animals at work. Alternatively, the speaker 
could be a black, white, or racially othered worker. Sympathizing with the subservient 
horse and injured rat, the speaker self-reflexively critiques his or her own oppressed life. 
Ultimately, however, the speaker’s identity is unclear.   
Compared to the speaker, the black reapers stand out. As Toomer’s title suggests, 
the reapers are the subject matter of the poem, and they emerge in and through the 
speaker’s essentialist description. Stripped of their subjectivity, the speaker reduces the 
labourers to nothing but the colour of their skin and occupation. The sole function of the 
worker is to be a reaper: a person who reaps, or cuts and gathers grain with a sickle or 
scythe (OED). The speaker’s appellation “black reapers” confines the workers within a 
social or racial script, or “a thing that’s done” to borrow from Toomer. Paradoxically, 
“black reapers” is a nominal – if not actual – restriction that also registers a form of 
empowerment. That is, the workers’ appellation alludes to the grim reaper, the 
personification of death who is often seen wearing a dark cloak and wielding a scythe 
used to harvest the living. Interestingly, however, this reading undercuts the reapers’ 
sense of empowerment because they are reaping their own death from overwork. As a 
result, the workers are both instruments of labour and symbols of otherness; in this 
configuration, they are less and more than human. Powerless and powerful, they are 
figures embodying a tension that is reflected in the opening of the poem.  
Although repressed, the black reapers still find a form of expression. Ostensibly, 
the workers are muted. If they have a voice, then it is mediated by what the speaker sees 
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and says. Describing their labour as “silent swinging”, for instance, the speaker 
downplays the nature of their work and portrays them as acquiescent. Yet, what would be 
said is heard instead. Here, silenced voices speak through sibilance. The poet’s 
successive use of consonance is audible at the outset of “Reapers” given the attack of the 
words “sound,” “steel,” “stones,” “sharpening,” and “scythes.” This sibilance is 
significant because the poem embodies and expresses the labourer and his or her work 
through breath. Here, too, the repressed workers are expressed through the sound of the 
tool: the sharpening of a scythe articulates a semblance of the reapers’ subjectivity and 
effort. Although speechless, the reapers are voiced through their tools. Moreover, the 
poem materializes the tangibility of workers and tools. For instance, the phrase “the 
sound of steel on stones” not only voices the racialized other, but also makes the noise of 
what it signifies—the repetition of “s” sounds translates bodies hitting steel on stone. In 
this scene there is a tension as the tools are instruments of both objectification and 
humanization; indeed, with tools in hand, the black reapers are paradoxically silenced and 
voiced.   
The complex relationship between worker and tool is emphasized by the poem’s 
syntax, enjambment, and metaphor. The syntax of the opening line presents part before 
whole; it mentions a characteristic of the tool before naming it as such: “Black reapers 
with the sound of steel on stones / Are sharpening scythes.” Not unlike seeing “black” 
before “reapers,” we get “steel” before “scythe,” which momentarily abstracts the 
specific from the general. The surface of skin and the substance of steel bring worker and 
tool together. This comparison, however, is interrupted by the poem’s enjambment. The 
enjambment produces a rift between subject and object: the endstop between “scythes” 
and “I” resists the homology between worker and tool. Encoded in the poem’s grammar, 
then, this disruption reveals a sense of agency in an otherwise oppressive scene. The 
relationship between worker and tool is also problematized with the metaphoric, racial 
slur “shade” at the end of the poem. As the poem comes to a close, the speaker notes how 
the mower’s blade continues to cut weeds and shade after injuring the field rat. Because 
one cannot cut shade, the poem’s ending refers to how the weeds that are cut lessen the 
field’s shaded areas, even if weeds only offer so much shade. Here, the loss of shade 
suggests the loss of a space of respite, which gestures to the continuation of strenuous, 
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potentially exploitative work. Moreover, the shade is racialized as it points to the black 
reapers. Reducing both weeds and shade, the workers and their tools cut blackness, too. 
Without being reductive, then, this scene seems to gesture to a form of self-imposed 
violence as the “shade” of the other is cut away, which implies that fertility and 
reproduction is found through the hegemony of whiteness via the sun’s light. If we read 
the workers as self-destructive, then the very tools that expressed their voices are, in fact, 
working against them. This reading is valid, but it underestimates the circuitous nature of 
power. Indeed, this poem cannot be reduced to the exhibition of masochistic workers 
unconsciously subscribing to an anti-black ideology. Instead, there are many levels of 
mediation that mask the source of violence including the speaker, the tools, and even the 
sublimated scene of the injured field rat. In Toomer’s poem, then, we witness the 
powerful and powerless conflict around processes of racialization and objectification, 
which, ultimately, reveals the tension tied to sticky black tools.  
I want to conclude with MacLeod’s autochthonous “Sons of Soil,” published in 
The New Masses in 1931, which presents us with the dirty side of the materiality of race 
in modernism; it reads: 
Color of soil is on their faces now,  
their knowledge the cool long curse of the loam 
in productive hearing:  
they are at home  
with the tradition of life germinating 
as men progress from the past into the future,  
and their muscles can ripple  
as their brains for social thought. (17) 
This poem reveals a struggling Übermensch fighting for a generative mode of being in 
the world cognizant of past, present, and future while working towards the development 
of community. With faces covered in dirt, the sons of soil are racialized, regardless of 
whether or not they are racial others. Typically, soil is thought of as black or dark brown, 
which is, of course, true; however, under the right conditions, soil can exhibit a spectrum 
of colours like gray, white, red, yellow, and green (Brady and Weil 95). There is, then, 
possibility with this wide array; this poem presents a provocative pretense—namely, an 
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unusual form of blackface. In vaudeville, blackface is from burnt cork, but here in “Sons 
of Soil” we get a blackface from the earth. Indeed, human, dirt, race, and relation emerge, 
and with them comes an outgrowth of “life germinating” from “the loam / in productive 
hearing.” Indeed, with a “productive hearing,” we can and should listen to dirty 
modernism’s sticky black ecology of objects, one that calls upon us to reconsider what 
could be racial things, like Ezra Pound’s “Petals on a wet, black bough” (New Selected 
Poems 39) or Zora Neale Hurston’s “brown bag of miscellany” of “a rusty knife-blade, 
old shoes saved for a road that never was and never will be, a nail bent under the weight 
of things too heavy for any nail, a dried flower or two still a little fragrant” (2161).  
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1 For a broader analysis of the relationship between race, technology, and media, see, for  
instance, Joel Dinerstein’s Swinging the Machine (2003), Mark Goble’s Beautiful 
Circuits (2010), or Katherine Biers’ Virtual Modernism (2013). 
2 An early manuscript version of this song was published by Newman Ivey White in 
American Negro Folk-Songs (1928) who heard it between 1915 and 1916; the opening 
stanza reads as follows: “This old hammer killed John Henry, / But it can’t kill me. / 
Take this old hammer, take it to the Captain, / Tell him I’m gone, babe, tell him I’m 
gone” (261; “Take this Hammer”). Later, in the 1940s, Huddie William Ledbetter, or 
Leadbelly, recorded a version of this song, and he added a distinctive “haah” at the end of 
each line (“Take this Hammer”). Also, for a thorough discussion of John Henry, the 
mythical story of the steel driver man who died with a hammer in his hand, see Scott 
Reynolds Nelson’s Steel Drivin’ Man: John Henry, the Untold Story of an American 
Legend (2006). 
3 Here, Ahmed is alluding to her discussion of “impression” in The Cultural Politics of 
Emotion, which involves an emphasis on the “‘press’ in an impression” (6). 
4 This piece is from an edited collected entitled Prismatic Ecology: Ecotheory Beyond 
Green (2013), which addresses “the speciousness of reducing ‘ecology’ or ‘ecocriticism’ 
to ‘green’” (Buell ix). More specifically, Lawrence Buell notes how “the problem with 
‘green’ is […] that it has been oversold as a lumping term, thereby foreshortening one’s 
sense of other spectrum/spectral possibilities” (ix), and so one consequence of this is that 
“[e]cology as green […] perpetuates the implication of binary nature-culture separation 
(simplistic for both sides of the human-nonhuman divide) and understates the potential 
for self-intoxicated fetishization of greenery as such” (ix-x). 
5 Responding to Morton’s central argument in Ecology without Nature (2007), Bryant 
reconfigures the way in which we can think about the relationship between nature and 
culture; he writes the following:  
Morton advocates abandoning the notion of “nature” as it gives rise to 
connotations of an elsewhere, an “over there,” that is outside society; but it seems 
that this risks reducing the natural world to cultural constructions. The winning 
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move, it seems, would lie not in abandoning the concept of nature but in 
abandoning the idea that culture is something outside nature. The advantage of 
this move is twofold: it undermines the human exceptionalism implicit in the 
distinction between nature and culture, and highlights the manner in which social 
and cultural formations are imbricated with broader material domains. (295-296) 
Bringing together nature and culture, Bryant’s black ecology challenges the status quo, or 
a green understanding of nature. As he puts it, “the central idol a black ecology must 
shatter is that ecology is solely about nature, and that ecotheory is a form of theory 
distinct from theory about society and culture” (294).  
6 Surprisingly, however, Bryant’s exploration of black ecology only offers a handful of 
preliminary remarks on the question of race in the age of ecology, which is, in fact, a 
rather unexplored topic. In “Black Nature: the Question of Race in the Age of Ecology,” 
Britt M. Rusert, however, makes an important intervention. Writing on the question of 
race in the age of ecology, Britt M. Rusert aims to redeem and mobilize the notion of 
“black nature,” which gestures to how blackness wields the ability to disrupt limiting or 
problematic conceptualizations of nature (150). She advocates that in “turning to ecology 
and race we might begin to disentangle nature from the ‘natural,’ the naturalized, or even 
the biological” (161). Here, Rusert seems to suggest that there is much, much more to 
nature, as if “society and culture are formations of nature” (Bryant 299). Instead of an 
“[e]cocriticsm [that] incorporates race on identitarian terms” (161), Rusert proposes a 
“different kind of engagement, one that proceeds from blackness itself, [which] might 
ultimately move accounts of race and environment beyond the horizon of identity 
politics” (161). For Rusert, “[r]ethinking ecology though blackness emphasizes the 
radical nonidentitiarian quality of the environment while questioning the limits of an 
anthropomorphic ecology” (161). Rusert’s intervention is important because it offers a 
number of inroads into thinking through the relationship between race and ecology; 
however, it only scratches the surface by setting the parameters for a different approach, 
but not necessarily detailing a methodology. And so in this I keep her work in mind 
because it serves as a useful springboard for how I am considering the materiality of race 
when it comes to the question of an ecopoetics of exploitation. For more of a literary 
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investigation of race and ecology, see Kimberley Ruffin’s Black on Earth: African 
American Ecoliterary Traditions (2010).  
7 For works that directly and indirectly gesture to the relationship between materiality, 
race, and labour, see the following: Jennifer Bajorek’s Counterfeit Capital: Poetic Labor 
and Revolutionary Irony (2009), Nicholas Knowles Bromell’s By the Sweat of the Brow: 
Literature and Labor in Antebellum America (1993), Michael Denning’s The Cultural 
Front: the Laboring of American Culture in the Twentieth Century (1996), Joel 
Dinerstein’s Swinging the Machine: Modernity, Technology, and African American 
Culture Between the Wars (2003), Page DuBois’ Slaves and Other Objects (2003), 
Thomas Foster’s The Souls of Cyberfolk: Posthumanism as Vernacular Theory (2005), 
Mark Goble’s Beautiful Circuits: Modernism and the Mediated Life (2010), Moishe 
Postone’s Time, Labor, and Social Domination: a Reinterpretation of Marx’s Critical 
Theory (1993), David Roediger’s Our Own Time: a History of American Labor and the 
Working Day (1989), and Margaret Ronda’s dissertation, Disenchanted Georgics: the 
Aesthetics of Labour in American Poetry (2010). 
8 For a discussion of the material unconscious, see Brown’s The Material Unconscious: 
American Amusement, Stephen Crane, & the Economies of Play (1996), where he 
suggests that it is “literature’s repository of disparate and fragmentary, unevenly 
developed, even contradictory images of the material everyday” (4), which illuminate the 
“shards of the past” (18) and reassemble them into a “recognizable form” (18). In 
“Reification, Reanimation, and the American Uncanny,” Brown develops this and 
addresses the question of race. Brown turns to a number of cultural artifacts and 
addresses the uncanny nature of an ontological scandal, which involves the ambiguity 
between human and thing in a racial, post-slavery context. For a critique of Brown’s 
argument, please see Joseph Jonghyun Jeon’s Racial Things, Racial Forms (2012), which 
claims that Brown’s historical materialism is ahistorical with its over-investment in the 
uncanny (xxiii-xxiv). 
9 Until recently, there has been little to no analysis of race from a phenomenological 
standpoint, at least not nominally. This has changed, however, given the publication of 
Living Alterities (2014), a collection of essays on phenomenology, embodiment, and race, 
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which highlights the importance of materiality and race and adds to the sparse history on 
this topic (see Frantz Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks [1952] or Lewis Gordon’s Bad 
Faith and Antiblack Racism [1995]; also, see Linda Martín Alcoff’s “Towards a 
Phenomenology of Racial Embodiment,” where she discusses how “[r]ace is real” [15], 
and see Charles W. Mills’ “Materializing Race,” where he notes how “[r]ace is indeed 
material” [38]). And so, in Living Alterities (2014), editor Emily S. Lee notes how we can 
– and should – think ontologically about race as a way of navigating through the often 
confused positions on race (7-8). As its title suggests, then, Living Alterities only deals 
with the living, but “a phenomenological framework recognizes that all contact with the 
world occurs trough negotiations between the intentions of the subject and the givens of 
the world” (8). Thus, I bring those “givens of the world” – things – into the mix. 
10 Running from 1911 to 1917, The Masses was devoted to the working class. From the 
harsh reality of realism to the emotionality of expressionism, the iconography of The 
Masses represents the weathered worker who harbored brute strength, too. A voice of and 
for the working class, The Masses functioned as a tool in itself with its socialist editorial 
machine “owned and published co-operatively by its editors” (The Masses 4.5 February 
1913 2). While its graphics were geared towards scenes of labour, conspicuous signs of 
race were absent. This gap was made up for in The Crisis. In 1910, W.E.B. Du Bois 
founded The Crisis, which was the magazine for the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People. Addressing race and social injustice in America, the 
magazine often depicted African Americans in a manner that emphasized childhood 
innocence, the celebration of athleticism, hardship, and nationalism. The style was 
politically aligned with The Masses, an important left-wing publication that emerged, as a 
part of a larger workers’ movement. However, the images in The Crisis are different from 
its labour movement predecessors in one key way. They are less interested in depictions 
of labour and more interested in representations of uplift. Seemingly, in response to racial 
prejudice and oppression, The Crisis’ covers primarily feature portraiture of African 
Americans, which, one could argue, function as a reparative measure by highlighting the 
individual’s autonomy. While The Masses and The Crisis take up class and race, 
respectively, they are acutely aware of how these issues are not mutually exclusive. 
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Nonetheless, there is more or less a gap here when it comes to the representations of the 
materiality of race, but that changed, as I point out with The New Masses.  
11 YCAL, Za+Zn299, Box 8.  
12 See Theo Van Leeuwen’s Introducing Social Semiotics (2005), pages 160 ff. 
13 Another, similar idea regarding the posthuman is found in the work of Bernard 
Stiegler. Turning to things, the body, and parts of the body, become “instruments” or 
tools, too, which registers prostheticity. “Prostheticity,” writes Bernard Stiegler, “is a 
putting-outside-the-self” (146), or “exteriorization” (148) where the “body of the living 
individual is no longer only a body: it can only function with its tools” (148). Elucidating 
Stiegler, Carrie Noland writes that, “insofar as working with objects gives muscular 
shape to the hand, the hand is not born but made, fabricated like a tool through its 
interactions with external matter. Interaction thus transforms an organic limb into a kind 
of prosthesis, rendering it external to itself” (108). Here, an appendage is always already 
a tool. 
14 In The New Masses, the misquoted caption – the word “where” is switched for the 
word “when” in the magazine – references this passage from Capital: “In the United 
States of America, every independent workers’ movement was paralysed [sic] as long as 
slavery disfigured a part of the republic. Labour in a white skin cannot emancipate itself 
where it is branded in a black skin” (Marx 414). 
15 Not unlike “Harlem Shadows,” McKay’s Home to Harlem (1928) is interested in the 
sensual side of the sex trade while also critically thinking through the violence, too. 
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Conclusion: Uncleaning Modernism 
 
 
Finding the U.S. too clean, the Baroness critiques the nation in a crass essay-poem 
ironically titled, “The Modest Woman,” which was published in The Little Review in 
1920 (Gammel, Baroness Elsa 252). She writes: “America’s comfort: – sanitation – 
outside machinery – Has made American forget own machinery – body!” (Body Sweats 
287).1 For her, American industry has obscured, if not concealed, the unpleasant nature of 
corporeality, like how “[t]oilets are made for swift cleanliness” (287). As an outsider, the 
Baroness witnessed some of the ways in which the United States sanitized the unclean, 
but she had nothing of it. “Thou art not acquainted / With thineself before thou not / 
Experienced feeling of tender / Affection towards thine excrements” (169), she writes in 
“Lofty Logic.” As much as one can, then, the Baroness avows the abject.2 “Why should I 
– proud engineer – be ashamed of my machinery – part of it?” (286), she asks. 
Unashamed of her machinery, the Baroness engineers a body of work that is less orderly 
and more chaotic. While she would come to admire America’s “sweet soil” (225),3 the 
Baroness never would have expected American modernism to be dirty. She would be 
surprised to find one of her poems offering up a different kind of constitution in the 
United States, one that discloses a dirty modernism.  
Composed circa 1924 to 1925,4 the Baroness’ “Constitution” is a poetic 
proclamation rallying against determinism, which, in turn, gestures to an alternative, 
messier way of thinking about things. Its loud uppercase subtitle, 
“INDESTRUCTIBILITY OF COSMOS – WHAT FATE!” announces the antagonist, 
which is also identified in the opening stanza:  
 Still 
 Shape distinct – 
 Resist 
  I 
  Automatonguts 
  Rotating appetite –  
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  Upbear against  
 Insensate systems 
 Systematical mechanism’s 
 Selferecting – annihilating  
  Cutchew immortality’s  
 Timeless digestive 
 Phallic act’s 
 Vacuity – ! (Body Sweats 171-172) 
Still a distinct shape, the speaker asserts his or her agency through form as body and 
poem come together. Resisting being but a machine with “Automatonguts” or a 
“Manikin” (173), the speaker challenges “Insensate systems” – the personification of a 
“Remorseless fate” (173) – that swallows time whole with its “Cutchew” capabilities 
while “annihilating” pleasure as such, or, in the Baroness’ words, “Phallic act’s / Vacuity 
– !” As the poem continues, it describes how fate forces one to “Live soulless” (173) 
while trapped in a “Mortalitycast” (173). Fighting against the “Indestructibility of 
cosmos” (173), the speaker taunts fate by claiming it is powerless in the face of his or her 
pride; the poem ends with this exclamatory challenge:  
I 
 Taunt 
 Thy 
 Teeth 
 Into – 
 Slashing  
 Me – 
 Ghoulpit – 
 Impotence 
 To  
 Shred 
 Pride: 
 
 Eternityshit! (173) 
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A coup, a slap in the face: eternity is shit. The idea that nothing ever ends is false. Paired 
with feces in a portmanteau, the speaker debases the idea of eternity and suggests that 
things like fate and the indestructible cosmos are not without fault. The clean cosmos – 
the “world or universe as an ordered and harmonious system” (OED) – is a utopian 
fantasy because there is and will be waste. There is an eternity of shit, hyperbolically 
speaking. Through the Baroness’ creative portmanteau, moreover, we encounter a dirty 
world full of entanglements like the very form of the portmanteau itself, which is an 
untidy hybrid that transgresses linguistic convention. Instead of an orderly cosmos, an 
unsullied world, the Baroness’ poem presents a messy constitution made of things like 
automatonguts, bloodthrobs, soulpants, and spiritembryos (171-172), a poem that points 
to the “kakosmos,” the soil of dirty modernism.   
 “What is a cosmos?” (“Which protocol” n.p.), asks Bruno Latour. “As we know 
from the Greek and from the word cosmetic it means a beautiful arrangement, the 
opposite of which being a kakosmos, a horrible shamble” (n.p.). Or, as he puts its 
elsewhere, a kakosmos is “a horrible and disgusting mess” (“Compositionist Manifesto” 
481). Elucidating this, Jeffery Jerome Cohen writes that “Latour coined the ‘dirty’ term 
kakosmos to describe the tangled, fecund, and irregular pluriverse humans inhabit along 
with lively and agency-filled objects, materials and forces” (xxiii). Indeed, as Jed Rasula 
reminds us, “chaos has always been with us, intrinsic to cosmos if not cosmology (words 
about the world)” (43). This dirty, disorderly way of thinking about and being in the 
world is not only what the Baroness and her writing bear out. It also captures the core of 
American modernism.  
In this thesis, I have shown how modernism is full of messy, gross, creepy, lively, 
rotten, stinky, driving, icky, gooey, slick, hairy, scuzzy, and yucky things and forms, 
which exhibit the tension and entanglement of nature and culture. Despite this 
proliferating list of things and forms, I have only skimmed the surface of a trashy, oily, 
furry, sticky, and sexy modernism. We can and should continue to unclean modernism 
and explore the tensions and entanglements of nature and culture by, as a first step, 
looking at dirty ecological objects. Indeed, dirt is much more fundamental than we could 
have ever imagined. Noting how anything that is real can be regarded as an object, 
Graham Harman argues that there are objects “withdrawn absolutely from all relation” 
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(Guerilla Metaphysics 76). As I see it, that which withdraws is that which cannot be 
cleaned up. At the level of ontology, there is dirt and dirtiness, that which is always 
uncleaning. All things can be and often are dirty. Cleanliness cannot compete with messy 
worlds. Whether it is dirty modernism’s dumpster diving, petropoetics, inanimals, or 
stickiness, we can and should keep digging for ecological objects because dirtiness is all 
around, and there is much to learn from it. To borrow from Williams, it is  
as if the earth under our feet  
were 
an excrement of some sky 
 
and we degraded prisoners  
destined  
to hunger until we eat filth [.] (1: 218)  
 
 
Coda: Plastic Futures  
 
 
In 1970, well after modernism is usually thought to have ended, Allen Ginsberg 
sings the swan song of poetry in “Friday the Thirteenth.” Asking, “What can Poetry do” 
(547) in the wake of worldly crises, Ginsberg gives us a blunt answer: “poetry obsolete” 
(548). We are but “Slaves of Plastic!” (548), he bemoans. Here, the poet personifies 
plastic and presents it as master of the twentieth century. Indeed, by 1960, the annual 
production of plastic in America exceeded six billion pounds (Meikle 1-2). With things 
like appliance housings, artificial Christmas trees, Barbie dolls, Bic pens, garbage pails, 
laundry baskets, Saran Wrap, Styrofoam egg cartons, Tupperware, and vinyl floors,5 
Ginsberg not only observed how the “postwar generation grew up with plastic” (1), but 
also witnessed the fulfillment of Roland Barthes’ prophecy that “the whole world can be 
plasticized” (99).  
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Though put to use in the production of consumer goods, plastic also plays a part 
in the creation of art. Noting how the “new plastics made one, above all, modern” (608), 
Judith Brown considers “cellophane as the objective (and material) correlative to many of 
the aims of modernism” (610). Crisp, smooth, hygienic, superficial, impersonal, and a 
pure form, cellophane is a metaphor for some of modernism’s formal ideals (609-611). 
While Brown offers a strong reading of cellophane in the production of Gertrude Stein’s 
Four Saints in Three Acts, when we look closely at this work, she only scratches the 
surface of how other types and forms of plastic manifest themselves in modernism. To 
borrow from Carl Rakosi, what else can we find in the “city wrapped in cellophane” (20) 
that is modernism? How can we think about “the plastic parts of poems” (197), as 
Wallace Stevens put it? That is, if plastic is “less a thing than the trace of movement” 
(Barthes 97), then what about the poetics of plasticity in modernism, one that considers 
the materiality of mutability, change, exchange, morphing, metamorphosis, and 
transformation in and around object matter?  
Indeed, dirty modernism’s plastic futures surge forward. Take, for instance, 
William Carlos Williams’ brown, celluloid, tortoiseshell eyeglasses (1: 205); Hope 
Mirrlees’ “Scentless,” “Icy,” and “Plastic” roses (8); Edna St. Vincent Millay’s metaphor 
that, “nothingness is plastic” (492); Muriel Rukeyser’s suggestion to “pour plastic down / 
men’s throats” (474); William Faulkner’s description of Southern California as “the 
plastic asshole of the world” (qtd. in Baldwin 35); and even Ezra Pound’s friend and 
twenty-five year correspondent Kit-Kat, or Kitasono Katue, whose “plastic poetry” 
consisted of photographs of everyday objects (Solt, Shredding the Tapestry of Meaning, 
275; “The Hooking of Distant Antennae” 119).6 These lyrical references to plastic in 
modernism raise the question of plastic poetics. 
Picking up on this in a different context, Christian Bök notes how the “invention 
of plastic has given birth to a celluloid spectacle” (93). He suggests that the unified 
imagination of the Romantics has been displaced by an “injection-moulded mentality” 
that is “pliable and durable as any blob of polypropylene” (93), or polymer used in 
moulded plastics (OED). Like the Romanian modernist writer Lucian Blaga’s “plastic 
metaphor” bringing plasticity and language together,7 Bök asks, “[h]as not the act of 
writing simply become another chemically engineered experience, in which we 
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manufacture a complex polymer by stringing together syllables instead of molecules?” 
(93). While Bök’s remarks are directed to contemporary thought and aesthetics, his point 
still stands for a much needed analysis of modernism. As Brown points out, “[w]e’ve 
lost, in the intervening decades, the ability to read the early-century semiotics of plastics” 
(606). In this regard, we can consider how plastic is less fixity and more flux and look at 
the repetition and difference in Stein, the sound poetry of the Baroness, and the linguistic 
hybrids in Abraham Lincoln Gillespie, say. We could even consider F. Scott Fitzgerald’s 
poem, “A Slave to Modern Improvements” from 1914 as an early form of plastic surgery, 
where the speaker’s father is a physician who wants to become a celebrity by replacing 
his son’s “parts with junk” like a silver chest, crystal eye, platinum lung, aluminum 
fingers, asbestos toes, and trash (7-8). 
This is just the beginning of dirty modernism’s plastics. The longevity of 
mermaid’s tears reminds us about the ubiquity of plastic and its poetics. The term 
“mermaid’s tears” refers to plastic waste subjected to photodegradation, which affects 
petroleum-based products. Here, the sun breaks down plastic into fragments that end up 
in the ocean for long periods of time. Mermaid’s tears are also chemical pollutants that 
function like sponges for insoluble, toxic chemicals like DDT, ones that enter into and 
negatively affect feeding chains (Guins 490-491). This is dirt, “matter out of place.” Like 
plastic, dirt does not just go away. 
Today, we are living in the “Plastic Age.”8 From the bottom of the ocean to the 
top of the ivory tower, plastic is everywhere, and it is as invasive as ever.9 In this regard, 
Myung Mi Kim offers a contemporary poetic diagnosis when she writes, “tons millions 
plastic skin fused” (12). It is, however, unlikely that the vindicated Ginsberg could have 
ever anticipated the discovery of Frankenstein’s monster, “plastiglomerate.” 
Plastiglomerate is a hybrid of melted plastic, beach sediment, basaltic lava fragments, and 
organic debris, which marks the Anthropocene (Corcoran et al. 4).10 This is surely one of 
my ecological objects, as it registers the entanglement of nature and culture. Indeed, 
plastic has a history that dates back to 1869 when the American mechanic John Wesley 
Hyatt introduced celluloid (Meikle 5).11 Following celluloid, many different types of 
plastic were produced throughout the twentieth century, which included Bakelite, nylon, 
and cellophane (Brown 610).12 Often, these innovations were presented as pristine and 
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sanitary in advertisements: “‘Dust, dirt and the germs on inquisitive hands are kept out 
by…Cellophane’” (Fenichell 114-115). Within the wasteland of modernity, plastics were 
pure, but also impure, unnatural, a “disgraced material” (98), as Barthes puts it.13 “Plastic 
is wholly swallowed up in the fact of being used” (99), writes Barthes, but “the quick-
change artistry of plastic” (97) gestures to something glamourous, too.  
By looking back to modernist poetics and its plasticity, we can be more attuned to 
how its aesthetic innovations and ecological sensibilities anticipated its plastic futures. 
The concept of dirty modernism, in this sense, enables us to grasp the complexities of 
these plastic futures, as the very stuff of waste on which culture is made. This is but one 
possible direction for ecocritics to take that connects dirty modernism with another 
epochal shift: the crises of postmodernism. With a new nature in mind, one made up of 
ecological objects, it is time to consider, if not reconsider, a range of things, like the 
permutations of plastic, the unrecyclability of radioactive waste, or any other “new thing 
under the Sun” (710), as Ginsberg writes in “Plutonian Ode.”  
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1 For a discussion of the context of “The Modest Woman,” see Gammel’s Baroness Elsa,  
252-253, which explains how the poem is a response to James Joyce’s controversial 
chapter “Nausicaa” from Ulysses (1922). 
2 As Julia Kristeva notes in The Powers of Horror: an Essay on Abjection (1982), our 
relationship with the abject, by its very definition, is precarious and oppositional; she 
writes, “being opposed to I” (1), “what is abject […] the jettisoned object, is radically 
excluded and draws me toward the place where meaning collapses” (2). 
3 In “The Baroness in little magazine history,” Tanya Clement notes how the Baroness’ 
“Purgatory Lilt” “uses America as a trope for a hopeful future” (n.p.; N.B. Jacket 2). 
4 Dated around this time, Gammel notes how “[t]here are at least four English variants of 
this poem titled ‘Constitution’, ‘Immortality’, ‘Hellcast’, and ‘Hell Pride’” (Body Sweats 
367-368). 
5 I have adapted this litany of plastic objects from Jeffrey L. Meikle’s American Plastic: 
a Cultural History (1995), 1-2. 
6 For a discussion of Katue’s plastic poetry, see Solt’s Shredding the Tapestry of Meaning 
(1999), 267-291. 
7 In The Metaphysics of Religion (2006), Michael S. Jones elucidates Blaga’s notion of 
the plastic metaphor; he explains that the “[p]lastic metaphor attempts to side-step the 
limitation of human language in referring to empirical objects. Plastic metaphors do not 
add to the understanding of the objects to which they refer. They attempt to complete the 
expression of some empirical fact that the speaker is unable to completely express, but 
substituting a second term in place of the first, transferring the meaning of the second 
onto the first and thereby completing the expression” (177). For more information on the 
plastic metaphor, see Jones, 177 ff. 
8 For a discussion of the shift from “Machine Age” to “Plastic Age,” see Meikle 63-64. 
9 See Raiford Guins’ “Mermaid’s Tears” and Catherine Malabou’s work on plasticity. 
10 The Anthropocene is, as Morton succinctly explains, “a geological time marked by the 
decisive human ‘terraforming’ of Earth as such” (Hyperobjects 4). For more information 
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on this, see the defining article by Paul Crutzen and E. Stoermer entitled, “The 
Anthropocene.” 
11 Explaining celluloid, Meikle writes that it “came from a doughy mixture of nitrated 
cellulose (obtained from pulped paper or cotton) and camphor (from the bark of the 
Formosan camphor tree). Pressed into blocks under heart and pressure, it was sliced into 
thin sections and then, after being partially resoftened by heat, was cut, stamped, pressed, 
or molded into inexpensive goods” (5). Typically, celluloid “imitated the layering of 
ivory, the mottling of tortoiseshell, the hard translucency of amber and semiprecious 
gems, the weave of stitching of linen, [and] the veining of marble” (2). 
12 “Plastic became a household material during the years between the world wars” (63), 
notes Meikle, who goes on to record its proliferation throughout the twentieth century (1-
2; 63-64). 
13 In Mythologies, Barthes compares plastic with rubber and metal: “In the hierarchy of 
the major poetic substances, [plastic] figures as a disgraced material, lost between the 
effusiveness of rubber and the flat hardness of metal; it embodies none of the genuine 
produce of the mineral world: foam, fibres, strata. It is a ‘shaped’ substance: whatever its 
final state, plastic keeps a flocculent appearance, something opaque, creamy and curdled, 
something powerless ever to achieve the triumphant smoothness of Nature” (98). 
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